One other point here, is that we should try at least one interop experiment with the PQC algorithm, whether it's composite mldsa44-ed25519-sha512 or mldsa44-sha512. This choice should be discussed at the interim Wednesday. -Wei
On Sat, Oct 17, 2026 at 11:21 PM Wei Chuang <[email protected]> wrote: > > > On Thu, Oct 15, 2026 at 6:09 AM Hannah Stern <hannah.stern= > [email protected]> wrote: > >> Hi! >> On 7/28/26 17:38, John Levine wrote: >> >> It appears that Wei Chuang <[email protected]> <[email protected]> said: >> >> [...] >> >> >> I also looked around DNSOPS for PQC advice. I found that they seem to be >> actively >> working<https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dnsop/Yr6A91U5gbjZ_L6NkMj8mbgTeQE/> >> <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dnsop/Yr6A91U5gbjZ_L6NkMj8mbgTeQE/> >> on rules for handling greylisting algorithms on short notice via >> draft-huque-dnsop-multi-alg-rules<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-huque-dnsop-multi-alg-rules/> >> <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-huque-dnsop-multi-alg-rules/>. We >> likely need a similar discussion for DKIM2 on how to gracefully handle >> greylisting of the classical RSA/Ed25519 signature. >> >> As I said in DNSOP, I think this is a bad idea becauase I don't think that >> a typical DNS operator (or mail operator) knows enough about cryptography >> to use such a feature sensibly. >> >> If you think a signing algorithm is broken, just stop signing with it. >> I think that DKIM signatures are likely to be pretty far down the list >> of things attacked with PQ computers since they're short lived and the >> stuff they sign is usually low value. If I want to phish people, there >> are a lot cheaper ways than using a quantum computer to make a fake >> DKIM signature. >> >> I've become convinced that John's argument here offers the right > perspective on finding a suitable PQC algorithm. In > draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2-dns-01 > <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2-dns/01/> we > introduced the composite PQC algorithm mldsa44-ed25519-sha512; however, > I'm worried that the downsides outweigh the security improvements it > brings. I agree that we shouldn't underestimate the difficulties of > introducing a new algorithm, as we saw with the friction of getting DKIM > operators to adopt Ed25519. I've recently heard one reason was library > compatibility issues. See draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2-dns-01 > <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2-dns/01/> appendix > A for a description of the RSA key format errata which I'm sure caused > DKIM1 early adopters trouble. Without native support in the popular crypto > libraries (OpenSsl, BouncyCastle, BoringSsl, Tink to name a few) for > mldsa44-ed25519-sha512, email operators will have to implement their own > composite implementation, introducing interoperability and security risks. > Keep in mind that the long term goal for DKIM2 is to make these algorithms > mandatory to implement as noted in Section 3.3 in that draft. > > I agree with John that stopping signing with a vulnerable algorithm is a > reasonable solution. If breakage of classical signature algorithms is > imminent because of a Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer (CRQC), > I suspect that there will be warnings with rumors and research papers > thrown about. Also as John points out, email won't be the first target of > actors with access to CRQCs. What's more important is creating an > ecosystem with the agility to pivot if there is a warning. As noted above, > the draft calls for an eventual mandatory implementation timeline in > Section 3.3 which hopefully will help. On the other hand, if that > mandatory-to-implement requirement is too onerous, it becomes a barrier to > deploying DKIM2. Thus I think we should start with three algorithms: RSA, > Ed25519, and ML-DSA-44 as they all have native support in the major crypto > libraries. > >> My impression is also that >> >> a) I'm not sure how likely it is in the first place for quantum attacks >> to become practical at all >> >> b) Even if they do so, I'd guess they'll stay very expensive for yet more >> time >> >> c) I'd agree with you that DKIM keys won't be extra high on the priority >> list of those operating such machines. >> > +1 > >> However, I'd like to add something: >> >> "[...] DKIM signatures [...] short lived [...]" >> >> I think this might miss the point a little. As far as I understand, the >> potential quantum attacks would probably be against the keys. So the effort >> isn't proportional to the number of signatures one would like to fake, but >> only to the number of keys involved. >> >> So so for sites with long-lived DKIM keys (much mail traffic with the >> same key), the effort/costs would be amortized over a much larger number of >> mails (or faked mails) than for sites with short-lived DKIM keys. >> >> So a partial mitigation of potential quantum attacks even without >> employing PQ algorithms would be rotating keys daily (removing old keys >> from DNS after 14 days). Then a potential quantum attacker would get even >> less value for the effort/costs. >> >> Re the "AND" thing, if we really think that's important, we can add >> a double signing algorithm where the keys and signatures are the >> two individual ones concatenated. No need to add more complication >> to the spec. >> >> After my mail suggesting such a combined algorithm, I read some >> rationales against them too (in favor of using one of the PQ algorithms >> "purely"). But then this would still leave us the way to decide to specify >> both a "pure" PQ algorithm, and a ed25519+PQ (concatenation based) >> algorithm. >> >> A bit orthogonal to that is the discussion we're still having elsewhere >> how to go on with the current spec ambiguities about multiple signature >> entries. >> >> But regardless which direction, I'd not like algorithm specific special >> rules like "in this combination it's AND, otherwise it's OR". >> > Currently multiple signatures for a given DKIM2-signature header field are > supposed to be evaluated with an "OR". Removing vulnerable signatures on > warning is one approach. Another approach could be to have a signature tag > that toggles the "OR" evaluation to "AND" which is more flexible but more > complex. Both approaches allow the signer to evaluate the effects of > deploying new algorithms. > -Wei > >> [...] >> >> Key rotation in DKIM1 doesn't work in practice, mostly because you have >> to have separate selectors for different algorithms which means double >> signing, which risks losing mail in badly designed receivers that >> penalize signatures they can't verify. I think we fixed this in DKIM2. >> >> IMO not completely. >> >> Also, the DNS crowd puts a lot of emphasis on keeping responses small. >> While ed25519 is smaller than RSA, it's not enough smaller that it >> would make any different in mail handling. >> >> I'm not sure about this. >> >> IIRC an ED25519 key is 256 or 257 bits, i.e. 43 base64 characters. >> >> A 2048 bit RSA key is those 2048 bits plus a bit for the 17 bit exponent. >> That is 345 base64 characters, i.e. already needs (at least) two >> at-most-255-char "entries" in the TXT record. >> >> But I've seen elsewhere in the discussion that it might be reasonable >> that even an ML-DSA-44 key would still be at least bearable with 1750 >> base64 characters. >> >> Hannah. >> >> -- >> Hannah Stern >> >> Software Developer >> Mail Transfer Development >> >> 1&1 Mail & Media Development & Technology GmbH | | | >> Phone: +49 721 91374-4519 <+49%20721%20913744519> >> E-Mail: [email protected] | Web: www.mail-and-media.com www.gmx.net >> www.web.de www.mail.com www.united-internet-media.de >> >> Hauptsitz Montabaur, Amtsgericht Montabaur, HRB 5452 >> >> Geschäftsführer: Alexander Charles, Dr. Michael Hagenau, Thomas Ludwig, Dr. >> Verena Patzelt >> >> >> Member of United Internet >> >> Diese E-Mail kann vertrauliche und/oder gesetzlich geschützte Informationen >> enthalten. 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