> Some details:
>    
>        ..., CGA (cryptographically 
>        generated addresses) and non-CGA addresses etc..
>        
> => you should note that CGAs are covered by some IPRs.   

While I'm concerned about IPR and the IPR on CGA, I don't see
the benefit of cluttering every document and slide which contains
the string "CGA" with text about the IPR.
We seem to have been able to talk about RSA for a decade or more
without sprinkling text about IPR everywhere the string "RSA" appeared.
Is it a hard requirement from the WG that we do this?
  
>        It is recommended that the application does a getsockopt() prior
> 
> => this comes only from the uncommon style (one flag from Home,
> another one from Care-of, etc).         

Point taken. Others have commented on this as well.
  
>        The following flags are added for the ai_flags in addrinfo data
>        structure defined in Basic IPv6 Socket API Extension [2].
>    
>         AI_PREFER_SRC_HOME
>         AI_PREFER_SRC_COA
>         AI_PREFER_SRC_TMP
>         AI_PREFER_SRC_PUBLIC
>         AI_PREFER_SRC_CGA
>         AI_PREFER_SRC_NONCGA
>           
> => why _SRC_ ?

To try to make it clearer that the application can't express this type
of preferences for the destination addresses.
    
>    5. IPv4-Mapped IPv6 Addresses
>    
>       IPv4-Mapped IPv6 addresses are not supported for setting preference
>       on home, care-of-address, CGA, non-CGA, public or privacy auto-
>       configured addresses as source addresses. Because they are all pure
>       IPv6 addresses. 
>    
> => this is not true for home/care-of and this section is not useful.

Agreed.
 
>    6. Security Considerations
>    
>       It is also recommended that
>       the applications set IPV6_V6ONLY IP level socket option to permit
>       the nodes to not process IPv4 packets as IPv4 Mapped addresses.
> 
> => I disagree about the implicit argument that IPv4 Mapped IPv6
> addresses are unsafe. And BTW this has nothing to do in this document.   

Agreed.

>    7. Open Issues
>    
>       - Are there more flags we should define at this point in time?
>         For instance, PREFER_LARGEST_SCOPE?
>    
> => all "matter of taste" rules of address selection which cannot be
> controlled through the policy table should be covered here.

Do you have a list handy?

>       - Is there a need for REQUIRE flags in addition to or instead of the
>         PREFER flags?
> 
> => yes, in some cases it is very important.

Any concerns about where and when the failures due to lack of
an address satisfying the REQUIREs?

>         Note that in general it isn't possible to verify 
>         that a requirement can be satisfied until sendto() or connect()
>         (when the destination address is known) thus this would result
>         in late errors being reported to the application.
>    
> => this is not really true because an application can use a connect()
> to verify the selected source but as I am against any changes in
> application I agree with the conclusion.

I don't understand what you are suggesting to change in the document
with respect to this.
Care to elaborate?

>       - Is there a need for "validation" functions to go with these
>         preferences such as functions that check whether an address is
>         a temporary address?
>    
> => it should be useful for some applications to have access to
> status of addresses.

Ack.

  Erik


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