Many thanks for implementing and describing the processing Mauro.  If after
the interim, the WG wants to pursue mldsa44-ed25519-sha512, and you're okay
with it, I propose this example gets documented as an Internet-Draft, so
that there is common documentation to follow.  Plus it can be further
security reviewed, and can exactly specify the key format.  Thanks again.
-Wei

On Mon, Oct 19, 2026 at 7:41 AM Mauro De Gennaro <mauro=
[email protected]> wrote:

>
>
> > One other point here, is that we should try at least one interop
> experiment with the PQC algorithm, whether it's composite
> mldsa44-ed25519-sha512 or mldsa44-sha512.   This choice should be discussed
> at the interim Wednesday.
> > -Wei
>
>
> Some implementation experience that may help before Wednesday's interim:
>
> I have implemented mldsa44-ed25519-sha512 in mail-auth, the Rust library
> behind Stalwart's DKIM2 support, as part of updating it to
> draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2-spec-07. It is available for interop testing in the
> mail-auth playground at https://mail-auth.stalw.art, where you can
> generate keys, sign and verify messages with rsa-sha256, ed25519-sha256 and
> mldsa44-ed25519-sha512. I am happy to share keys and test messages with
> anyone who wants to try it against their own implementation.
>
> On the "implementing your own crypto" concern: I did not have to implement
> any primitive myself. ML-DSA-44 and Ed25519 come from AWS-LC (and, in a
> second backend, from the RustCrypto ml-dsa and ed25519-dalek crates). The
> composite part from draft-ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs is only the
> construction of M' (a fixed prefix, the label, the context length and
> context, and the SHA-512 pre-hash) plus splitting and concatenating keys
> and signatures. Both backends pass the test vectors in Appendix E of the
> LAMPS draft. The one library feature it needs is pure ML-DSA with a
> caller-supplied context string, since the LAMPS label is used as the ML-DSA
> context. AWS-LC supports that in its C API, although the aws-lc-rs wrapper
> does not expose it yet, so I call AWS-LC directly for that step. OpenSSL
> has the same building blocks: it has no composite algorithm as such, but
> OpenSSL 3.6 signs and verifies pure ML-DSA-44 with a caller-supplied
> context string (for example "openssl pkeyutl -sign -rawin -p
>  keyopt context-string:COMPSIG-MLDSA44-Ed25519-SHA512"), so the composite
> can be built on it in the same way. Performance is not a concern either: on
> my machine a composite signature takes about 46 microseconds to sign and 30
> microseconds to verify with AWS-LC, against about 18 microseconds for an
> Ed25519 verification.
>
> While implementing it I found some points the current texts leave open. I
> think they need answers whichever PQ algorithm the group picks, because
> most of them apply to a plain mldsa44-sha512 as well.
>
> 1. What is signed. Section 3.4 of -07 says the algorithm "computes a hash
> over all the Message-Instance and DKIM2-Signature fields as described in
> Section 12.8 using SHA-512 [FIPS-180-4] as the hash-alg. It signs the hash
> with both the "post-quantum" MLDSA-44 algorithm [FIPS-204] and the
> PureEdDSA variant Ed25519 (see [RFC8032])." That mirrors Section 3.3 and
> does not cite LAMPS; only dns-01 says the algorithm "is specified in" the
> LAMPS draft, and lists it as an informative reference. I can see three
> readings that do not interoperate:
>
>    a. The LAMPS composite, where its message M is the Section 12.8 signing
> input, and the SHA-512 in Section 3.4 is the LAMPS pre-hash computed
> outside the signer (LAMPS Section 10.5, External Pre-hashing). The input is
> hashed once.
>
>    b. The LAMPS composite, where M is the SHA-512 digest of the Section
> 12.8 input, by analogy with Section 3.3. M' then contains
> SHA-512(SHA-512(input)).
>
>    c. No LAMPS combiner: plain ML-DSA-44 and Ed25519 each sign the digest
> and the two values are concatenated.
>
>    I implemented (a), which matches Richard's pointer to the LAMPS draft
> and avoids hashing twice. It is also the "pre-hashed input model" from
> Wei's threat model statement, which LAMPS explicitly allows. For a plain
> mldsa44-sha512 the equivalent question is whether pure ML-DSA signs the
> SHA-512 digest (as Ed25519 does in Section 3.3) or whether HashML-DSA is
> meant. Either way, a sentence stating exactly what bytes are passed to the
> signature primitive would remove the ambiguity.
>
> 2. Context string. Neither draft specifies an application context, so for
> the composite the LAMPS default (empty) applies, and that is what I use.
> Plain ML-DSA also takes a context string. Should DKIM2 define one (for
> example "DKIM2") for domain separation, or is empty deliberate?
>
> 3. Key encoding. I publish the raw composite public key in p=, that is the
> 1312-byte ML-DSA-44 public key followed by the 32-byte Ed25519 public key,
> not a SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure, which is how I read dns-01 together
> with LAMPS Sections 4.1 and 5. Given the RSA format errata in dns-01
> Appendix A, it would help to say explicitly whether SPKI is allowed for the
> new key types.
>
> If the interim decides to go with plain ML-DSA-44 instead, adding it on my
> side is a small change, and I will add it to the playground as well so
> there is something to interop against.
>
>
> Best,
> Mauro
>
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