On Fri, Oct 23, 2026 at 09:37:06PM +0200, Steffen Nurpmeso wrote:
> |So the simplest choice is just ML-DSA-44 (pure) and one or two classical
> |alternatives, say either or both of RSA (with a 2048–3072 bit modulus)
> |and ed25519.
>
> The problem with that is that the public key is so large that DNS
> over UDP is no longer possible *per se*.
This is not an argument in favour composites, which are (slightly)
larger still. And TCP is not optional in DNS. There's already at least
one domain with algorithm 18 (ML-DSA-44) DNSSEC keys. Its DNSKEY RRset
(including an ML-DSA-44 KSK, ZSK and RRSIG) arrives over TCP:
;; Query time: 1395 msec
;; SERVER: 127.0.0.1#53(127.0.0.1) (TCP)
;; WHEN: Sat Oct 24 03:46:45 UTC 2026
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 6546
> Other algorithms (will) exist (standardized) that fit all the
> bills, in a not too distant future --- anyway soon enough before
> any thinkable (afaik) introduction time of CrQCs.
The more compact PQ signature schemes will take some time to land in
libraries. ML-DSA-44 is
> |Dragging composite signatures into DKIM makes no sense.
>
> It does for my/the alternative DKIM/ACDC approach. (Though not
> as "composite" but as a "stack" of two different algorithms.)
It seems you're even more strongly against composites than I am, that
you don't even support a pure PQ signature scheme at this time is a
separate matter. Let's at least not drag in composites.
--
Viktor. 🇺🇦 Слава Україні!
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