Murray is looking at re-opening the DKIM working group, chartering it
to work on replay mitigation.

To that end, I've knocked out a draft charter, which I passed by
Murray (he was sitting next to me when I wrote it): he thinks it looks
good.  I'm posting it here for comment before Murray puts it into the
datatracker to start the chartering process.

To be clear: the plan is to re-open the DKIM working group with this
new charter -- not to come up with a new name for a brand-new working
group.  And we will keep using this list, ietf-dkim@ietf.org, for
discussion.

Barry

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DKIM Working Group Charter

Domain Keys Identified Mail (DKIM, RFC 6376) defines a mechanism for
using a digital signature to associate a domain identity with an email
message in a secure way – a process that has become known as “email
authentication” – and to assure receiving domains that the message has
not been altered since the signature was created.  Receiving systems
can use this information as part of their message-handling decision.
This can help reduce spam, phishing, and other unwanted or malicious
email.

The DKIM-Signature header field can include an “x=” tag that defines
an expiration timestamp for the signature, and that tag was intended
to reduce the opportunity to obtain a signed spam message and then
“replay” it by simply re-introducing it to the e-mail flow.  But
legitimate delays involved in email submission, transmission, and
delivery prevent sufficiently short expiration periods to effectively
prevent such DKIM replay attacks, and other mechanisms are needed.

The DKIM working group is being restarted to work on this problem.
The working group will produce one or more specifications of
replay-prevention or replay-mitigation mechanisms.  It is expected
that the working group will settle on a single Standards-Track
mechanism, and that is the preferred path, but it might decide that
differing proposals need Experimental trials first.  Because of DKIM’s
broad deployment, compatibility with existing deployments will be a
critical factor, and it is unlikely that proposals that lack
compatibility will proceed to publication.

Unrelated changes to DKIM are out of scope for this effort.

Current proposals include the following drafts:
 - draft-bradshaw-envelope-validation-extension-dkim
 - draft-chuang-replay-resistant-arc
 - draft-gondwana-email-mailpath
 - draft-kucherawy-dkim-anti-replay

The working group will start by considering those proposals; other
proposals remain welcome.
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