On Sun, 25 Oct 2026, Wei Chuang wrote:
FWIW I agree, but there still needs to be a way to express composites for
those senders who want to be extra cautious about PQC.
If those senders exist, I think it is up to them to show up and tell us
why they want it. I haven't seen any, but perhaps people at M3AAWG this
week can ask around. I don't think it's a good use of our time to add
needless complication without at least some evidence of demand for it, and
explain why they don't think they can switch to non-broken algorithms if
the time comes when that's advisable.
We can look at the TLS WG to see those arguments. IMO we should find the least
complicated
way to cover their use case rather than claiming the composite proponents'
arguments are wrong.
TLS algorithms are used in S/MIME which has long lasting signatures and
encryption. DKIM is neither.
I don't think the AND evaluation adds any sort of practical vulnerability
the way you are suggesting.
The vulnerability is already there if you use OR. AND adds extra
complication with only the illusion of a benefit.
R's,
John
PS: in the TLS list I'm now seeing comments like this, from people who
work at places that are going to implement it:
I agree with others that the hybrids are excessive. This is getting out
of hand. I think it's now quite clear that the "low cost" part of
hybrids as a low cost hedge against algorithm failure was false.
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