----- Original Message -----
From: "Charles Brown" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "'Forum for the discussion of theoretical issues raised by Karl Marx
andthe thinkers he inspired'" <marxism-thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu>
Sent: Friday, May 27, 2005 6:04 PM
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] O, Dialectics!


>
> [Marxism-Thaxis]
>
> Oudeyis >
>
> -clip-
>   Describing
> their accomplishment in a dialectical form, the materialism of Marx,
Engels
> and Lenin is not a statement about the world but about the unity of
logical
> and physical and sensual activity in human labour (practice).
> NOTE, THAT THE ISSUE OF THE RELEVANCE OF LOGIC (DIALECTICS) TO HUMAN
HISTORY
> IS NOT A MATTER OF THE NATURE OF THE WORLD BUT OF MAN'S INTERACTION WITH
THE
> WORLD.
>
> ^^^^^
>
> CB: For me, this is a good way to say it. I would just add that their
> attitude was that the best way to conclude "what the nature of the world "
> is is to see what "works" in the world in practice. This is very clever,
> cunning, desirable to follow, as human's have no interest in "the nature
of
> the world" except in human interaction with the world.
>
> ^^^^
>
> As regards the universality of the laws of dialectics:
>     The abstract laws of dialectics are universalities.  We may like
> McTaggart  find them less than perfect, but whatever the modifications,
> revisions and so on we may make on dialectics is a matter of dealing with
> universals.  That dialectic processes may produce divergent truths is a
> different issue from the universality of the logical process itself.  To
> understand the emergence of divergent dialectically arrived at truths, we
> must recognize the diversity of objects and subjects of dialectical
> activities.  Science, the development of practical knowledge, has as its
> object the realization of men's needs in the transformation of the
material
> world, or, in other words the realization of the needs of men that are
> ultimately the function of his being a part and force in nature through
the
> transformation of nature in conformance to the specifications implied by
> those needs.  All the components of this description; the object and
subject
> of the activity described, the means and ends of scientific activity,
> involve states universal to men and to the subject of his activity, hence
> divergence in science is always a temporary product of differentiated and
> limited practical experience.  For science truth, temporary as it may be,
is
> found in effective practice.
>
> ^^^^^^
> CB: This is fundamental for Marx, Engels , Lenin: Theses on Feurerbach,
> Anti-Duhring, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism.
>
> ^^^^^^^^^
>
>     The divergencies of the dialectics of ethics (ideality) on the other
> hand are an inevitable and irresolvable consequence of all the
> differentiating forces that emerge in human social life; the gender
> distinctions, the division of labour, ethnic segregation, and so on.
True,
> the methods of Natural Science of History, Historical Materialism, can
> provide scientific universals that enable the development of theory and
> practice to produce, regulate and revise these distinctions, but these
> universals, theories and practices should never be confused with the
> arguments of the dialectics of ethics (the main object of Hegel and to a
> considerable extent of Kant).  In general, where we find irreconcilable
(in
> practice) dialectical arguments we have entered into a debate over ethics
or
> ethos  rather than over a scientific issue.  Dialectical arguments of this
> sort are properly the realm of religion and traditional philosophy,
classic
> materialism being an example of the latter.
> Regards,
> Oudeyis
>
> ^^^^^^^
>
> CB: What do you think of treating ethics as a category of practice , since
> ethics deals with what people as does practice ?

One of the most interesting and to me attractive aspects of Ilyenkov's (1977
The Concept of the Ideal, 1974 Dialectical Logic, and 1960 Dialectics of the
Abstract and the Concrete) discussion on ideality is the view that Capital
is basically a material (or natural scientific) analysis of the ethos and
ethics of the capitalist mode of production.  I. L. Rubin (1972 -originally
1928 Essays on Marx's Theory of Value) also presents capitalist practice as
a working ethical system.  Vygotsky (1978 -originally 1930 - Mind in
Society) also has a good deal to say on the role of ethics as a means to
social ends, particularly as regards the socialization of prospective
members of society.

Ethics and ethos are social practice.  However, the object and means of
social practice as ethics are considerably different from the practicalities
of science and practical labour. These differences are not always easy to
identify since the intellectual tools for theorizing about ethical social
practice and about labour practice are virtually the same: e.g. speech
forms, texts, graphic representations and of course dialectics.  The
difference is usually even harder to detect when the subject of theory is
social practice.  The basic object of ethical theory, and in many respects
the objective idealism of Hegel is ethical theory, is to describe and
propose (casuistry more or less) or justify (apologetics) a particular ethos
or array of norms and customs.  The object of the natural science of ethics,
and here Capital is an excellent if dated example of this, is to determine
the material conditions, natural and social, of ethical (in the broad sense)
activity.  Marx's critique of bourgeois political economy was that it never
got beyond being a description and apologetics of the capitalist mode of
production, and failed to provide an honest scientific understanding of the
rational material foundation of the ethos of capitalism.

In this sense Capital is not a justification of proletarian class interests
(or let's say not only a justification of proletarian class interests) it is
a scientific analysis of the operations of the political economy of
commodity capitalism that is no less informative about the rationality of
capitalist practice as it is about the rationality of class conflict.

So, in answer to your question, I certainly regard ethics as a category of
practice. But the fact  that ethics is social practice was never a
questionable issue.  The critical issue is what kind of understanding of
ethics is practical science as opposed to either casuistry or to
apologetics.
>
>
>
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