On Sun, Oct 25, 2026 at 12:26 PM Vittorio <[email protected]> wrote: > Hello Wei, > > Two observations, taking as given the point already made in this thread > that an AND flag does not deliver what it promises when the receiver has > not implemented the stronger algorithm. > > The first is that making the handling of an unimplemented algorithm a > SHOULD has an undefined effect: the same flag produces AND at a verifier > that implements every algorithm present, the OR outcome at one that does > not and whatever local policy prefers elsewhere. So the signer cannot > know what its own flag will produce. >
Apologies. I'm not following. Consider creating an example? > The second point is the result values. In RFC 8601 Section 2.7.1 > “policy” means the message was signed but some aspect of the signature > was not acceptable to the ADMD, which is not the case of a verifier that > cannot evaluate it. “softfail” is not a result of the dkim method at all > and belongs to spf. The nearest existing value is “neutral”, which > covers a signature that contained syntax errors or was “not otherwise > able to be processed”. In DKIM1 a signature in an algorithm the verifier > does not implement is not reported at all, since RFC 6376 Section 3.3.4 > says that verifiers MUST ignore such signatures. The dkim2 method as > defined in draft-gondwana-dkim2-authres-00 has pass, fail, permerror, > temperror and none, so it offers none of these and says nothing about > this case. > I'm simply trying to distinguish the local policy cases that will be defined for future feedback reports. A sender needs to know how receivers are adopting a new algorithm they sign with, and needs to be distinguished from dkim2-spec PASS and FAIL results. > Leaving things as they are does not settle the question either, because > the present text does not say one thing. Section 14.1 states that “A > Verifier MAY cease verifying once a single failure is detected”, while > Section 14.6 states that “If there is more than one signature provided > then they MUST all be checked if the Verifier is able to do so. If any > signature fails then an error SHOULD be reported.” Section 14.1 also > leaves the form of that report open, since verifiers wishing to > communicate results to other parts of the mail system “may do so in > whatever manner they see fit”. There is no defined state for the error > to be reported into. > > What is missing is one rule in the protocol for how a hop carrying > several signatures is evaluated, covering the case of a signature the > verifier is unable to evaluate. Stated once, it makes the verdict on a > hop the same at every verifier. One such rule is that a signature the > verifier cannot evaluate is, for that verifier, in the same position as > a signature that is not present, so the hop is judged on the signatures > it can check. The treatment of such a signature as absent is already > DKIM1’s, as noted above. What is new in DKIM2 is that the verdict is > reached per hop, which is why the rule has to be stated. It also has a > consequence for reporting: results that follow from a rule everyone > applies can be checked by a later verifier against what it computes > itself and counted together across receivers, while results produced > under a rule each verifier chooses can be neither checked nor added up. > > Agreed: the current text does not reflect any of this multi signature evaluation proposal, and would have to be updated. -Wei
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