> -----Original Message----- > From: ipv6-boun...@ietf.org [mailto:ipv6-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of > Karl Auer > Sent: Thursday, June 27, 2013 5:00 PM > To: ipv6@ietf.org > Subject: Re: draft-bonica-6man-frag-deprecate > > On Fri, 2013-06-28 at 09:31 +1000, Mark Andrews wrote: > > Then add a cryptographic checksum of the original packet when > fragmenting. > > 48 bits in a HBH should be enough. > > Why HBH? Is that to prevent it being send in a fragment itself? And, > um, > I hate to suggest this, but isn't that sort of exactly what the AH > header is for? I know, I know.... (covers head, ducks)
SEAL has the *option* to insert a per-segment HMAC that the destination can use for data origin verification. Sort of like AH, but this is only one *optional* mode of operation. But that said, going back to Tony's scenario why would an adversary that is already able to get the destination to accept its packets bother with finessing the reassembly cache? Upper-layer checksums would weed out bad reassemblies, while the attacker could much more easily just inject whole packets that are evil. Thanks - Fred fred.l.temp...@boeing.com > Regards, K. > > -- > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > Karl Auer (ka...@biplane.com.au) > http://www.biplane.com.au/kauer > http://twitter.com/kauer389 > > GPG fingerprint: B862 FB15 FE96 4961 BC62 1A40 6239 1208 9865 5F9A > Old fingerprint: AE1D 4868 6420 AD9A A698 5251 1699 7B78 4EEE 6017 > > -------------------------------------------------------------------- > IETF IPv6 working group mailing list > ipv6@ietf.org > Administrative Requests: https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipv6 > -------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------- IETF IPv6 working group mailing list ipv6@ietf.org Administrative Requests: https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipv6 --------------------------------------------------------------------
