On Mon, Oct 19, 2026 at 04:49:37PM +0100, Richard Clayton wrote:
> >1. What is signed. Section 3.4 of -07 says the algorithm "computes a hash
> >over
> >all the Message-Instance and DKIM2-Signature fields as described in Section
> >12.8
> >using SHA-512 [FIPS-180-4] as the hash-alg.
>
> I think it's pretty clear we should use either the LAMPs composite
> (where the hash is fed into ed25519 and the ML-DSA-44 gets fed the raw
> data)
I all this discussion I see no substantive motivation for introducing
composite signature algorithms. What realistic threat are they really
intended to address?
- If there's not a CrQC in the next decade, classical algorithms
are quite sufficient for now.
- If there is a CrQC in that timeframe, the classical component of
the composite algorithm is needless baggage.
- If a pure PQ algorithm is selected and the choice later turns out
broken, the same goes for its composites. Selectors for broken
algorithms can be easily removed from the DNS by the sender,
and a classical algorithm used instead if there is as yet no
known CrQC (cost-effectively available to the attackers, ...).
If CrQCs are readily available to the attackers, and fallback
to a classical algorithm (with sufficiently frequent key rotation)
is unexpectedly not an option, then a new PQ algorithm is needed,
and composites don't help.
Also DKIM signatures do not need to meet a high bar of cryptographic
robustness. The DNS lookups to obtain said keys are typically not
protected, and signature forgery just needs to be noticeably more
expensive than various non-cryptographic attacks (look-alike domains,
fresh free email accounts at the major too big to block providers, ...).
So the simplest choice is just ML-DSA-44 (pure) and one or two classical
alternatives, say either or both of RSA (with a 2048–3072 bit modulus)
and ed25519.
Dragging composite signatures into DKIM makes no sense.
--
Viktor. 🇺🇦 Слава Україні!
_______________________________________________
Ietf-dkim mailing list -- [email protected]
To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]