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A few comments on the article by Michael Karadjis:

***

1. The US and Assad

Michael says:

"The deepening American intervention in Syria under the administration of 
president Donald Trump has been both far bloodier than that under Barack Obama, 
and also more openly on the side of the regime of Bashar Assad, as has been 
clarified by a number of recent official statements and changes".

Michael notes that: 

"However, within a number of months of Trump’s election, some events began to 
cast doubt on this trajectory. Above all, in contrast to the complete absence 
of any military clash between the US and Assad in the Obama years, the first 
half-year of Trump saw one regime airbase bombed, one regime warplane downed, 
and three minor hits on pro-Assad Iranian-led Iraqi militia in the southeast 
desert".

But he argues that these are "minor clashes".  The "main game" is "a US-Russia 
alliance, a victory for Assad".

I agree that these clashes are small incidents, and that in general the US 
under Trump is collaborating with Assad.

My question is:  How long has this pro-Assad policy been in effect?

The reference to "the complete absence of any military clash between the US and 
Assad in the Obama years" could be taken as implying that the US has always 
supported Assad, ever since the start of the uprising in 2011.

But in considering the lack of direct military clashes between the US and Assad 
during the  Obama period, we should not forget that allies of the US did 
intervene militarily.  Israel bombed Syria on a number of occasions.  Turkey 
and the Gulf states supplied weapons to rebels (albeit limited in quantity and 
quality).

I think that initially the US probably wanted Assad to be replaced.  While he 
had collaborated with the US in some ways, he was not totally reliable.

On the one hand, he had collaborated with the CIA's rendition program.  But on 
the other hand, he had collaborated with Hezbollah, which had driven Israel out 
of Lebanon.

Thus I think the US had a perspective of removing Assad, and bringing a section 
of the opposition into the government, while keeping the regime largely intact. 
 

However the policy of replacing Assad has been dropped.  Russian and Iranian 
support for Assad made it too difficult to carry out.

***

2. The US and Iran in Syria

Michael seems to downplay hostility between the US and Iran as a factor 
influencing events in Syria: 

"One reason commonly cited for the US stand in al-Tanf is that the 
Baghdad-Damascus Highway passes through the town, and the US is thereby 
blocking a direct Iranian connection, a “land bridge”, to Syria, which would 
effectively link Iran to Hezbollah in Lebanon by land...

"While the real reason may be a mixture ... the anti-Iranian reason is 
undermined by the fact that there remains a great expanse of Syria-Iraq 
borderland that Iranian, pro-Iranian Iraqi and Assadist forces can seize in 
order to form the land bridge. If we take out the small area around al-Tanf in 
the southeast corner, and the northern part of the Iraq-Syria border around 
Hassakah, controlled by the US-backed SDF, then we are left with the entire 
ISIS-controlled Deir-Ezzor province".

Michael seems to imply that the US would be unconcerned if Iranian-led forces 
were able to take over a large part of Deir Ezzor province.  I think it is more 
likely that the US rulers have reluctantly accepted that they have no realistic 
way of preventing it.

I suspect that the US might originally have had the aim of trying to seize Deir 
Ezzor using forces trained at al-Tanf, thereby preventing Iranian-led forces 
from controlling the various roads through the province, but then realised that 
their proxy force was not up to the task.

The relationship between the US and Iran is complex.  They are cooperating 
against ISIS, especially in Iraq, but the US is still imposing economic 
sanctions on Iran, which means that the hostility is not just a matter of 
rhetoric.

***

3. Turkey's role in Syria

MK: "In addition, the rebel-held region of northern and eastern Aleppo province 
where Turkish troops are present as part of the Euphrates Shield operation is 
effectively a de-escalation zone, as the rebels there only fight ISIS and are 
not permitted to confront the regime (and, at least in this case, it also means 
they are free from regime bombing)".

If the "rebels" are no longer fighting the Assad regime, should they still be 
called "rebels"?   Some former rebel groups have become instruments of Turkish 
intervention in Syria.

The Turkish-backed groups are fighting the Syrian Democratic Forces, not ISIS.

MK: "At present there is much talk of a counterrevolutionary agreement between 
Russia, Turkey and the regime, directed at both the SDF in Afrin and HTS in 
Idlib. According to one scenario, Russia, which has troops protecting the 
SDF-held region of greater Afrin, would withdraw from some areas to allow 
Turkey to help its FSA allies to re-take the Arab-majority Menaq-Tal Rifaat 
region, which was conquered from the rebels by the YPG, with Russian airforce 
support, in early 2016. In exchange, Turkey would use this as passage into 
Idlib to attack HTS, and facilitate the entry of Russian troops into Idlib to 
occupy the “de-escalation zone” alongside Turkey".

There has already been a "counterrevolutionary agreement" between Turkey, 
Russia and Assad.  Last year some Turkish-backed groups withdrew from Aleppo 
city and other areas where they had been fighting against Assad's forces.  Some 
of them were transferred to the northern part of Aleppo province in order to 
fight against the SDF.

There may well be a new "counterrevolutionary agreement" (or a new stage of the 
same agreement).  But some of the details mentioned by Michael seem improbable.

Turkey has a border with Idlib province.  It does not need to go to Idlib via 
the "Menaq-Tal Rifaat region" (which is in Aleppo province).

The attacks on Tal Rifaat are part of Turkey's war against the Democratic 
Federation of Northern Syria.  Turkey does not want to see the creation of a 
multi-ethnic democracy with a leftist Kurdish party playing a leading role.

Chris Slee 


________________________________
From: Marxism <marxism-boun...@lists.csbs.utah.edu> on behalf of mkaradjis . 
via Marxism <marxism@lists.csbs.utah.edu>
Sent: Tuesday, 5 September 2017 6:13:07 PM
To: Chris Slee
Subject: [Marxism] The Trump-Putin coalition for Assad lays waste to Syria: 
Imperial agreement and carve-up behind the noisy rhetoric

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The deepening American intervention in Syria under the administration
of president Donald Trump has been both far bloodier than that under
Barack Obama, and also more openly on the side of the regime of Bashar
Assad, as has been clarified by a number of recent official statements
and changes.
https://mkaradjis.wordpress.com/2017/09/05/the-trump-putin-coalition-for-assad-lays-waste-to-syria-imperial-agreement-and-carve-up-behind-the-noisy-rhetoric/
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