Eleanor, maybe you can help shed some light on this "lack of awareness." How do you think developers should be analyzing risk here? Do you have specific suggestions and/or can you point to sources where that information can be found?
On Tue, Sep 30, 2014 at 2:48 PM, Eleanor Saitta <e...@dymaxion.org> wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA256 > > On 2014.09.30 18.01, Jonathan Wilkes wrote: > > Hi Eleanor, I understand the logic of the argument, but are there > > news stories about people being harmed in the field due > > specifically (or mainly) to deniability of the software they are > > using? (Or research on the topic, though I'm not sure how it could > > be a falsifiable or reproducible.) > > I don't have any field stories that I have permission to share, but > yes, I've heard of specific incidents. More generally, it represents > an utter lack of awareness on the part of developers for the security > risk analysis choices faced by individuals actually at risk. > > E. > > - -- > Ideas are my favorite toys. > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > > iF4EAREIAAYFAlQrJRoACgkQQwkE2RkM0wohJQD/crteV0ZMLmZe5cbuNUgYrw45 > FZYX657kGhcl0sYmfQMA/2YD3SBHWyqThFjWuF8xuhAh7BkQwEo3ouNchdAbBtml > =2qRF > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > -- > Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable on Google. Violations > of list guidelines will get you moderated: > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. > Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at > compa...@stanford.edu. > >
-- Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable on Google. Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu.
