Hello.
The question asked more than once in this thread has no AND or OR
answer, because two states are being treated as one.
A verifier unable to check a signature.
The hop is judged on the signatures the verifier can check and the
unchecked one is recorded, counting neither way. This is what lets a new
algorithm be introduced without a flag day, and it needs neither OR
semantics nor a requirement that every verifier implement every
algorithm on the day of publication.
An invalid signature alongside a valid one, both of them checkable.
This is not an admissible outcome. The signature that verifies
establishes that the content is intact, since every signature at the hop
covers the same content, so the failure of the other is damage confined
to that signature. A defect and an attack are indistinguishable from the
message, so an exemption written for defects is available to an attacker
on the same terms.
The OR argument optimises deliverability during bring-up, which is a
property of the deployment stage and not of the algorithm pair. A flag
leaves that choice with the signer, which is the party being checked. A
sender under deliverability pressure will set it to the permissive value
and leave it there.
One narrower point, on treating two signatures of the same algorithm as
valid when one passes and the other returns TEMPERROR. A TEMPERROR
covers a failed DNS lookup, so it is remotely inducible. Two signatures
of one algorithm differ only in the key they use, so an attacker able to
prevent resolution of one selector removes the stronger key from the
decision while the verdict stays valid. A transient condition has an
answer of its own, which is to defer the message with a temporary
failure so that the sender retries. That costs an attacker a delay and
gains him nothing.
Regards,
Vittorio Moccia
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