At 15:11 15/09/99 +1000, you wrote:
>The plot sickens ...
But Rob, do you really imagine that there can be any political situation,
let alone a crisis , that does not team with numerous contradictions and
different class interests?
>Wiranto has apparently given notice that he may resign after army day
>(October 5) and join the presidential race (to be concluded in November).
>He will, of course, keep his job as Minister for Defence. A lot of
>Indonesians are for it if the west doesn't shore up the Habibie/Megawati
>'transition' options here and now by accepting their invitations to go in,
>save some lives, make the idea of a truly civilian presidency look
>credible, and take the initiative from the uniforms. Of course, now that
>Wiranto has gone for it, he may feel moved to shore himself up by
>presenting a foreign (especially decisively white) intervention as an
>assault on Indonesian sovereignty - which would split the population,
>'necessitate' nationwide martial control, and kick up some useful
>belligerent fear and loathing.
>
>But that's all so much wind, I think. Things are turning out just as our
>betters had it in mind for them to turn out ...
>
>Cheers,
>Rob.
What is this about our betters? It is most unlikely that events in Timor
and Indonesia could at one go, reverse the overall balance of forces in the
world. However nor should we be fatalistic. US imperialism is operating at
the limits of its ability and has problems to deal with, as do other
reactionary and oppressive elements.
The interesting scenario you paint is where Wiranto may step forward as a
representative of the military/national bourgeoisie. He too is an amiguous
character with dialectically opposed aspects. If he were to win there would
still be much to play for.
The bigger scenario in the archipelago as a whole is that while it may be
right to press for some sort of intervention, that should be as little as
possible intervention in the interests of US hegemonism. The more it is of
that character the more it is likely to stir up the national bourgeoisie of
Indonesia and to risk the democratic gains of the revolutionary upheavals
against Suharto with the reimposition of a regime which suppresses
democratic rights. That is why the economic pressure from the World Bank
and IMF should have been combined with a development plan which the
progressive national and democratic forces of both Timor and Indonesia
could have had an interest in shaping.
Instead of being fatalistic we have to struggle
a) to think globally, and then
b) not to think like the transnational bourgeoisie.
But the more blunders the latter makes the more it will arouse the
opposition of millions. One outcome of this could be Indonesia joining
Malaysia is a strongly anti-IMF world stance.
Chris Burford
London
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