Ralph Dumain
. . Briefly: (1) Seed, imaginary numbers as negation of negation: stated and argued in this manner: these examples are empty verbiage. ^^^^^ CB: As stated here, this assertion is unsupported,i.e. it itself is empty verbiage. ^^^^ Engels was indeed in pursuit of something much ore serious, but along the way he dropped a number of ill-thought-out examples in his _unpublished_ writing, which was later taken as gospel. ^^^^^^ CB: Claim that Engels' example of imaginary numbers is "taken as gospel" is strawman argument. Important thing here is _I_ don't take it as "gospel" but an interesting suggestion from a teacher of dialectics. You haven't demonstrated, that I see, that it is ill-thought out. You just make an unsupported assertion. Yes, I think the unpublished aspect is important to consider. A big reason why it is not "gospel". It's like an email discussion with Engels on the list. ^^^^^^ (2) Confirmation of dialectical laws (or of formal logic): there is a basic conflation between natural law and logical law. Engels seems to have finessed the distinction, and the garbling was never corrected, though there have been attempts to do so (cf. Richard Norman). ^^^^^^ CB: Where exactly does Engels do this ? ^^^^^ Formal logical laws make no direct assertions about ontological matters such as stasis, motion, change, etc. The real issue is the relationship of logic to ontology. These problems arise in the fusion of logic with ontology, as occurs historically with interpretations of both formal and dialectical logic. But if logic is conceived as a mode of valid and consistent inference of statements one from another, and not as a direct set of assertions about being, then the relationship between conceptions of logic and ontology can evolve into a more mature analysis. If it turns out that we cannot adequately formulate a system of assertions about being without eliminating the contradictory relationships between categories, then dialectical logic has something to do. But physical processes have nothing to do with dialectical laws per se; rather, dialectical laws, if such exist, are logical abstractions describing the categorial relationships of concepts (which in turn reference empirical realities) one to another. ^^^^^^ CB: This seems worth thinking over. ^^^^^^^ (3) Confirmation of dialectical laws/processes: the historical problem with diamat rhetoric is the positing of correlations of abstract categorial statements (which cannot deduce empirical matters, as we should know since Hume and Kant) with specific empirical contents (scientific theories & examples of natural phenomena). To wit, your examples: ^^^^^^^^ CB: Problem is you assert that there is a "problem" but you don't make an argument supporting your assertion. Pronoucements are not rebuttals. Are you saying there is never a step of correlating abstract categorical statements with specific empirical contents ? If so, your claim here seems invalid. ^^^^^^^ >CB: I don't recall if I said it here, but his formulation "there is only >matter and its mode of existence is motion" seems a quite exact forumuation >of the philosophical-physics issue that was addressed experimentally by >Michelson and Morley in discovering no absolute rest/ether and used >theoretically by Einstein in the relativity of all motion ( no absolute >rest). Change is absolute. Rest is relative. It's quite a remarkable >philosophical anticipation of the events in actual physics. > >Also, the way Engels emphasizes in _The Dialectic of Nature_ the >transformations of one form of matter into another makes me think about E = >MC squared which is a formula for the transformation of mass into energy and >vica versa. I haven't thought this one through as much, but there might be >something there. Note that general ontological statements about matter, motion, energy, etc. lack the specificity to be translated into special relativity or any other scientific theory. ^^^^^^ CB: Note: this is another baldface assertion with no supporting argumentation. When you argue with someone, it is not a valid method to rely on authoritative assertion with you as the "authority". ^^^^^^^ There is no substance here to the argument that Engels anticipates relativity. A better developed argument would look for more substantive remarks by Engels and show that the world-picture delineated therein has some substantive relationship to the conceptual reorganization mandated by revolutionary developments in scientific theories. ^^^^^ CB: You may have missed it. That there is no absolute rest, no ether, is an underlying empirical premise of Einstein's theory of Special Relativity. Engels formulation "there is only matter and motion is it mode of existence" is pretty much identical with the physical empirical discovery that there is no absolute rest. ^^^^^^^^ You may be right about heuristics, but in context of this discussion, I would again bring up Gerald Holton's notion of themata. ^^^^^^ CB: I'll look for notion of themata At 11:17 AM 5/24/2005 -0400, Charles Brown wrote: >Ralph Dumain > >Any of these in turn: false, trivial, elementary. > >^^^^ >CB: Taking these in turn gives a kind of silly result. False is the opposite >of elementary, elementary meaning a basic _truth_. Trivial means true too. > >^^^^^ > >The silliest examples >are those which make little sense: the seed is the negation of the >negation; > >^^^^^ >CB: The seed ? Do you mean the flower is the negation of the negation of the >seed ? Make little sense ? Makes perfect sense. You start out with some >_thing_ a seed, and you end up with it gone, negated. But clearly something >_else_ now existing came out of something that no longer exists. And there >is the stage of the plant inbetween the seed and the flower, so there is a >place for "double negation". > >This is such a lovely and , yes, elementary, natural, fundamental example, I >can't imagine why any dialectician would want to discard it. > >^^^^ > >imaginary numbers are the negation of the negation. > >^^^^^ >CB: Again, elementary. As math goes through defining its basic sets of >numbers, it's not hard to conceive of the category imaginary numbers as some >"double not" of the previously established sets. Natural, whole, integers, >rational, irrational, real, imaginary. Irrationals are _not_ expressible as >the ratio of two integers. Imaginaries are _not_ something or other. > >^^^^^ > There are >better examples which never get beyond the elementary: water -> steam = >quantitative -> qualitative change. I'm not bothered by this, though Sartre >has an interesting counter-argument in his 1946 essay "Materialism and >Revolution." The problem is, what use is it to prove the truth of a >dialectical law by means of such isolated examples? There has to be some >overall systematic way in which an analysis makes a difference to adopt a >dialectical conception. Most of these examples taken from natural phenomena >are either logically flawed or fairly trivial or both. Hence >"silly". > >^^^^^^ >CB: I'd read Engels' "laws" as sort of heuristics. Maybe this is the way to >bring in Stephen Gould's idea of heuristic. The examples don't "prove" the >"law". They are examples of the expression of the law. > >Take formal logic. If I give an example illustrating modus ponens, it >doesn't prove modus ponens. But we wouldn't call the illustration silly. > >On the other hand, we don't really prove the first principles of formal >logic or mathematics, do we ? They are assumed. Axioms or the first laws of >math or logic are not proven. They are asserted, a priori. > >Plus, I think the principle of dialectics is exactly anti-universal, >anti-"overall systematic way". Change is absolute. Rest is relative. The >only "overall systematic" is "no permanent overall systematic". > >^^^^^^^ > >A more productive approach would be to criticize the logical structure of an >interlocking system of concepts as being an inadequate characterization of a >complex whole. But this has nothing to do with putting some real world >event in one-to-one correspondence with some dialectical law. > >The second consideration is the type of phenomenon under >investigation. Engels' unfortunate formulation of a unified system of >dialectical laws governing nature, society, and thought obscures the issues >and vitiates whatever virtues can be found in his version of emergent >materialism, which was historically important in delineating qualitative >distinctions that would show how historical materialism--the analysis of >social organization and its development--functioned as opposed to the >confused logical structure of the vulgar biologism and ersatz evolutionism >that ran rampant in the second half of the 19th century. Biologism and >evolution became master metaphors at that time as mechanics had become >earlier, and thus the formation of a proper unified scientific perspective >as biology was added to the scientific revolutions in physics and chemistry, >and social theory/science (beyond political economy) was in its >embryonic stages. > >A pure dialectic of nature sans society and mind (which is where emergent >materialism becomes most crucial and remains so) may serve some function, as >a counter to mystification and philosophical confusion, but the generic >issues involved are not so easily formulated in concrete terms, and the >non-sociological (i.e. theological, metaphysical, epistemological) >mystifications matter in a more general world-view sense. For example, the >late 19th century saw a more unified picture of forms of energy (though I >can't recall whether electromagnetism and kinetic energy fit into a >consistent unified system at the time--I've lost the relevant brain cells), >a unity which Engels for reasons I don't recall felt the need to >address. And this was before the crisis in physics that led to the >revolutionary developments of the 20th century kicked in, though a >questioning of basic concepts was afoot. In what sense can we say that >Engels latched onto the key philosophical dilemmas embedded in the physical >world picture? What mystifications did he address and what conceptual >developments did he anticipate (that involve only physics and chemistry--for >the purpose of argument)? > >^^^^ >CB: I don't recall if I said it here, but his formulation "there is only >matter and its mode of existence is motion" seems a quite exact forumuation >of the philosophical-physics issue that was addressed experimentally by >Michelson and Morley in discovering no absolute rest/ether and used >theoretically by Einstein in the relativity of all motion ( no absolute >rest). Change is absolute. Rest is relative. It's quite a remarkable >philosophical anticipation of the events in actual physics. > >Also, the way Engels emphasizes in _The Dialectic of Nature_ the >transformations of one form of matter into another makes me think about E = >MC squared which is a formula for the transformation of mass into energy and >vica versa. I haven't thought this one through as much, but there might be >something there. > >^^^ > >Let's fast-forward to Lenin's MATERIALISM AND EMPIRIO-CRITICISM. Lenin >attacks the mystifications surrounding of recent philosophies of science and >the nascent mystifications of brand-new developments. He claims that a >conceptual revolution is under way that will radically change our picture of >the physical world and understanding of its basic elements and their >interrelations. These conceptual difficulties show that a dialectical world >picture of the physical world must emerge. In a vague, generic sense his >prediction was correct--the interconvertibility of mass and energy, the >intimate relation of space and time and ultimately matter/energy, >wave-particle duality, the uncertainty principle, the principle of >complementarity. Paradox upon paradox builds up as physics evolves in the >next century. > >My point here is: to analyze the structure of whole systems of concepts and >physical interrelationships is a far more sophisticated endeavor that to >take isolated examples of specific entities and transformations as >validating instances of a dialectical law. The problem is then to match up >in a systematic and sufficiently delineated manner the logical relationships >implicit from a dialectical perspective with the specific logical structures >of scientific theories. This is customarily not done, >because the customary practice is to match up nebulous philosophical >sloganeering with empirical or theoretical scientific examples. Hence >dialectics never has more than an intuitive feel, or, alternatively, bogs >down in crudely delineated logical arguments. > >^^^ >CB: I'd say use the elementary/silly examples to develop the heuristic sense >of it. Then when engaging more complicated matters, go for it with that >heuristic sense. > >I think the current importance of dialectics goes back to a more elementary >level , actually. It is the role that dialectics plays in atheism. In the >U.S., the attacks on science and scientific thinking are at the elementary , >silly level. >^^^^^^ > >And remember that so far I am restricting the discussion to physics and >chemistry. > >^^^^ >CB: Yea, I gave you a fairly profound and ,actually, "overall" example from >physics. > > >^^^^^^^ > > "Marxism" has a world-view interest in what goes on here, even >though it lacks a direct scientific competence in these areas and a mandate >to interfere. And of course natural scientific knowledge is an ineluctable >component of the overall world picture and cannot be sundered from social >scientific and culturological knowledge, though qualitative distinctions are >discernable. And there there is the role of science--and images of >science--in the overall ideological life of society, which is where >metaphorical extension and mystification play a part. "Marxism" wants to >know why scientific theory turns into mysticism at the hands of bargain >basement philosophers and popularizers. > >Once we get to the more arcane problems of biological entities, including >the emergence of conscious, intelligent life--mind and society--the urgency >of an emergent materialist perspective (one aspect of dialectics) and the >structural interrelationships within complex phenomena (also codified in the >word "dialectics") becomes more serious and the arguments more compelling. > >The basic flaw in the kindergarten arguments to which we are accustomed lies >in a simple minded triangulation of formal logic, 'dialectical logic', and >empirical examples. But, I argue, what makes dialectics 'dialectical' is a >categorial overview of conceptual structures on a systemic scale--the >structural interrelationships of systems of concepts and their >interpretation. > >^^^^^^ >CB: I'd say it has a role at the overall level and at the elementary level. >There are mutiple levels of wholes, embedded in each other. That is more a >dialectical picture of "the" whole. > >Charles > >P.S. Will get to earlier post. Took these out of order. _______________________________________________ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
