On Sun, 25 Oct 2026, Wei Chuang wrote:
For interoperability, a receiver can treat an unknown algorithm signature as local policy passing i.e., with a SHOULD and Authentication-Result of "policy". If a vulnerability has been announced or for some operator defined reason, that same local policy can set the Authentication-Result to "softfail".
See Viktor's recent messages where he points out that DKIN signatures are not long lived so if you think a signing scheme is broken, stop using it. That's straightforward and doesn't require inventing new mechanisms that operators are unlikely to understand. ("I sign with RSA, ED25519, and ML-44 using AND on all three because that makes my mail extra secure!")
With your proposal, if you think a signature scheme is weak, and you add a new stronger one with AND, but the recipient hasn't upgraded to handle the strong one, the weak one passes anyway. That doesn't really help. Let's just leave things as they are and give people advice to sign only with known good algorithms.
R's, John _______________________________________________ Ietf-dkim mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
