It appears that Wei Chuang  <[email protected]> said:
>...  I agree that we shouldn't underestimate the difficulties of
>introducing a new algorithm, as we saw with the friction of getting DKIM
>operators to adopt Ed25519.  I've recently heard one reason was library
>compatibility issues. 

I don't think that's it.  Everyone figured out how to handle RSA signatures,
and the spec we wrote for Ed25519 was clear enough that nobody I know had
significant trouble implementing it.

As I said:

>> Key rotation in DKIM1 doesn't work in practice, mostly because you have
>> to have separate selectors for different algorithms which means double
>> signing, which risks losing mail in badly designed receivers that
>> penalize signatures they can't verify.  I think we fixed this in DKIM2 ...

 ... by allowing multiple signatures in each header.  They have to be ORed
or algorithm rotation isn't going to work.  I don't think an AND option
makes sense unless you can explain to me what is the correct thing to do
with a signature with two signatures, one of which you can verify and passes,
and the other you don't understand at all and can't even try to verify.

R's,
John
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