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Further response to Michael Karadjis (part 2) Michael quotes my statement: "If the 'rebels' are no longer fighting the Assad regime, should they still be called 'rebels'? Some former rebel groups have become instruments of Turkish intervention in Syria". He accuses me of double standards, because I have not criticised the Syrian Democratic Forces, even though the SDF also "does not fight Assad". The SDF has a policy of not initiating armed conflict with the Assad regime forces, but fighting back if attacked. I would not criticise any rebel group that adopted a similar policy. What I am criticising is the fact that some rebel groups have become instruments of a Turkish intervention that is directed against the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria. Michael quotes my statement that: "There has already been a 'counterrevolutionary agreement' between Turkey, Russia and Assad. Last year some Turkish-backed groups withdrew from Aleppo city and other areas where they had been fighting against Assad's forces. Some of them were transferred to the northern part of Aleppo province in order to fight against the SDF". Michael disputes this, saying: "....no, they were transferred to northern Aleppo province to fight ISIS, not the SDF". Turkey said its intervention was directed against both ISIS and the YPG. But this was a smokescreen. Turkey had accepted ISIS controlling a section of the Syria/Turkey border, including the town of Jarablus, for several years. Turkey had collaborated with ISIS in attacking Rojava. It was only after the SDF had liberated Manbij from ISIS, and was advancing on Jarablus, that Turkey invaded. Turkey succeeded in blocking further SDF advances, but was unable to reverse the gains already made. Turkey was warned against trying to capture Manbij by the US, which was worried this would divert SDF resources away from the campaign against ISIS in Raqqa. However Turkey and its allies have continued a campaign of harassment by bombarding SDF-controlled towns (including Tal Rifaat). Michael makes several references to the SDF's capture of Tal Rifaat in February 2016. He claims the Menagh-Tal Rifaat region is "occupied Arab territory", and that "The rebels [by which he means the groups allied to Turkey] have the right to re-take their territory from the YPG-SDF". This ignores the fact that the SDF has a strong Arab component, and that many of its Arab members come from a Free Syrian Army background. In his Marxist Left Review article, Michael mentions the violent suppression of the Syrian Revolutionaries Front and Harakat Hazm (both of which were regarded as part of the FSA) by Jabhat al-Nusra. But he doesn't mention that some of the survivors of Nusra's attacks fled to Afrin, where they helped form a new, predominantly Arab, group called Jaysh al-Thuwar (Revolutionary Army), which later combined with the mainly Kurdish YPG/YPJ to form the Syrian Democratic Forces. Thus the "rebel" groups allied to Turkey can not be considered the sole representatives of Arab people in northern Syria. Tal Rifaat is not "their territory", which they are entitled to "re-take". Chris Slee ________________________________ From: mkaradjis . <mkarad...@gmail.com> Sent: Saturday, 16 September 2017 1:13:59 AM To: Chris Slee Cc: Activists and scholars in Marxist tradition Subject: Re: [Marxism] The Trump-Putin coalition for Assad lays waste to Syria: Imperial agreement and carve-up behind the noisy rhetoric Part 2 of response to Chris Slee On Turkey's role in Syria, Chris asks: “If the "rebels" are no longer fighting the Assad regime, should they still be called "rebels"? Some former rebel groups have become instruments of Turkish intervention in Syria.” Turkey has held back the rebels in the region it occupies in the north from fighting Assad, just as the SDF does not fight Assad. So we could say they are more or less on the same wavelength. Or does Chris think whatever the SDF does is OK, they don’t have to lift a finger against Assad to be called “rebels”, they can be far-and-away the most totally US-backed force in Syria, which only fights ISIS and never Assad, and still get called “rebels”, but those who went through hell fighting both Assad and ISIS for years are immediately denied rebel status as soon as they are forced into a compromise situation due to the entire international intervention against them. These are all (or mostly) real rebel forces, formed by people whose purpose was and is trying to oust the regime. Currently they are in a bind. But that does not make them all puppets, any more than the SDF are US puppets due to their close, long-term, strategic cooperation with the US. The situation remains fluid. There have also been some confrontations with Turkish forces at times. But what Chris ignores here too is the geography: the main reason the rebels in the northern Aleppo countryside region could not fight Assad as he crushed eastern Aleppo city was that their passage south to the city was blocked, by the YPG/SDF in the Arab-majority Tal Rifaat region, which they had seized from the rebels under bloody Russian air cover in early 2016; meanwhile, the only other way through to Aleppo city would have been a-Bab, which was held by ISIS. And of course, neither the SDF nor ISIS fight the Assad regime in that region. This inability of the FSA due to this geography to fight Assad there is what allowed both the US and Russia to back the Turkish-FSA Euphrates Shield operation against ISIS, because there was no danger of this bolstering the FSA against Assad as well. “The Turkish-backed groups are fighting the Syrian Democratic Forces, not ISIS.” Yes Chris, and Assad is fighting US imperialism, the US is supporting ISIS and Nusra, and Trotsky was an agent of the Gestapo. Uncritical SDF supporters need to get over this kind of thing. The Turkey-FSA-rebel alliance (‘Euphrates Shield’) cleared ISIS from a vast swathe of territory, between Azaz and Jarablus and down to al-Bab. The SDF was not present in any of those places. There were brief clashes initially in the region between SDF-occupied Manbij and Euphrates Shield-occupied Jarablus, rapidly brought to an end by US pressure on Turkey to back off. While I opposed the Turkish intervention, and I pointed out that this use of the FSA against ISIS in that region was not the main priority *at that moment* when Free Aleppo needed more defence against the main enemy, things are “complex” - of course I still hail the liberation of these areas from ISIS terror. Now that they are not being bombed every day by Assad (due to the Turkish presence), they have the opportunity to develop some political institutions in peace, and perhaps strengthen their forces if they do intend to renew their struggle with Assad. I would have thought doing deals with Assad to not get bombed - for years on end - was precisely a strategy the YPG/SDF and their supporters approved of. Regarding my discussion of the counterrevolutionary dealing between Russia, Turkey and Assad over Idlib and Afrin, Chris responds: “There has already been a "counterrevolutionary agreement" between Turkey, Russia and Assad. Last year some Turkish-backed groups withdrew from Aleppo city and other areas where they had been fighting against Assad's forces. Some of them were transferred to the northern part of Aleppo province in order to fight against the SDF.” Again, Chris’ Orwellian point at the end: no, they were transferred to northern Aleppo province to fight ISIS, not the SDF. The reason SDF supporters make this odd claim is because they believe the entire Azaz-Jarablus-Al Bab region, despite being majority Arab and Turkmen in composition, and despite having been controlled by the rebels before the ISIS conquest, “rightfully” belongs to the SDF. No-one else knows why. On the rest, if Chris thinks that the transferring of rebel cadre from Aleppo city to the front against ISIS in the north was a counterrevolutionary agreement (as I have written in numerous articles), then presumably he also thinks that the role of the SDF in the Tal Rifaat region north of Aleppo, where it blocked the Azaz-Mare revels from the Aleppo front, and their role in Sheikh Maqsud, where they directly aided the Assadist siege, was at east as counterrevolutionary. Consistency, comrade. Chris: “There may well be a new "counterrevolutionary agreement" (or a new stage of the same agreement). But some of the details mentioned by Michael seem improbable. Turkey has a border with Idlib province. It does not need to go to Idlib via the "Menaq-Tal Rifaat region" (which is in Aleppo province).” This misses the point. Yes, Turkey has a border with Idlib “around the corner” on Syria’s northwest border. So that’s fine if Turkey merely wants to launch an invasion over that border to evict HTS itself. But if Turkey wants to work with the more or less allied Syrian rebel groups - FSA, soft-Islamist groups, and Ahrar al-Sham - to goad them to drive HTS out of Idlib - then it needs a passage to link the northern Aleppo chapters of these groups (where they are in Euphrates Shield) with their southwest Aleppo and Idlib chapters. That is, they need to get through their occupied territories in the Tal Rifaat region. Look at a map. I oppose HTS, of course, and support the actual grass-roots struggles by civil councils, popular protest and local FSA against HTS repression, but I also oppose the rebels being used by Turkey, Russia or the US to launch all-out war against HTS in Idlib, to the benefit of much bigger and more powerful enemies. That’s why I call it counterrevolutionary. As I said, it would also be counterrevolutionary if the rebels allowed themselves to be used against the YPG/SDF in Kurdish Afrin itself. But the Menagh-Tal Rifaat region is not part of “Afrin canton” just because the SDF says it is: it is occupied Arab territory, from which both fighters and populations have been driven out of, many in camps in Azaz, where they demand return. SDF artillery regularly targets them in Azaz and Mare, and vice versa. The rebels have the right to re-take their territory from the YPG-SDF, which conquered them with the direct aid of the bloody Russian imperialist airforce in a highly counterrevolutionary act, and I expect they will. When they do, SDF supporters could kindly spare us the hypocrisy. “The attacks on Tal Rifaat are part of Turkey's war against the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria. Turkey does not want to see the creation of a multi-ethnic democracy with a leftist Kurdish party playing a leading role.” “Attacks on Tal Rifaat.” We’ve heard before when people trying to liberate their own territory from an occupier are called the “attackers.” On Wed, Sep 13, 2017 at 2:43 AM, mkaradjis . <mkarad...@gmail.com> wrote: > Response to Chris Slee (first part - re Turkey etc, will post later). > > Chris: > > “The reference to "the complete absence of any military clash between > the US and Assad in the Obama years" could be taken as implying that > the US has always supported Assad, ever since the start of the > uprising in 2011. > > “But in considering the lack of direct military clashes between the US > and Assad during the Obama period, we should not forget that allies of > the US did intervene militarily. Israel bombed Syria on a number of > occasions. Turkey and the Gulf states supplied weapons to rebels > (albeit limited in quantity and quality).” > > “Allies of the US” are not the US. For example, Iraq is a close ally > of the US, in fact essentially a creature of the US invasion and > occupation, the crowning act of US aggression this century, and Iraq > actively supports Assad, in fact, as my article documents (see links), > this involves nothing less than an invasion of Syria by 20,000 troops > of the US/Iran-backed Iraqi regime. Al-Sisi’s bloody Egyptian tyranny > is a US ally, and has sent arms and even military personnel to Syria > to aid the Assad regime. Jordan is a US ally and has used its leverage > over the southern FSA (given geography) to wind down the southern > front against Assad, and when tasked jointly by the US and Russia to > draw up a list of “terrorist” organisations to be excluded from talks, > came up with a list of some 160 rebel groups, about half the > insurgency! A list partly based on an earlier list drawn up by the > UAE, another US ally. Lebanon is a US ally (5th largest recipient of > US arms in the world), and it is quite remarkable how US arms manage > to turn up with Hezbollah in Lebanon. > > The silly trope about “reactionary” or” US-backed” regimes supporting > the Syrian opposition (albeit “for their own reasons”) relies on the > idea that such regimes are limited to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey > (and even that needs to take into account how hostile the first is to > the second two, and hence their “support” was based precisely on their > own rivalries). The majority of “reactionary” and “US-backed” states > in the region either vigorously back the reactionary Assad regime, are > neutral, or are effectively pro-Assad and anti-revolutionary. > > All that aside, these states are not puppets of the US, on either > side, they act on their own interests. If Chris thinks Turkey, for > example, backed the Syrian rebels because it is a “US ally,” then he > presumably thinks the US told Turkey to send the Mavi Mamara to try to > break the siege of Gaza too. Chris should also consider that, to the > extent that the US had any relation to the arming of the Syrian rebels > by these three states, its main role was always to try to limit the > quantity and quality of the arms sent, restrict who they could be sent > to, act to coopt those who got a few arms to divert them away from the > struggle against Assad, and above all to ensure that no anti-aircraft > weaponry got to the rebels ever, in an overwhelmingly air war launched > by the regime. > > In the first few years, Israel (US ally, but once again, not puppet) > was strongly pro-Assad, but with the greater Iranian involvement on > Assad’s side by late 2013, together with the 2013 overthrow of the > anti-Assad MB regime in Egypt (which had threatened an > Egypt-Hamas-Syrian rebel alliance with heavy MB influence, but this > danger was now reduced with Sisi's coup), Israel developed a new > policy aimed largely at keeping Hezbollah away from the Golan and > hitting warehouses or convoys where it suspected advanced weapons were > being delivered to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Yet it has still never armed > any rebel faction, the rebels remain relentlessly in support of > regaining the Golan, and no Israeli hits on Hezbollah have ever > directly aided rebels while clashing with Hezbollah. > > However, Chris continues: > > “I think that initially the US probably wanted Assad to be replaced. > While he had collaborated with the US in some ways, he was not totally > reliable. Thus I think the US had a perspective of removing Assad, and > bringing a section of the opposition into the government, while > keeping the regime largely intact.” > > We are all entitled to think what we want. Evidence is better. > Initially the US - Hilary Clinton no less - strongly supported Assad > the “reformer”, while telling “US ally” Mubarak to “step down” within > a week or so of the beginning of the Egyptian uprising. The equivalent > Obama statement asking Assad to “step aside”, by contrast, came some 6 > months, and thousands of killings, later. But as Chris says, the aim > was only ever replacing the Assad figure, not the regime - the US > aimed to keep the regime intact, strengthened by removing the highly > destabilising figure of Assad himself and by broadening its base by > bringing in some conservative elements of opposition leadership. > > But such a conservative, regime-preserving outcome, could not be > achieved by providing any significant level of arms to the FSA, whose > aim was the destruction of the regime. So pointing out that the US, > eventually, came to the conclusion that Assad should “step down” is > entirely different to thinking the US was trying to support anyone to > militarily oust Assad, or to support any kind of revolutionary > overthrow. > > Hence the nature of the arming. Let me be as clear as I can, and I > think any realistic look at the arms supplied to the rebels by any > quarter, compared to those possessed by and supplied to the regime, > would show that the *aim* of this micro-arming was NOT: > > i. to help the rebels overthrow the regime, NOR > > ii. to help the rebels make on the ground tactical or strategic gains > against the regime, NOR > > iii. to “help both sides win” by maintaining a “balance” (helping one > when the other side was too strong etc) > > NO. The *aim* was simply to allow *bare survival* of a heavily > weakened group of moderate rebels, weakened enough so that maximum > pressure could be placed on them to go along with US dictates, which > as I documented in my article in the current Marxist Left Review > (http://marxistleftreview.org/index.php/no-14-winter-2017/147-us-vs-free-syrian-army-vs-jabhat-al-nusra-and-isis-history-of-a-hidden-three-way-conflict), > was above all to divert them away from the fight against Assad into > mere US pawns in its “war on terror”, ie, to agree to fight ISIS and > Nusra *only* and *not* the regime. The US in the same way had tried to > preserve the core of a weakened Fatah in order to find its Abbas, not > its Arafat: In Syria the US also searches for its Abbas. > > If you haven’t read my MLR piece Chris, and only this latest piece, I > recommend you do. > > 2. The US and Iran in Syria > > Chris thinks I “downplay hostility between the US and Iran as a factor > influencing events in Syria.” Yes, I do. Because if this “hostility” > was a major factor *in Syria*, then I expect we would see more of an > anti-Assad position, at least to some extent, than we do. The fact > that Trump’s rhetoric is far more anti-Iran than Obama’s, yet US > intervention, as Chris acknowledges, is more pro-Assad under Trump, > underlines this nicely. > > Now one way to interpret this is that the US under Trump prefers Assad > be bolstered by Russia rather than Iran, and in the process hope to > exploit Russian-Iranian differences on Syria to drive a wedge between > them (more or less the Israeli line). While there is no doubt > something to this, what I documented in great detail is that has no > relation to anything the US is doing *in practice* either anywhere in > the region, or anywhere in Syria, at the moment. Of course, I cannot > rule out a change at a later date, but this is the reality now, which > in class terms I see as the global and regional counterrevolutionary > alliance (open or covert) against the Syrian people’s revolt against > the tyranny. > > Chris writes: > “Michael seems to imply that the US would be unconcerned if > Iranian-led forces were able to take over a large part of Deir Ezzor > province. I think it is more likely that the US rulers have > reluctantly accepted that they have no realistic way of preventing it. > I suspect that the US might originally have had the aim of trying to > seize Deir Ezzor using forces trained at al-Tanf, thereby preventing > Iranian-led forces from controlling the various roads through the > province, but then realised that their proxy force was not up to the > task.” > > Once again, we are all entitled to think what might be in the back of > some imperialist leaders’ minds. However, I did not merely “imply” US > support for Assad taking over Deir Ezzor, I also had this quote from > the Pentagon (along with tons of other quotes, evidence facts etc): > > On June 23, US-led Coalition spokesman Colonel Ryan Dillon explained > that if the Assad regime or its allies “are making a concerted effort > to move into ISIS-held areas” then “we absolutely have no problem with > that.” Dillon said that "if they [ie, Assad regime] want to fight ISIS > in Abu Kamal and they have the capacity to do so, then that would be > welcomed. We as a coalition are not in the land-grab business. We are > in the killing-ISIS business. That is what we want to do, and if the > Syrian regime wants to do that and they're going to put forth a > concerted effort and show that they are doing just that in Abu Kamal > or Deir el-Zour or elsewhere, that means that we don't have to do that > in those places." > > Really, I’m not sure how anyone can read that differently. As I wrote, > that could hardly be clearer; and I expect the Pentagon, unlike Trump > himself, picks its words very carefully. For the Pentagon, if Assad > and allies take the Deir Ezzor region from ISIS, the US “doesn’t have > to” go there. Why go there, when your allies are headed there anyway? > > Also, the failure to comprehend that the US is supporting Assad in > Deir Ezzor in particular is highly revealing of the myopia of so much > reportage (from left, right and centre) on Syria. Facts do not come > first; idealist notions that, because we think, for example, that the > US and Assad are “hostile,” we think therefore they cannot be > collaborating in Deir Ezzor, despite the fact that the *active* > US-Assad in Deir Ezzor **for the past 3 years** is clearer than > anywhere else in Syria. They are allies; tweets from the US Embassy, > State Dept, CentCom etc often refer to them as allies and hail Assad’s > advances there. > > It is quite remarkable that when the Friendly Fire incident occurred > last year (ie, when the US accidentally bombed its Assadist allies in > Deir Ezzor on one occasion, then profusely apologized and offered > compensation), most commentary was along the lines of “see the US is > pretending to be fighting ISIS but instead it bombs Syrian > “government” troops fighting ISIS.” Remarkable that the thousands of > US strikes on ISIS in Deir Ezzor in active concert with Assadist and > Russian strikes on the same targets in tandem over several years were > not the issue; remarkable that the incident of Friendly Fire didn’t > highlight precisely this. Incidentally, there have been somewhat more > incidents of Russian Friendly Fire on Assadists than American; the US > has been far more careful. > > Of course, again we might say that US support for Assad in Deir Ezzor > may not necessarily mean support for Iran there, especially if they > can get a strong Russian presence; yet as I pointed out, Assad’s > hollowed-out rump “SAA” necessarily relies heavily on the global > Shiite jihadist intervention forces. I expect Assad doesn’t like them > (there have been plenty of incidents), but at the moment that is his > reality. > > Chris is right of course that the US proxies don’t stand a chance; but > Deir Ezzor province, and neighbouring regions in eastern Suweida and > eastern Qalamoun are awash with FSA/rebel forces that have refused to > bow to US commands to not fight Assad, and as the province was > originally a strong revolutionary base, it is likely that the basis > for an ongoing insurgency in the heavily Sunni region against Assad > and the rule of the Shiite jihad is there. > > “The relationship between the US and Iran is complex. They are > cooperating against ISIS, especially in Iraq, but the US is still > imposing economic sanctions on Iran, which means that the hostility is > not just a matter of rhetoric.” > > Cooperation between the US and Iran in Iraq goes a long way back > before “cooperation against ISIS” began; it has been fundamental since > 2003, and in fact is one of the causes of ISIS. On the other hand, > sanctions are indeed part of the old US-Iran relation, and so > relations are indeed “complex.” The active geopolitical/sectarian > rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and the active “war of > rhetoric” mediated by geographical distance between Iran and Israel, > which serves both theocratic projects, are important factors: while > Obama’s rapprochement with Iran represented, I believe, a far-sighted > policy in terms of US imperialist interests, the interests of more > traditional US allies need to be taken into account. The sanctions, > incidentally, have not prevented some pretty major world-class > imperialist firms doing great deals with Iran (Boeing, Airbus, > Mercedes-Benz, Total etc). > > On Fri, Sep 8, 2017 at 2:56 PM, Chris Slee <chris_w_s...@hotmail.com> wrote: >> A few comments on the article by Michael Karadjis: >> >> *** >> >> 1. The US and Assad >> >> Michael says: >> >> "The deepening American intervention in Syria under the administration of >> president Donald Trump has been both far bloodier than that under Barack >> Obama, and also more openly on the side of the regime of Bashar Assad, as >> has been clarified by a number of recent official statements and changes". >> >> Michael notes that: >> >> "However, within a number of months of Trump’s election, some events began >> to cast doubt on this trajectory. Above all, in contrast to the complete >> absence of any military clash between the US and Assad in the Obama years, >> the first half-year of Trump saw one regime airbase bombed, one regime >> warplane downed, and three minor hits on pro-Assad Iranian-led Iraqi militia >> in the southeast desert". >> >> But he argues that these are "minor clashes". The "main game" is "a >> US-Russia alliance, a victory for Assad". >> >> I agree that these clashes are small incidents, and that in general the US >> under Trump is collaborating with Assad. >> >> My question is: How long has this pro-Assad policy been in effect? >> >> The reference to "the complete absence of any military clash between the US >> and Assad in the Obama years" could be taken as implying that the US has >> always supported Assad, ever since the start of the uprising in 2011. >> >> But in considering the lack of direct military clashes between the US and >> Assad during the Obama period, we should not forget that allies of the US >> did intervene militarily. Israel bombed Syria on a number of occasions. >> Turkey and the Gulf states supplied weapons to rebels (albeit limited in >> quantity and quality). >> >> I think that initially the US probably wanted Assad to be replaced. While >> he had collaborated with the US in some ways, he was not totally reliable. >> >> On the one hand, he had collaborated with the CIA's rendition program. But >> on the other hand, he had collaborated with Hezbollah, which had driven >> Israel out of Lebanon. >> >> Thus I think the US had a perspective of removing Assad, and bringing a >> section of the opposition into the government, while keeping the regime >> largely intact. >> >> However the policy of replacing Assad has been dropped. Russian and Iranian >> support for Assad made it too difficult to carry out. >> >> *** >> >> 2. The US and Iran in Syria >> >> Michael seems to downplay hostility between the US and Iran as a factor >> influencing events in Syria: >> >> "One reason commonly cited for the US stand in al-Tanf is that the >> Baghdad-Damascus Highway passes through the town, and the US is thereby >> blocking a direct Iranian connection, a “land bridge”, to Syria, which would >> effectively link Iran to Hezbollah in Lebanon by land... >> >> "While the real reason may be a mixture ... the anti-Iranian reason is >> undermined by the fact that there remains a great expanse of Syria-Iraq >> borderland that Iranian, pro-Iranian Iraqi and Assadist forces can seize in >> order to form the land bridge. If we take out the small area around al-Tanf >> in the southeast corner, and the northern part of the Iraq-Syria border >> around Hassakah, controlled by the US-backed SDF, then we are left with the >> entire ISIS-controlled Deir-Ezzor province". >> >> Michael seems to imply that the US would be unconcerned if Iranian-led >> forces were able to take over a large part of Deir Ezzor province. I think >> it is more likely that the US rulers have reluctantly accepted that they >> have no realistic way of preventing it. >> >> I suspect that the US might originally have had the aim of trying to seize >> Deir Ezzor using forces trained at al-Tanf, thereby preventing Iranian-led >> forces from controlling the various roads through the province, but then >> realised that their proxy force was not up to the task. >> >> The relationship between the US and Iran is complex. They are cooperating >> against ISIS, especially in Iraq, but the US is still imposing economic >> sanctions on Iran, which means that the hostility is not just a matter of >> rhetoric. >> >> *** >> >> 3. Turkey's role in Syria >> >> MK: "In addition, the rebel-held region of northern and eastern Aleppo >> province where Turkish troops are present as part of the Euphrates Shield >> operation is effectively a de-escalation zone, as the rebels there only >> fight ISIS and are not permitted to confront the regime (and, at least in >> this case, it also means they are free from regime bombing)". >> >> If the "rebels" are no longer fighting the Assad regime, should they still >> be called "rebels"? Some former rebel groups have become instruments of >> Turkish intervention in Syria. >> >> The Turkish-backed groups are fighting the Syrian Democratic Forces, not >> ISIS. >> >> MK: "At present there is much talk of a counterrevolutionary agreement >> between Russia, Turkey and the regime, directed at both the SDF in Afrin and >> HTS in Idlib. According to one scenario, Russia, which has troops protecting >> the SDF-held region of greater Afrin, would withdraw from some areas to >> allow Turkey to help its FSA allies to re-take the Arab-majority Menaq-Tal >> Rifaat region, which was conquered from the rebels by the YPG, with Russian >> airforce support, in early 2016. In exchange, Turkey would use this as >> passage into Idlib to attack HTS, and facilitate the entry of Russian troops >> into Idlib to occupy the “de-escalation zone” alongside Turkey". >> >> There has already been a "counterrevolutionary agreement" between Turkey, >> Russia and Assad. Last year some Turkish-backed groups withdrew from Aleppo >> city and other areas where they had been fighting against Assad's forces. >> Some of them were transferred to the northern part of Aleppo province in >> order to fight against the SDF. >> >> There may well be a new "counterrevolutionary agreement" (or a new stage of >> the same agreement). But some of the details mentioned by Michael seem >> improbable. >> >> Turkey has a border with Idlib province. It does not need to go to Idlib >> via the "Menaq-Tal Rifaat region" (which is in Aleppo province). >> >> The attacks on Tal Rifaat are part of Turkey's war against the Democratic >> Federation of Northern Syria. Turkey does not want to see the creation of a >> multi-ethnic democracy with a leftist Kurdish party playing a leading role. >> >> Chris Slee >> >> >> ________________________________ >> From: Marxism <marxism-boun...@lists.csbs.utah.edu> on behalf of mkaradjis . >> via Marxism <marxism@lists.csbs.utah.edu> >> Sent: Tuesday, 5 September 2017 6:13:07 PM >> To: Chris Slee >> Subject: [Marxism] The Trump-Putin coalition for Assad lays waste to Syria: >> Imperial agreement and carve-up behind the noisy rhetoric >> >> ******************** POSTING RULES & NOTES ******************** >> #1 YOU MUST clip all extraneous text when replying to a message. >> #2 This mail-list, like most, is publicly & permanently archived. >> #3 Subscribe and post under an alias if #2 is a concern. >> ***************************************************************** >> >> The deepening American intervention in Syria under the administration >> of president Donald Trump has been both far bloodier than that under >> Barack Obama, and also more openly on the side of the regime of Bashar >> Assad, as has been clarified by a number of recent official statements >> and changes. >> https://mkaradjis.wordpress.com/2017/09/05/the-trump-putin-coalition-for-assad-lays-waste-to-syria-imperial-agreement-and-carve-up-behind-the-noisy-rhetoric/ >> _________________________________________________________ >> Full posting guidelines at: http://www.marxmail.org/sub.htm >> Set your options at: >> http://lists.csbs.utah.edu/options/marxism/chris_w_slee%40hotmail.com _________________________________________________________ Full posting guidelines at: http://www.marxmail.org/sub.htm Set your options at: http://lists.csbs.utah.edu/options/marxism/archive%40mail-archive.com
