Hello John,
Il 2026-10-05 19:08 John R Levine ha scritto:
That reminds me, are we including RSA keys? The argument against was
that ed25519 keys are better in every way,
argument for was that there are a lot of published RSA keys people
might want to keep using.
On the RSA question, a measurement rather than an argument. One mailbox
on my server, 61815 DKIM-Signature headers, delivery years 2024 to date.
Continuation lines were unfolded before the a= tag was extracted. The
tag was matched only at a tag boundary, so base64 ending in “a=” is not
counted. These are signatures as received, including those added by
intermediaries on the path.
What follows is a statistic and not a fact about the Internet. It is one
mailbox and another one would give different figures. What makes it
worth reporting is that nothing in the mechanism behind these numbers is
specific to my site. The senders are the ordinary mix of personal
correspondence, commercial mail and mailing lists that reaches any small
operator. The signing software is theirs and not mine. I would expect
the orders of magnitude to hold elsewhere and I would be glad to see a
sample where they do not.
year sigs ed25519-sha256 rsa-sha1 rsa-sha256
2024 21107 1 0.005% 1497 7.092% 19609 92.903%
2025 19356 0 0.000% 531 2.743% 18825 97.257%
2026 21352 39 0.183% 76 0.356% 21237 99.461%
ALL 61815 40 0.065% 2104 3.404% 59671 96.532%
Two transitions of the same age are visible here, moving in opposite
directions.
rsa-sha1 is going away. It is down from 7.1% to 0.36% in two years.
Looking at the signing domains, most of that decline is one large
retailer that stopped during 2025, and the remainder is the turnover of
short-lived domains of the kind associated with bulk unsolicited mail.
It reads as a long tail in exhaustion rather than as a prohibition being
defied.
ed25519-sha256 has been available since RFC 8463 in September 2018. In
2026 it is 0.183% of the signatures arriving here, which is about half
the share of the algorithm that has been a MUST NOT since January 2018.
All 39 of those signatures come from seven domains and every one of them
is a mail software project or the personal domain of someone who writes
mail software, several of whom post on this list. None is a provider or
an ESP.
That last point carries a selection effect I should state plainly: I
receive ed25519 because I correspond with the people who implement it,
which is also why the count jumps between 2025 and 2026. The effect does
not weaken the observation. After eight years, the only ed25519 reaching
one ordinary mailbox is the working group’s own mail.
I offer no conclusion on whether RSA should stay. The quantity I would
keep in view is the one above. The observed time for a new DKIM
signature algorithm to become visible at all outside the implementer
community is longer than the interval we are planning across for a
post-quantum algorithm.
Regards
Vittorio Moccia
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