> > we can design protocols to tolerate transient failures; but we > > cannot design protocols that work no matter what arbitrary > > filtering the network imposes. > > I agree in principle but in practice a protocol that depends on the > random kindness of remote routers won't fly.
Obviously IP will never work then. I don't know why we've bothered with it all these years, we must have been wasting our time. I have no problem with trying to choose a signaling protocol that won't look like an attractive target to ignorant sysadmins, or with trying to pick a signalling protocol that is easy to distinguish from traffic that sysadmins will be tempted to filter. But vague assertions of the form "sysadmins will filter X" are unsupportable. If we pay them too much heed we'll end up trying to design a protocol to meet an unrealistic set of conditions, and either we'll never finish or we'll put the robustness in the wrong place. -------------------------------------------------------------------- IETF IPv6 working group mailing list [EMAIL PROTECTED] Administrative Requests: https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipv6 --------------------------------------------------------------------
