Dear Howard, The earliest surviving example is probably in the Vigrahavyavartani, where the possibility of pramanas being proved by other pramanas is rejected because this would lead to an infinite regress. Most scholars think that Nagarjuna argues there agains the Nyaya, but I take the opponent to be an Abhidharmika. Best wishes, Eli
Sent from my iPad > On 04.06.2024, at 11:05, Howard Resnick via INDOLOGY > <[email protected]> wrote: > > Dear Scholars, > > Does the nyāya system speak about the problem of an infinite regress of > proofs? Aristotle famously identifies and then avoids this problem through > the notion of a self-evident foundation or starting point of knowledge. In > Western epistemology, this strategy is often called foundationalism. > > Is there anything at all similar or analagous in nyāya or other Indian > schools? The Caitanya-caritāmṛta several times affirms that the Veda is > ’self-evident’, svataḥ pramāṇa, but the term is not used there as a general > or secular epistemic strategy. Is the CC simply repeating a well-known > epistemic principle? > > All help will be greatly appreciated. > > Thanks! > Howard > > _______________________________________________ > INDOLOGY mailing list > [email protected] > https://list.indology.info/mailman/listinfo/indology _______________________________________________ INDOLOGY mailing list [email protected] https://list.indology.info/mailman/listinfo/indology
