Thanks Mauro. As I recall the main direction <https://meetecho-player.ietf.org/playout/?session=IETF-DKIM-20261021-2000> seems to be supporting multiple signatures for handling the composite structure. How that would be done wasn't resolved. I suspect this will all come back for another round of discussion at IETF-127. -Wei
On Thu, Oct 22, 2026 at 10:46 AM Mauro De Gennaro <mauro= [email protected]> wrote: > Hi Wei, > > Yes, I'm okay with that. If the group decides to go with > mldsa44-ed25519-sha512, documenting the processing in an Internet-Draft > makes sense. > > Unfortunately I wasn't able to join the interim meeting, but I'll catch up > with the emails on the list now. > > > Best, > Mauro > > On 21 Oct 2026, at 06:46, Wei Chuang <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Many thanks for implementing and describing the processing Mauro. If > after the interim, the WG wants to pursue mldsa44-ed25519-sha512, and > you're okay with it, I propose this example gets documented as an > Internet-Draft, so that there is common documentation to follow. Plus it > can be further security reviewed, and can exactly specify the key format. > Thanks again. > -Wei > > On Mon, Oct 19, 2026 at 7:41 AM Mauro De Gennaro <mauro= > [email protected]> wrote: > >> >> >> > One other point here, is that we should try at least one interop >> experiment with the PQC algorithm, whether it's composite >> mldsa44-ed25519-sha512 or mldsa44-sha512. This choice should be discussed >> at the interim Wednesday. >> > -Wei >> >> >> Some implementation experience that may help before Wednesday's interim: >> >> I have implemented mldsa44-ed25519-sha512 in mail-auth, the Rust library >> behind Stalwart's DKIM2 support, as part of updating it to >> draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2-spec-07. It is available for interop testing in the >> mail-auth playground at https://mail-auth.stalw.art, where you can >> generate keys, sign and verify messages with rsa-sha256, ed25519-sha256 and >> mldsa44-ed25519-sha512. I am happy to share keys and test messages with >> anyone who wants to try it against their own implementation. >> >> On the "implementing your own crypto" concern: I did not have to >> implement any primitive myself. ML-DSA-44 and Ed25519 come from AWS-LC >> (and, in a second backend, from the RustCrypto ml-dsa and ed25519-dalek >> crates). The composite part from draft-ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs is only >> the construction of M' (a fixed prefix, the label, the context length and >> context, and the SHA-512 pre-hash) plus splitting and concatenating keys >> and signatures. Both backends pass the test vectors in Appendix E of the >> LAMPS draft. The one library feature it needs is pure ML-DSA with a >> caller-supplied context string, since the LAMPS label is used as the ML-DSA >> context. AWS-LC supports that in its C API, although the aws-lc-rs wrapper >> does not expose it yet, so I call AWS-LC directly for that step. OpenSSL >> has the same building blocks: it has no composite algorithm as such, but >> OpenSSL 3.6 signs and verifies pure ML-DSA-44 with a caller-supplied >> context string (for example "openssl pkeyutl -sign -rawin -p >> keyopt context-string:COMPSIG-MLDSA44-Ed25519-SHA512"), so the composite >> can be built on it in the same way. Performance is not a concern either: on >> my machine a composite signature takes about 46 microseconds to sign and 30 >> microseconds to verify with AWS-LC, against about 18 microseconds for an >> Ed25519 verification. >> >> While implementing it I found some points the current texts leave open. I >> think they need answers whichever PQ algorithm the group picks, because >> most of them apply to a plain mldsa44-sha512 as well. >> >> 1. What is signed. Section 3.4 of -07 says the algorithm "computes a hash >> over all the Message-Instance and DKIM2-Signature fields as described in >> Section 12.8 using SHA-512 [FIPS-180-4] as the hash-alg. It signs the hash >> with both the "post-quantum" MLDSA-44 algorithm [FIPS-204] and the >> PureEdDSA variant Ed25519 (see [RFC8032])." That mirrors Section 3.3 and >> does not cite LAMPS; only dns-01 says the algorithm "is specified in" the >> LAMPS draft, and lists it as an informative reference. I can see three >> readings that do not interoperate: >> >> a. The LAMPS composite, where its message M is the Section 12.8 >> signing input, and the SHA-512 in Section 3.4 is the LAMPS pre-hash >> computed outside the signer (LAMPS Section 10.5, External Pre-hashing). The >> input is hashed once. >> >> b. The LAMPS composite, where M is the SHA-512 digest of the Section >> 12.8 input, by analogy with Section 3.3. M' then contains >> SHA-512(SHA-512(input)). >> >> c. No LAMPS combiner: plain ML-DSA-44 and Ed25519 each sign the digest >> and the two values are concatenated. >> >> I implemented (a), which matches Richard's pointer to the LAMPS draft >> and avoids hashing twice. It is also the "pre-hashed input model" from >> Wei's threat model statement, which LAMPS explicitly allows. For a plain >> mldsa44-sha512 the equivalent question is whether pure ML-DSA signs the >> SHA-512 digest (as Ed25519 does in Section 3.3) or whether HashML-DSA is >> meant. Either way, a sentence stating exactly what bytes are passed to the >> signature primitive would remove the ambiguity. >> >> 2. Context string. Neither draft specifies an application context, so for >> the composite the LAMPS default (empty) applies, and that is what I use. >> Plain ML-DSA also takes a context string. Should DKIM2 define one (for >> example "DKIM2") for domain separation, or is empty deliberate? >> >> 3. Key encoding. I publish the raw composite public key in p=, that is >> the 1312-byte ML-DSA-44 public key followed by the 32-byte Ed25519 public >> key, not a SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure, which is how I read dns-01 >> together with LAMPS Sections 4.1 and 5. Given the RSA format errata in >> dns-01 Appendix A, it would help to say explicitly whether SPKI is allowed >> for the new key types. >> >> If the interim decides to go with plain ML-DSA-44 instead, adding it on >> my side is a small change, and I will add it to the playground as well so >> there is something to interop against. >> >> >> Best, >> Mauro >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Ietf-dkim mailing list -- [email protected] >> To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected] >> > > _______________________________________________ > Ietf-dkim mailing list -- [email protected] > To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected] >
_______________________________________________ Ietf-dkim mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
