Hi!

On 7/28/26 17:38, John Levine wrote:
It appears that Wei Chuang<[email protected]> said:

[...]

I also looked around DNSOPS for PQC advice.  I found that they seem to be
actively working
<https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dnsop/Yr6A91U5gbjZ_L6NkMj8mbgTeQE/>
on rules for handling greylisting algorithms on short notice via
draft-huque-dnsop-multi-alg-rules
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-huque-dnsop-multi-alg-rules/>.  We
likely need a similar discussion for DKIM2 on how to gracefully handle
greylisting of the classical RSA/Ed25519 signature.
As I said in DNSOP, I think this is a bad idea becauase I don't think that
a typical DNS operator (or mail operator) knows enough about cryptography
to use such a feature sensibly.

If you think a signing algorithm is broken, just stop signing with it.
I think that DKIM signatures are likely to be pretty far down the list
of things attacked with PQ computers since they're short lived and the
stuff they sign is usually low value. If I want to phish people, there
are a lot cheaper ways than using a quantum computer to make a fake
DKIM signature.

My impression is also that

a) I'm not sure how likely it is in the first place for quantum attacks to become practical at all

b) Even if they do so, I'd guess they'll stay very expensive for yet more time

c) I'd agree with you that DKIM keys won't be extra high on the priority list of those operating such machines.

However, I'd like to add something:

"[...] DKIM signatures [...] short lived [...]"

I think this might miss the point a little. As far as I understand, the potential quantum attacks would probably be against the keys. So the effort isn't proportional to the number of signatures one would like to fake, but only to the number of keys involved.

So so for sites with long-lived DKIM keys (much mail traffic with the same key), the effort/costs would be amortized over a much larger number of mails (or faked mails) than for sites with short-lived DKIM keys.

So a partial mitigation of potential quantum attacks even without employing PQ algorithms would be rotating keys daily (removing old keys from DNS after 14 days). Then a potential quantum attacker would get even less value for the effort/costs.

Re the "AND" thing, if we really think that's important, we can add
a double signing algorithm where the keys and signatures are the
two individual ones concatenated.  No need to add more complication
to the spec.

After my mail suggesting such a combined algorithm, I read some rationales against them too (in favor of using one of the PQ algorithms "purely"). But then this would still leave us the way to decide to specify both a "pure" PQ algorithm, and a ed25519+PQ (concatenation based) algorithm.

A bit orthogonal to that is the discussion we're still having elsewhere how to go on with the current spec ambiguities about multiple signature entries.

But regardless which direction, I'd not like algorithm specific special rules like "in this combination it's AND, otherwise it's OR".

[...]
Key rotation in DKIM1 doesn't work in practice, mostly because you have
to have separate selectors for different algorithms which means double
signing, which risks losing mail in badly designed receivers that
penalize signatures they can't verify.  I think we fixed this in DKIM2.
IMO not completely.
Also, the DNS crowd puts a lot of emphasis on keeping responses small.
While ed25519 is smaller than RSA, it's not enough smaller that it
would make any different in mail handling.

I'm not sure about this.

IIRC an ED25519 key is 256 or 257 bits, i.e. 43 base64 characters.

A 2048 bit RSA key is those 2048 bits plus a bit for the 17 bit exponent. That is 345 base64 characters, i.e. already needs (at least) two at-most-255-char "entries" in the TXT record.

But I've seen elsewhere in the discussion that it might be reasonable that even an ML-DSA-44 key would still be at least bearable with 1750 base64 characters.

Hannah.

--
Hannah Stern

Software Developer
Mail Transfer Development

1&1 Mail & Media Development & Technology GmbH |  |   |
Phone: +49 721 91374-4519
E-Mail:[email protected] | Web:www.mail-and-media.com www.gmx.net www.web.de www.mail.com www.united-internet-media.de
Hauptsitz Montabaur, Amtsgericht Montabaur, HRB 5452

Geschäftsführer: Alexander Charles, Dr. Michael Hagenau, Thomas Ludwig, Dr. 
Verena Patzelt


Member of United Internet

Diese E-Mail kann vertrauliche und/oder gesetzlich geschützte Informationen 
enthalten. Wenn Sie nicht der bestimmungsgemäße Adressat sind oder diese E-Mail 
irrtümlich erhalten haben, unterrichten Sie bitte den Absender und vernichten 
Sie diese E-Mail. Anderen als dem bestimmungsgemäßen Adressaten ist untersagt, 
diese E-Mail zu speichern, weiterzuleiten oder ihren Inhalt auf welche Weise 
auch immer zu verwenden.

This e-mail may contain confidential and/or privileged information. If you are 
not the intended recipient of this e-mail, you are hereby notified that saving, 
distribution or use of the content of this e-mail in any way is prohibited. If 
you have received this e-mail in error, please notify the sender and delete the 
e-mail.
_______________________________________________
Ietf-dkim mailing list -- [email protected]
To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]

Reply via email to