******************** POSTING RULES & NOTES ******************** #1 YOU MUST clip all extraneous text when replying to a message. #2 This mail-list, like most, is publicly & permanently archived. #3 Subscribe and post under an alias if #2 is a concern. *****************************************************************
On Chris’s first part of the response, we don’t have big disagreements here, judging from his response. Disagreement is stronger on the second part, the Turkey/SDF part. But some comments on the first part anyway. In relation to my comment that Turkey acted in its own interests, and not that of the US, in backing the Syrian rebels, just as it did when it backed the Mavi Marmara to break the siege of Gaza, Chris responds: “That is not a good analogy. A government permitting its citizens to join a humanitarian aid convoy is not the same as a government arming rebels to overthrow another government.” But my point was the reasons for Turkish actions: that Turkey did not back the rebels because it is a “US-backed” state, a rather obvious statement given how much more forcefully Turkey did back them, in contrast to the US role of trying to block, limit, coopt and divert the rebels as much as possible, leading to significant US-Turkish differences throughout the war. But then Chris seems to agree that various states either backed Assad or the rebels due to their own reasons, and not due to being “US puppets” or otherwise, so we agree basically. On the specifics though: the AKP did not just “permit” its citizens to “join” the convoy; it was part-organised by the Islamist IHH, connected to Erdogan’s son. Most observers understand the strong political connection between the AKP’s Syria and Palestine policies, connected as they were via the AKP’s ideological links to the Muslim Brotherhood, present both among the Syrian opposition and in the form of Hamas in Gaza. The AKP also provides significant support to Hamas, which is a political movement aimed at liberating Palestine, not an aid convoy. It does not do this because it is “US-backed.” Next, Chris takes up my point that “to the extent that the US had any relation to the arming of the Syrian rebels by these three states, its main role was always to try to limit the quantity and quality of the arms sent, restrict who they could be sent to, act to coopt those who got a few arms to divert them away from the struggle against Assad, and above all to ensure that no anti-aircraft weaponry got to the rebels ever, in an overwhelmingly air war launched by the regime". He says that if this was the US “main role” then “the simplest way would have been to ban its allies from giving any arms at all to the rebels. To enforce this edict, it could have threatened these allies with sanctions (e.g. a ban on new weapons supplies from the US).” Of course, the US cannot “ban” states that are not its puppets from doing their thing. For example, the US was not able to “ban” Saudi Arabia from supplying so many countless billions of dollars to the PLO/Fatah over the decades, even though the whole time the US listed them as an arch-villainous “terrorist” organization. I’m not sure why Chris thinks the simplest thing for the US to do would have been to threaten sanctions, when I did not say the US aimed to “ban” them providing arms, but rather to “limit,” “restrict”, “coopt”, “divert” and “ban” certain weapons - which the US did very successfully. As you may have noticed, in a 6-year air war, almost zero anti-aircraft weapons got to the rebels - thanks to the US. Chris says “The US did not do this, because it wanted SOME arms to flow to the rebels.” But that is what I said. But the US did not want the quantity or quality of arms flowing to the rebels that Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey would have liked. Of course, even these countries did not want an unlimited flow; even they only wanted, in my opinion, “to put pressure on the Assad regime, leading to a negotiated transition, similar to what happened in Yemen,” as Chris says the US aim was. Yes, we agree that the US only ever wanted a “Yemeni solution” - ie, a superficial change at the top, preserving the regime, not “regime change.” However, I think we also need to account for the difference between the far more conservative US, on this, and these three states. These states knew that, if any actual “pressure” was going to be imposed on Assad, to bring about the “political solution” they all support, then the rebels would need somewhat better arms than the crap they got. If the arms are *too* limited in quantity and quality, no real pressure at all can be put on Assad, even for the most limited objectives. In other words, there was a contradiction between the alleged US aim - putting pressure on Assad to negotiate - and the very tight degree to which the US limited, restricted and banned. That is because, in my opinion, the US had very little commitment to even this conservative solution. The US aim was for the mere *survival* of extremely weakened and pressured groups of moderate rebels, so that they could be coopted and diverted into the US “war on terror.” As explained in my long article in MLR, pressuring the rebels to *drop the fight against Assad* completely was the condition for them receiving arms from the US to take part in the war on ISIS and/or Nusra. Next, on my claim that the US had welcomed the idea of the Assad regime taking Deir Ezzor province, even though this essentially meant US acceptance of the Iranian “land-bridge” project, where I quoted the Pentagon itself to that effect, as well as noting that the US and Assad have been fighting on the same side in Deir Ezzor for the last 3 years, Chris claims to have found that I provided evidence against myself on that: “In his Marxist Left Review article, Michael says: "Meanwhile, in the south, the US cobbled together the New Syrian Army. In November 2015, the NSA, backed by US air strikes, expelled ISIS from the al-Tanf border crossing with Iraq, releasing a video showing copious US weaponry. Later it launched a failed raid on Abu Kamal, where the going was tough, because many Deir Ezzor rebels “distrust its American backers”, especially because the NSA’s introductory video made no mention of fighting the regime". Chris thinks this proves that the US did try to use a proxy force to advance into Deir Ezzor and thus only reluctantly accepted Assad taking it because the proxies were "not up to the task". Two problems with this. First, this thrust into Deir Ezzor was in 2015, whereas I am talking about this the new, more serious, US engagement with new proxy forces in the southeast desert in 2017. In 2015, Assad’s forces were nowhere near Deir Ezzor, the US had not even helped bomb him into Palmyra yet (Palmyra being the route to Deir Ezzor from Damascus). For most of this war, the Assad regime has not conducted any serious fight with ISIS at all (and for a period of at least a year, no fight at all). In 2015, Assad’s entire war effort was still against the rebels, indeed also through most of 2016. Assad even managed to re-lose Palmyra (!) while incinerating Aleppo to defeat the rebels (and then the US obligingly helped bomb him back into Palmyra again in 2017, the real beginning of the current Assad ground war on ISIS in the east). So using its proxies in the far east of Syria on the Iraqi border against ISIS in 2015 can in no way be conceived of as a challenge to Assad’s control there. In any case, from the onset of US bombing of ISIS in September 2014, Assad also decided to do something he hadn’t done before: bomb ISIS! Because now he could do it as part of the US “war on terror”. But as it was the US doing most of the work, Assad could have that role while in reality concentrating nearly all his fire on the rebels in western Syria. When the US used its proxies against ISIS in 2015 - proxies banned from fighting Assad - the US was essentially doing this in alliance with the regime. Indeed, note the reason I gave for its NSA proxies failing - many local Deir Ezzor rebels distrusted the NSA because it did not fight Assad. Note that this did not prompt the US to arm the more numerous real rebels. Because what the US wanted was some proxies to defeat ISIS who would not challenge Assad’s rule over Syria - including, I suggest, Deir Ezzor. “The US and Iran are currently allies in Syria. But there is no guarantee this will continue.” No-one has a crystal ball. But no-one has shown me that my analysis of the situation as it is *now* is wrong. As for why the US and Iran might decide to fight at a later date is anyone’s guess. I did indicate in my article that some kind of US strike, driven by the Trump faction, could take place at some point for “bread and circuses” reasons, with no apparent connection to the *actual* US policy in the region at present, or actual US interests. But more broadly, what is behind the ongoing “war of rhetoric” between the US and Iran that has never led to an actual war is a good question for research. I suggest Obama understood the real long-term interests of US imperialism much better with his policy of engagement of a major regional capitalist power, with a large population/market, a relatively developed economy, plenty of oil and plenty of potential as a regional killer-cop. On Sat, Sep 16, 2017 at 11:40 PM, Chris Slee <chris_w_s...@hotmail.com> wrote: > A further response to Michael Karadjis > (Part 1) > > In my previous message I noted that during the Obama period, some US allies > had either bombed Syria (Israel) or supplied arms to the rebels (Turkey and > the Gulf states). I expressed the view that "initially the US probably > wanted Assad to be replaced", because he was not totally reliable. > > Michael responded: > > 'The silly trope about “reactionary” or ”US-backed” regimes supporting > the Syrian opposition (albeit “for their own reasons”) relies on the > idea that such regimes are limited to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey....The > majority of “reactionary” and “US-backed” states > in the region either vigorously back the reactionary Assad regime, are > neutral, or are effectively pro-Assad and anti-revolutionary. > > 'All that aside, these states are not puppets of the US, on either > side, they act on their own interests'. > > I agree that reactionary and/or US-backed regimes have taken different > positions on the Syrian conflict. Some have supported Assad, while others > have supported various rebel groups. > > One factor has been the desire of some regimes to promote religious > sectarianism, both inside Syria and elsewhere. They wanted their own people, > and the people of the broader Middle East, to see the Syrian war as a > religious conflict rather than a struggle for democracy. Hence they took > opposite sides, based in part on the religious affiliations of the various > participants in the Syrian conflict. > > These regimes act in their own interests, which often coincide with US > interests, but sometimes do not. > > Michael says: > > "If Chris thinks Turkey, for example, backed the Syrian rebels because it is > a 'US ally,' then he > presumably thinks the US told Turkey to send the Mavi Mamara to try to > break the siege of Gaza too". > > That is not a good analogy. A government permitting its citizens to join a > humanitarian aid convoy is not the same as a government arming rebels to > overthrow another government. > > Michael says: > > "Chris should also consider that, to the > extent that the US had any relation to the arming of the Syrian rebels > by these three states, its main role was always to try to limit the > quantity and quality of the arms sent, restrict who they could be sent > to, act to coopt those who got a few arms to divert them away from the > struggle against Assad, and above all to ensure that no anti-aircraft > weaponry got to the rebels ever, in an overwhelmingly air war launched > by the regime". > > If the "main role" of the US had "always" been to "limit the quantity and > quality of the arms sent", the simplest way would have been to ban its > allies from giving any arms at all to the rebels. To enforce this edict, it > could have threatened these allies with sanctions (e.g. a ban on new weapons > supplies from the US). > > The US did not do this, because it wanted SOME arms to flow to the rebels. > This was because the US wanted to put pressure on the Assad regime, leading > to a negotiated transition, similar to what happened in Yemen. > > Therefore the US allowed Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar to supply weapons to > the rebels (within certain limits). > > It should also be noted that US policy is not static. It has changed as > circumstances changed. The goal of removing Assad, while not formally > renounced, was in practice abandoned in subsequent years. > > One factor leading to this change was recognition that, because of Russian > and Iranian support, the Assad regime was not about to collapse. > > Another factor was the rise of ISIS. The US became alarmed, particularly > after the capture of Mosul by ISIS in 2014. Replacing Assad ceased to be a > priority. > > Turkey, by contrast, was much more alarmed at the Rojava revolution, and saw > ISIS as an ally in crushing it. Hence Turkey's policy began to diverge from > that of the US. (I will say more about Turkey in another message) > > IRAN AND THE UNITED STATES > > In my previous message I argued that the US rulers have "reluctantly > accepted" that Iranian-led forces are likely to take over a large part of > Deir Ezzor province. I said: > > "I suspect that the US might originally have had the aim of trying to > seize Deir Ezzor using forces trained at al-Tanf, thereby preventing > Iranian-led forces from controlling the various roads through the > province, but then realised that their proxy force was not up to the > task". > > Michael criticises this statement, saying: > > "Once again, we are all entitled to think what might be in the back of > some imperialist leaders’ minds. However, I did not merely “imply” US > support for Assad taking over Deir Ezzor, I also had this quote from > the Pentagon (along with tons of other quotes, evidence facts etc): > > "On June 23, US-led Coalition spokesman Colonel Ryan Dillon explained > that if the Assad regime or its allies “are making a concerted effort > to move into ISIS-held areas” then “we absolutely have no problem with > that.” Dillon said that "if they [ie, Assad regime] want to fight ISIS > in Abu Kamal and they have the capacity to do so, then that would be > welcomed". > > However, my ability to read the minds of imperialist leaders has been > confirmed by none other than....Michael Karadjis! In his Marxist Left Review > article, Michael says: > > "Meanwhile, in the south, the US cobbled together the New Syrian Army. In > November 2015, the NSA, backed by US air strikes, expelled ISIS from the > al-Tanf border crossing with Iraq, releasing a video showing copious US > weaponry. Later it launched a failed raid on Abu Kamal, where the going was > tough, because many Deir Ezzor rebels “distrust its American backers”, > especially because the NSA’s introductory video made no mention of fighting > the regime". > > http://marxistleftreview.org/index.php/no-14-winter-2017/147-us-vs-free-syrian-army-vs-jabhat-al-nusra-and-isis-history-of-a-hidden-three-way-conflict > > Thus the US did indeed try to use a proxy force (the New Syrian Army) to > advance into Deir Ezzor (the province in which Abu Kamal is situated), but > found it was (as I said) "not up to the task". > > Somewhat later, Colonel Dillon "welcomed" the advance of the Assad regime and > its allies into Deir Ezzor. But this was only after the initial (and > presumably preferred) US plan had failed. > > The US and Iran are currently allies in Syria. But there is no guarantee > this will continue. The fact that Colonel Dillon politely "welcomes" > advances by the Assad regime and its allies (including Iranian-led forces) > does not prove he is happy about them. > > Chris Slee > > > > > > > > ________________________________ > From: mkaradjis . <mkarad...@gmail.com> > Sent: Wednesday, 13 September 2017 2:43:37 AM > To: Chris Slee > Cc: Activists and scholars in Marxist tradition > Subject: Re: [Marxism] The Trump-Putin coalition for Assad lays waste to > Syria: Imperial agreement and carve-up behind the noisy rhetoric > > Response to Chris Slee (first part - re Turkey etc, will post later). > > Chris: > > “The reference to "the complete absence of any military clash between > the US and Assad in the Obama years" could be taken as implying that > the US has always supported Assad, ever since the start of the > uprising in 2011. > > “But in considering the lack of direct military clashes between the US > and Assad during the Obama period, we should not forget that allies of > the US did intervene militarily. Israel bombed Syria on a number of > occasions. Turkey and the Gulf states supplied weapons to rebels > (albeit limited in quantity and quality).” > > “Allies of the US” are not the US. For example, Iraq is a close ally > of the US, in fact essentially a creature of the US invasion and > occupation, the crowning act of US aggression this century, and Iraq > actively supports Assad, in fact, as my article documents (see links), > this involves nothing less than an invasion of Syria by 20,000 troops > of the US/Iran-backed Iraqi regime. Al-Sisi’s bloody Egyptian tyranny > is a US ally, and has sent arms and even military personnel to Syria > to aid the Assad regime. Jordan is a US ally and has used its leverage > over the southern FSA (given geography) to wind down the southern > front against Assad, and when tasked jointly by the US and Russia to > draw up a list of “terrorist” organisations to be excluded from talks, > came up with a list of some 160 rebel groups, about half the > insurgency! A list partly based on an earlier list drawn up by the > UAE, another US ally. Lebanon is a US ally (5th largest recipient of > US arms in the world), and it is quite remarkable how US arms manage > to turn up with Hezbollah in Lebanon. > > The silly trope about “reactionary” or” US-backed” regimes supporting > the Syrian opposition (albeit “for their own reasons”) relies on the > idea that such regimes are limited to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey > (and even that needs to take into account how hostile the first is to > the second two, and hence their “support” was based precisely on their > own rivalries). The majority of “reactionary” and “US-backed” states > in the region either vigorously back the reactionary Assad regime, are > neutral, or are effectively pro-Assad and anti-revolutionary. > > All that aside, these states are not puppets of the US, on either > side, they act on their own interests. If Chris thinks Turkey, for > example, backed the Syrian rebels because it is a “US ally,” then he > presumably thinks the US told Turkey to send the Mavi Mamara to try to > break the siege of Gaza too. Chris should also consider that, to the > extent that the US had any relation to the arming of the Syrian rebels > by these three states, its main role was always to try to limit the > quantity and quality of the arms sent, restrict who they could be sent > to, act to coopt those who got a few arms to divert them away from the > struggle against Assad, and above all to ensure that no anti-aircraft > weaponry got to the rebels ever, in an overwhelmingly air war launched > by the regime. > > In the first few years, Israel (US ally, but once again, not puppet) > was strongly pro-Assad, but with the greater Iranian involvement on > Assad’s side by late 2013, together with the 2013 overthrow of the > anti-Assad MB regime in Egypt (which had threatened an > Egypt-Hamas-Syrian rebel alliance with heavy MB influence, but this > danger was now reduced with Sisi's coup), Israel developed a new > policy aimed largely at keeping Hezbollah away from the Golan and > hitting warehouses or convoys where it suspected advanced weapons were > being delivered to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Yet it has still never armed > any rebel faction, the rebels remain relentlessly in support of > regaining the Golan, and no Israeli hits on Hezbollah have ever > directly aided rebels while clashing with Hezbollah. > > However, Chris continues: > > “I think that initially the US probably wanted Assad to be replaced. > While he had collaborated with the US in some ways, he was not totally > reliable. Thus I think the US had a perspective of removing Assad, and > bringing a section of the opposition into the government, while > keeping the regime largely intact.” > > We are all entitled to think what we want. Evidence is better. > Initially the US - Hilary Clinton no less - strongly supported Assad > the “reformer”, while telling “US ally” Mubarak to “step down” within > a week or so of the beginning of the Egyptian uprising. The equivalent > Obama statement asking Assad to “step aside”, by contrast, came some 6 > months, and thousands of killings, later. But as Chris says, the aim > was only ever replacing the Assad figure, not the regime - the US > aimed to keep the regime intact, strengthened by removing the highly > destabilising figure of Assad himself and by broadening its base by > bringing in some conservative elements of opposition leadership. > > But such a conservative, regime-preserving outcome, could not be > achieved by providing any significant level of arms to the FSA, whose > aim was the destruction of the regime. So pointing out that the US, > eventually, came to the conclusion that Assad should “step down” is > entirely different to thinking the US was trying to support anyone to > militarily oust Assad, or to support any kind of revolutionary > overthrow. > > Hence the nature of the arming. Let me be as clear as I can, and I > think any realistic look at the arms supplied to the rebels by any > quarter, compared to those possessed by and supplied to the regime, > would show that the *aim* of this micro-arming was NOT: > > i. to help the rebels overthrow the regime, NOR > > ii. to help the rebels make on the ground tactical or strategic gains > against the regime, NOR > > iii. to “help both sides win” by maintaining a “balance” (helping one > when the other side was too strong etc) > > NO. The *aim* was simply to allow *bare survival* of a heavily > weakened group of moderate rebels, weakened enough so that maximum > pressure could be placed on them to go along with US dictates, which > as I documented in my article in the current Marxist Left Review > (http://marxistleftreview.org/index.php/no-14-winter-2017/147-us-vs-free-syrian-army-vs-jabhat-al-nusra-and-isis-history-of-a-hidden-three-way-conflict), > was above all to divert them away from the fight against Assad into > mere US pawns in its “war on terror”, ie, to agree to fight ISIS and > Nusra *only* and *not* the regime. The US in the same way had tried to > preserve the core of a weakened Fatah in order to find its Abbas, not > its Arafat: In Syria the US also searches for its Abbas. > > If you haven’t read my MLR piece Chris, and only this latest piece, I > recommend you do. > > 2. The US and Iran in Syria > > Chris thinks I “downplay hostility between the US and Iran as a factor > influencing events in Syria.” Yes, I do. Because if this “hostility” > was a major factor *in Syria*, then I expect we would see more of an > anti-Assad position, at least to some extent, than we do. The fact > that Trump’s rhetoric is far more anti-Iran than Obama’s, yet US > intervention, as Chris acknowledges, is more pro-Assad under Trump, > underlines this nicely. > > Now one way to interpret this is that the US under Trump prefers Assad > be bolstered by Russia rather than Iran, and in the process hope to > exploit Russian-Iranian differences on Syria to drive a wedge between > them (more or less the Israeli line). While there is no doubt > something to this, what I documented in great detail is that has no > relation to anything the US is doing *in practice* either anywhere in > the region, or anywhere in Syria, at the moment. Of course, I cannot > rule out a change at a later date, but this is the reality now, which > in class terms I see as the global and regional counterrevolutionary > alliance (open or covert) against the Syrian people’s revolt against > the tyranny. > > Chris writes: > “Michael seems to imply that the US would be unconcerned if > Iranian-led forces were able to take over a large part of Deir Ezzor > province. I think it is more likely that the US rulers have > reluctantly accepted that they have no realistic way of preventing it. > I suspect that the US might originally have had the aim of trying to > seize Deir Ezzor using forces trained at al-Tanf, thereby preventing > Iranian-led forces from controlling the various roads through the > province, but then realised that their proxy force was not up to the > task.” > > Once again, we are all entitled to think what might be in the back of > some imperialist leaders’ minds. However, I did not merely “imply” US > support for Assad taking over Deir Ezzor, I also had this quote from > the Pentagon (along with tons of other quotes, evidence facts etc): > > On June 23, US-led Coalition spokesman Colonel Ryan Dillon explained > that if the Assad regime or its allies “are making a concerted effort > to move into ISIS-held areas” then “we absolutely have no problem with > that.” Dillon said that "if they [ie, Assad regime] want to fight ISIS > in Abu Kamal and they have the capacity to do so, then that would be > welcomed. We as a coalition are not in the land-grab business. We are > in the killing-ISIS business. That is what we want to do, and if the > Syrian regime wants to do that and they're going to put forth a > concerted effort and show that they are doing just that in Abu Kamal > or Deir el-Zour or elsewhere, that means that we don't have to do that > in those places." > > Really, I’m not sure how anyone can read that differently. As I wrote, > that could hardly be clearer; and I expect the Pentagon, unlike Trump > himself, picks its words very carefully. For the Pentagon, if Assad > and allies take the Deir Ezzor region from ISIS, the US “doesn’t have > to” go there. Why go there, when your allies are headed there anyway? > > Also, the failure to comprehend that the US is supporting Assad in > Deir Ezzor in particular is highly revealing of the myopia of so much > reportage (from left, right and centre) on Syria. Facts do not come > first; idealist notions that, because we think, for example, that the > US and Assad are “hostile,” we think therefore they cannot be > collaborating in Deir Ezzor, despite the fact that the *active* > US-Assad in Deir Ezzor **for the past 3 years** is clearer than > anywhere else in Syria. They are allies; tweets from the US Embassy, > State Dept, CentCom etc often refer to them as allies and hail Assad’s > advances there. > > It is quite remarkable that when the Friendly Fire incident occurred > last year (ie, when the US accidentally bombed its Assadist allies in > Deir Ezzor on one occasion, then profusely apologized and offered > compensation), most commentary was along the lines of “see the US is > pretending to be fighting ISIS but instead it bombs Syrian > “government” troops fighting ISIS.” Remarkable that the thousands of > US strikes on ISIS in Deir Ezzor in active concert with Assadist and > Russian strikes on the same targets in tandem over several years were > not the issue; remarkable that the incident of Friendly Fire didn’t > highlight precisely this. Incidentally, there have been somewhat more > incidents of Russian Friendly Fire on Assadists than American; the US > has been far more careful. > > Of course, again we might say that US support for Assad in Deir Ezzor > may not necessarily mean support for Iran there, especially if they > can get a strong Russian presence; yet as I pointed out, Assad’s > hollowed-out rump “SAA” necessarily relies heavily on the global > Shiite jihadist intervention forces. I expect Assad doesn’t like them > (there have been plenty of incidents), but at the moment that is his > reality. > > Chris is right of course that the US proxies don’t stand a chance; but > Deir Ezzor province, and neighbouring regions in eastern Suweida and > eastern Qalamoun are awash with FSA/rebel forces that have refused to > bow to US commands to not fight Assad, and as the province was > originally a strong revolutionary base, it is likely that the basis > for an ongoing insurgency in the heavily Sunni region against Assad > and the rule of the Shiite jihad is there. > > “The relationship between the US and Iran is complex. They are > cooperating against ISIS, especially in Iraq, but the US is still > imposing economic sanctions on Iran, which means that the hostility is > not just a matter of rhetoric.” > > Cooperation between the US and Iran in Iraq goes a long way back > before “cooperation against ISIS” began; it has been fundamental since > 2003, and in fact is one of the causes of ISIS. On the other hand, > sanctions are indeed part of the old US-Iran relation, and so > relations are indeed “complex.” The active geopolitical/sectarian > rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and the active “war of > rhetoric” mediated by geographical distance between Iran and Israel, > which serves both theocratic projects, are important factors: while > Obama’s rapprochement with Iran represented, I believe, a far-sighted > policy in terms of US imperialist interests, the interests of more > traditional US allies need to be taken into account. The sanctions, > incidentally, have not prevented some pretty major world-class > imperialist firms doing great deals with Iran (Boeing, Airbus, > Mercedes-Benz, Total etc). > _________________________________________________________ Full posting guidelines at: http://www.marxmail.org/sub.htm Set your options at: http://lists.csbs.utah.edu/options/marxism/archive%40mail-archive.com
