>If Yoshie wants to understand Africa, I'd advise her to read Basil
>Davidson--the author of 27 books on the continent and a radical--rather
>than James Heartfield, who writes nothing but puff pieces on LBO-Talk.
>
>Louis Proyect
_The Black Man's Burden_ was published in 1992. Has Basil Davidson
written about the recent developments in Burundi, Congo, Uganda,
Rwanda, etc.? I haven't read Davidson's article (in French) cited by
François Ngolet below: Basil Davidson, "Kabila, une chance pour
l'Afrique," _Jeune Afrique_ 14 Mai 1997 & _L'Express_ 22 May 1997.
It seems that Davidson had a rosier view of Kabila than Mark did.
***** Africa Today 47.1 (2000) 65-85
African and American Connivance in Congo-Zaire
François Ngolet
Abstract: Kabila's power takeover has been interpreted by political
analysts as orchestrated by African countries fighting rebel groups
using the Zairian territory as a basis for action. This regime
change has also been presented as a victory of the United States over
France for the control of the central African region. This article
will demonstrate that this powershift was a combination of African
countries, intervention on the ground and the action of the US
diplomacy in the international scene. The African engagement is even
stronger in the second Congolese civil war, but has not eliminated
the US influence. This influence can still be felt behind the scenes
through its strategic allies and has increased since the bombing of
the two embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.
Introduction
Kabila's arrival to power has been a source of intense intellectual
speculation. Many analysts have interpreted this event as a
demonstration of strength by African states in the post-Cold War
period (Leymarie 1997). Indeed, a coalition of African countries in
concert decided to topple one of the most corrupt and brutal
dictatorships in central Africa. This new tendency of African
leaders to resolve Africa's own problem has been widely celebrated by
political analysts and is seen as the affirmation of a "new
independence" by African nations (Askins and Collins 1997). Basil
Davidson, one of the most acclaimed analysts of African affairs saw
Kabila's power conquest as "a chance for Africa" (Davidson 1997).
Davidson's argument is that Kabila represents a symbol of what Africa
can do for itself, meaning its capacity to get its own house in order
before facing challenges in the international scene. The former
President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere came in support of this African
thesis when he confessed to French journalists that from the
beginning to the end, the transfer of power in Congo-Zaire has solely
been an African matter, and in this process westerners have been
completely powerless (Bassir 1997).
This African thesis is sharply contradicted by other observers who
see Kabila's take-over as a victory of the United States over France
(Leymarie 1998b; Braeckman 1997a; Asteris 1998). For many analysts,
the victory of the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation
of Congo-Zaire (ADFL) would not have been possible without
overwhelming American support of the rebels. French diplomats
frustrated by this American intrusion in the Congo openly accused the
US of working to dismantle the French influence in central Africa in
general (Leymarie 1998b). The contenders of this thesis argue that
the US victory was made easier because of France's defense of the
despised regime of Mobutu and its participation in slowing the
democratization process (Leymarie 1996). This opinion is backed by
American activists who have voiced their concern over seeing
"neo-colonialism made in USA" taking place in the Congo. This
neo-colonialism is seen as a culmination of a long stated ambition of
American foreign policy, whose ultimate goal is to dismantle the
monopoly of former colonial powers in Africa (IG 1997; Leymarie 1996;
Leymarie 1992; Wauthier 1994).
The objective of this article is to reconcile these two views by
illustrating that Kabila's victory in 1997 was not solely an African
enterprise nor only the result of an American-orchestrated policy,
but a combination of both. The military presence on the ground of
neighboring Congolese states and the efficiency of the American
diplomacy on the international scene worked well together to topple
23 years of Mobutu regime. But even though African heads of state
and the United States agreed on the objective, the two parties seemed
to have been following different interests in the Congo. By fighting
the Mobutu regime, Rwanda, Uganda, and Angola were simply attempting
to stabilize their borders by denying opposition groups in these
countries the use of the Congo to destabilize their respective
regimes. On the other hand, the US supported the rebellion to extend
its influence in central Africa, to exploit natural resources,
filling the Congolese soil while containing Islamic fundamentalism in
east Africa (Willame 1998). But this strengthening of both the
African and American presence in the Congo is forcing former colonial
powers to withdraw from their zones of influence and allowing the
redesigning of a new geopolitical map in which African and American
interests will be predominant.
Rising African Forces
The growing influence of African countries in this post-Cold War
period clearly appeared during the events following the genocide of
the Tutsi in Rwanda and the subsequent settlement of Hutu refugees in
eastern Congo. This migration set the stage for profound political
changes in the Congo and the Great Lakes region in general. Indeed,
the Hutu refugees settling in different camps in the Kivu region were
accompanied by thousands of Hutu soldiers and militia Interahamwe,
who were preparing to reconquer power in Kigali (Braeckman 1996a;
Braeckman 1996b). These armed groups, animated by a strong
anti-Tutsi sentiment, began attacking the Congolese-Tutsi, and even
succeeded in expelling thousands of them from the Masisi area
(Braeckman 1996a). This action of the Hutu militia nonetheless
encountered unexpected resistance from the Tutsi established in the
Ruzizi plain and the higher region of the Mulenge hills. They are
the Tutsi known as Banyamulenge (people of Mulenge), and they have a
settlement also extending through Uvira, Mwenga and the Fizi Baraka
mountains (Nzongola-Ntalaja 1996). For most of this century, these
Tutsi lived side by side, in peace and harmony with local populations
like the Bembe, Fulero, Nyindu, Rega, Rundi, Shi, and Hunde. It was
not until the Mulele rebellion in Kivu in 1964 that the Banyamulenge
found themselves in opposition to other local people. The Muletists,
espousing a communist philosophy in which property, land and cattle
were to be shared among local people, drew support from other ethnic
groups. The Banyamulenge, however, did not share their neighbors'
enthusiasm for these goals and helped the Congolese national army
crush the movement in South Kivu. This episode instilled a deep and
lingering resentment against the Banyamulenge within other ethnic
groups in the area, a resentment which continues today
(Nzongola-Ntalaja 1996; Mbokolo 1997).
The refugee crisis in eastern Congo exacerbated these tensions
because local Bantu populations became identifiable with the Hutu
cause and the Bantu applauded the action of the Hutu militia against
local Tutsi in the Congo. The Banyamulenge decided to arm in
defense. It is at this stage of the crisis that Congo's neighbors
became involved in its internal matters. Paul Kagame armed and
trained the Banyamulenge, continuing a relationship already
established with the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) during the civil
war in Rwanda. Like all Tutsi communities in Africa, Europe, the
United States and Canada, the Banyamulenge-Tutsi raised funds for the
RPF cause and sent some of their young people to take part in the
struggle as fighters (Nzongola-Ntalaja 1996; Prunier 1995). The
irony is that when these Congolese-Tutsi fought with the RPF against
the Rwandan national army, the Zairian government was supporting the
Habyarimana regime both politically and militarily. This face-off
between the Banyamulenge-Tutsi and their own government raised
questions about their loyalty to Zaire. For many patriots in Zaire,
this type of behavior meant that, for the most part, the Banyarwanda
(both Hutu and Tutsi) used their Zairian citizenship for purely
political ends or pecuniary advantage, while their heart and loyalty
were dedicated to Rwanda. These feelings were understandable, but do
not justify the xenophobic campaign against all the Tutsi
(Nzongola-Ntalaja 1996). The Banyamulenge rebelled against the
Mobutu government and rejected the hatred they were facing in eastern
Congo.
They decided to start a war against the Zairian national army (FAZ),
and were quickly joined by several non-Tutsi groups of rebels who
have waged a low-scale war for years and at the time a sporadic
campaign of armed struggle against Mobutu (Nzongola-Ntalaja 1996).
All these opposition forces were regrouped under the label Alliance
of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL). The
alliance initially regrouped four parties: The Parti de la Révolution
Populaire (PRP) of Laurent-Désiré Kabila, the Conseil de la
Résistance pour la Démocratie (CRD) led by Kisasse Ngandu, the
Mouvement Révolutionnaire pour la Libération du Zaire led by Masasu
Ningaba (MRLZ) and the Alliance Démocratique des Peuples (ADP) of
Déogratias Bugera, a Tutsi of Masisi (Braeckman 1996b; Human Rights
Watch 1997). Laurent-Désiré Kabila was nominated head of the
Alliance because of his long and persistent opposition to Mobutu.
The formation of this alliance was accompanied by the increasing
involvement of Rwanda in this struggle against Mobutu, and this
intervention can be explained by the fact that the Tutsi-dominated
government in Kigali armed the Congolese-Tutsi to dismantle the camps
in eastern Congo. The African involvement gained momentum with the
military assistance of Uganda to the ADFL because Yuweri Museveni who
is himself a Hima (Tutsi of Uganda) was sympathetic to the Tutsi
cause in the Great Lakes and mainly because he wanted to deny the
Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), and
West Bank Nile Front (WBNF) the use of the Zairian territory as rear
posts for the destabilization of Uganda (Reyntjens 1998; Arseneault
1998; Mazrui 1998; Prunier 1998a; 1998b). For the same reasons,
Burundi decided to help the Tutsi rebels because the Tutsi-led
government in Bujumbura saw the presence of the Hutu militia in north
Kivu as a potential source of assistance to the Hutu rebels of the
National Council for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD) and its armed
wing, the Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD), which had been
using the Congolese territory to launch attacks against the Tutsi
regime (Braeckman 1995; 1996b). The Angolan support of the ADFL
during the second half of the war can be explained by the same
preoccupations because for a long time the UNITA (Uniao Nacional Para
a Independencia Total de Angola) forces have been using the Congolese
territory since the beginning of the civil war in Angola. As a
payback to the Mobutu regime, thousands of "ex-gendarmes Katangais"
(descendants of Mobutu opponents exiled in Angola) joined Kabila's
troops (Braeckman 1997b), while Zambia, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, and, to a
lesser extent, South Africa, and Namibia ensured the ADFL with their
diplomatic assistance (Reyntjens 1998).
With this tremendous support, the ADFL began its military campaign
against Mobutu's forces in October 1996. The ADFL military success
surprised everyone, by occupying the main cities in the Kivu region
such as Uvira, Goma, Bukavu and Walika. These military victories
forced thousands of Hutu refugees to return to Rwanda or to migrate
further west in the Congo. The observers, thinking that it was a war
led to "clean" the camps, were surprised when the rebels announced
that they were going to conquer Kinshasa (Braeckman 1997b; Leymarie
1997). This conquest was made possible by the fact that many of
these Banyamulenge benefited from extraordinary training received
when fighting with the RPF in Rwanda since 1990, and also because
Mobutu's soldiers, unpaid for months and using old equipment, were
poorly led and demoralized. So the training, determination, and
discipline of the rebels made the difference when confronted with
Mobutu's regime, weakened by corruption and seven years of democratic
protests. After destroying the refugee camps, the rebels marched
towards Kisangani. Rather than using the Congo River to reach
Kinshasa, the rebels moved south and occupied Mbuji-Mayi, and from
this city, the ADFL troops advanced towards Lubumbashi, the country's
second largest city. At this point of the conquest, the rebels
controlled the richest regions of the country (Braeckman 1997a).
But the rebel's military victories were tarnished with information
from humanitarian organizations and the United Nations reporting the
massacre of Hutu refugees (Pomfret 1997; Garreton 1997). According
to these organizations, the rebels were not only attacking Hutu
militia and soldiers, they were also killing unarmed civilians.
These allegations did not stop the ADFL rebels from advancing to
Kengue where they encountered strong resistance from Mobutu's army
aided by the UNITA rebels of Savimbi. The conquest of Kengue opened
the gate of Kinshasa, which the ADFL occupied without fighting in May
1997. Laurent-Désiré Kabila proclaimed himself President and changed
the country's name to the Democratic Republic of Congo (Braeckman
1997a).
The takeover by this man in the Congo marked a turning point in the
country's history and revealed Africa's geostrategical importance.
Commenting on this power shift, the French journalist Philippe
Leymarie had this to say:
History will retain that, for the first time since the end of the
Cold War, a crisis of a magnitude such as the civil war in
Congo-Zaire was resolved by African people themselves (Leymarie
1998a).
It is a crisis solved by a new generation of African leaders, such as
Yoweri Museveni in Uganda and Paul Kagame in Rwanda. This generation
of leaders is also well represented by Meles Zenawi in Ethiopia,
Isaias Afwerki in Eritrea, and Thabo Mbeki in South Africa.
Hegemonic conflicts oppose some of them (Eritrea and Ethiopia, and
now Uganda and Rwanda), but they nonetheless represent a new
leadership style in post-Cold War Africa. The majority of these "new
leaders" (Ottaway 1999) took power through armed struggle against
corrupt regimes and foreign occupation. They have a sense of
management, and usually combine liberal economics and a one-party
system (Leymarie 1998a). These leaders reject the division of Africa
on linguistic and ideological zones inherited from the colonial rule,
and all work towards the revival of Africa and its integration into
the global economy (Ottaway 1999). Kabila's rise to power can be
seen as a continuation of this political trend and the growing
determination of Africa to deal with its own problems (Ottaway 1998).
The US Re-Engagement
But this African role in the geopolitical scene does not have to
overshadow America's renewed interest in the Congo since the collapse
of the Soviet Union. Indeed, because of its rich potential in
natural resources and its strategic location, Congo-Zaire has
captured the attention of Washington. After abandoning the corrupted
and ailing Mobutu, the US became involved in Kabila's rebellion from
the very beginning. Even though the ADFL forces were led by Rwandan
and Ugandan officers, the US ties with Kabila were striking. These
links were evident when an American diplomat, Dennis Hankins, the
political official in Kinshasa, went to the rebel headquarters in
Goma. Hankins's visit was followed by the US ambassador in Kigali,
Peter Whaley, who frequently visited Kabila in Goma, at a moment when
the rebels' strategy moved from a regional insurgency to the drive to
overthrow Mobutu (IG 1997). These diplomats were not operating on
their own account. In his interview in the Washington Post in July
1997, Paul Kagame not only admitted that Rwandan military officers
led the ADFL, but also revealed that he informed Washington about the
military campaign in the eastern Congo. In August of 1996, the
Rwandan leader even traveled to New York and Washington to highlight
his plans to the Clinton administration (IG 1997).
The American influence was also noticeable in the rebels' military
strategy. Indeed, their conquest of the Congo seemed to have been
inspired by the Eisenhower tactic during World War II, consisting of
occupying key economic zones in Germany before moving towards Berlin.
The rebels first seized the gold mining areas in the northeast, the
diamond center of Mbuji-Mayi and the copper capital of Lubumbashi
before advancing to Kinshasa. This military influence is not
surprising, because the organizer of this insurrection, Paul Kagame,
was trained at the US army's command and general staff College at
Fort Leavenworth in Kansas. At that time (1990), he was still head
of military intelligence for the Ugandan army and soon became leader
of the RPF during its successful campaign to overthrow the Hutu
regime in Kigali. This American military influence continued at the
time of the civil war in Rwanda, during which Kagame and his Tutsi
exiles enjoyed the tactical and active support of the US government
(IG 1997).
The US diplomatic and military presence was accompanied by the
establishment of economic ties with the rebels. Indeed, as soon as
the ADFL forces took Kinsangani, North American mining companies
rushed to pay court to Kabila. One of those companies was
Canadian-owned Tenke Mining Corp, which in May 1997 won a contract of
$50 million to exploit the world's largest copper and cobalt deposits
(The Wall Street Journal 1997b). Another major company was America's
Mineral Fields (AMF), which signed a contract of $1 billion with the
ADFL. These two mining companies began supplying millions of dollars
to the ADFL war effort along with planes and ferries for the
transportation of Kabila's troops (L'Express 1997). When the
fighting was still going on east of Kinshasa, Kabila's minister of
finance, Mawampanga Mwana, held a seminar for 30 businessmen at a
hotel in Lubumbashi. In attendance were Goldman Sachs, the First
Bank of Boston, Morgan Grenfell and other fund managers from North
America (The Wall Street Journal 1997a). Mawampanga Mwana is himself
trained in the US, but he is not the only one. There is also Mwenze
Kongolo, a lawyer who graduated from Temple University and worked for
the Philadelphia district attorney (The Philadelphia Inquirer 1997).
As one can see, the US was not only providing diplomatic support but
also became financially involved with the ADFL rebels.
This American engagement in the Congo is not isolated. It is simply
another manifestation of the growing US interest in the African
continent as a whole, an interest that has gained momentum since the
fall of the Berlin Wall. But this US engagement in Africa places
this country in confrontation with former colonial powers such as
France. In Congo-Brazzaville for example, President Pascal Lissouba
signed a $150 million deal with Occidental Petroleum (Oxy) from Los
Angeles in 1992. Oxy was given a part of the oil production
including the largest oil field of Nkossa. This oil deal profoundly
irritated the French company Elf Aquitaine which had the monopoly of
oil exploitation in the Congo. Negotiations between Congo and Elf
restarted. Finally Oxy's contract was nullified allowing Elf to
regain control of the oil exploitation in the country (Clark 1997;
1998b). The clash between the US and French interests also occurred
in Gabon, where a riot took place in 1990 forcing Elf-Gabon to
suspend oil production in Port-Gentil. President Omar Bongo, who saw
Elf's action as a declaration of hostility to his regime, ordered Elf
Gabon to restart the exploitation or the French would lose their
monopoly in the Anglo-Dutch Shell benefit. The same economic
conflicts occurred in Chad. Indeed, important oil fields have been
discovered in Boda in the south. The contract signed in the 1970s by
President Tombalbaye gave the exploitation to the American company
CONOCO, and negotiations carried out later led to the transfer of the
deal to Shell-Esso. Idriss Deby who took power with the help of
French secret services decided to give 20% of the oil deal to Elf
Aquitaine (Wauthier 1994).
These economic conflicts between France and the US also had
significant political repercussions, which give a far better
understanding to the US involvement in Congo-Zaire. Indeed, France
tried in 1990 to rebuild the declining Mobutu regime, in order to
counter Yoweri Museveni of Uganda seen as an American ally in the
Great Lakes region. Uganda has indeed been used by Washington to
provide weapons to the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) led
by John Garang, whose movement is fighting an Islamic regime in
Karthoum. Uganda and Washington have helped the RPF win the civil
war in Rwanda and this victory is seen as an extension of the US
influence in central Africa (Wauthier 1994). The victory of the ADFL
in the Congo came to achieve the complete eviction of France from the
Great Lakes region.
Now to further settle its influence in the region and strengthen its
engagement in the rest of Africa, the US is taking a series of
important initiatives towards this continent marked by the passage on
January 27, 1998, of the African Growth and Opportunity Act, which
states the reduction or suppression trade tariff of 1800 African
products entering the US market (Nwangu 1998; Mouradian 1995). This
act threatens the "Lomé Convention," which was signed in 1975
allowing former colonial powers to finance developmental programs, in
the form of aid to the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries
(ACP), open up 95% of ACP products to the European market, and allow
Europe to receive low-priced natural resources from the ACP. But for
the past 20 years this convention has not permitted an economic and
social takeoff of ACP nations, and this convention is not likely to
be renewed at the end of the twentieth century (Mouradian 1995). The
passage of this act was received with enthusiasm by American policy
makers as a much more realistic project than the Lomé Convention and
opened up the vast African market to US products. Commenting on the
passage of this act, Susan Rice said: "Africa is a huge market
insufficiently exploited of 700 million people, in expansion, with
enormous unexploited resources and opportunities for job creation"
(Africa Report 1998). Clearly, the ambition of the US is to
contribute to the integration of Africa in the world market. Prior
to the passage of this trade act, Washington launched the African
Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) to deal with the resolution of
conflicts in Africa. This military initiative will benefit from the
US army financial support and logistical training (Associated Press
1998; Leymarie 1996; Corey 1998). Travelling in Africa to convince
African leaders to support this military proposition, Warren
Christopher clearly stated that: "The time has passed when Africa was
divided in zones of influence, when foreign powers could consider
African countries their exclusive zones of influence" (Leymarie
1998b). To further reinforce its presence, the US is providing
military assistance to the ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone and is
also providing financial aid to the Organization of African Unity
(OAU). As a way of strongly expressing America's ambition to the
continent, President Clinton made a 12 day tour of 6 African
countries (South Africa, Uganda, Botswana, Ghana, Senegal and Rwanda)
in 1998. The countries were chosen for their economic growth (except
Rwanda) and strategic interests (Corey 1998). The US influence is
also conveyed through high profile regional events such as the
African/African-American summits organized by the Reverend Leon
Sullivan as a vehicle for strengthening cultural relations between
Africans and African-Americans. These summits, which have been held
in a variety of African cities (Abidjan, 1991; Libreville, 1993;
Dakar, 1995; and Harare, 1997), have become powerful forum for
encouraging trade and investments between Africa and the US
(Schraeder 1998). It is in the light of this economic and diplomatic
offensive that the US engagement in the Congo should be understood.
This engagement is simply a confirmation of the US ambition in Africa
since the end of the Cold War.... ******
Since the article is very long, I only reproduce the first couple of
sections here. The full article is available at
<http://www.press.jhu.edu/journals/africa_today/v047/47.1ngolet.html>.
Yoshie
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