On 12/11/22 12:20 PM, Murray S. Kucherawy wrote:
Pop culture references aside, I don't follow this. If I send a piece
of spam from this account to another, it will be signed by Gmail
(assuming their filters pass it). Then from that other account I can
spray it to as many recipients as I want so long as the only thing I
change is the envelope. The signature remains intact, and its
delivery to those domains checking such things will be predicated on
the validity of that signature. I haven't "lost" my email address; I
can repeat this attack as many times as I want. And I (via Gmail) have
a globally good reputation. This is the concern that I understand is
being discussed.
Re: stripping signatures, all the attacker needs to do is either send it
to a service that doesn't strip signatures or use their own MTA.
Trivially avoidable, and a Maginot Line of epic narrowness.
As for resolution: the first obvious one is to not send spam in the
first place. That is the root of the problem. The second is that Bcc's
can be treated with more suspicion. Neither of these needs the working
group to do anything.
Mike
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