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I think Chris raised an essential point re: 2002 coup, but I'd extend it further and discuss the whole period of intense class struggle from about December 2001 (when Chavez announced his few dozen enabling laws that touched property, however slightly, for the first time) until February 2003 with the defeat of the bosses lock out as the crucial period that established the (yes unsteady, uneasy and contradictory) alliance between the Chavista military, the urban and rural poor and key sectors of industrial working class. This alliance was the actual basis of Chavez's power and the strength of it despite everything in recent years is why it is so hard to overthrow Maduro. It was an alliance forged in the white heat of class (and national) struggle, as the oligarchs, acting in concert with Washington, sought to destroy Chavez and Bolivarianism, and were defeated by mass mobilisations backed by rank and file soldiers and loyal officers. In this, the April 2002 coup was a decisive point, but by itself didn't resolve this. After the rebellion by loyal sectors of the military and the urban poor restored Chavez, the government still lacked economic power and had a still too narrow base of support. Chavez came back and immediately compromised with the opposition, when politically you;d think he would have been within his rights to react far more radically. But this reflected the limits of the social base. The bosses lock-out in December that year was a more prolonged battle that the coup, which lasted a couple of days. By their sabotage, especially of the oil industry, the oligarchs brought the economy to its knees The entire process lasted many weeks and the suffering of the poor was real, it was a major economic contraction. This was defeated by early February 2003 by a broader alliance of the urban and rural poor, loyal soldiers (who were critical to taking control over pdvsa and other sectors), and the formal workers and industrial workers who defeated the lock-out by physically retaking their workplaces. This particular victory placed the oil company in the hands of the government for the first time (what they have done right or wrong with it since is for a different story), giving real economic power based on a now-expanded and mobilised social base. The Chavista military sectors, strengthened by the urban poor after April 2002, were now joined by larger sectors of the formal workers too. This is why at *that point* more decisive measures began, such as the social missions that were initiated after the bosses lock out was defeated, based on the structures created through the struggle to defeat the bosses lock out. The reason was as Michael Lebowitz (who has already commented here) explains so well when he describes this -- it was the defeat of the lock out that placed "the sword" in the hands of the revolution (or Bonapartist government, which ever makes you feel happier...) And the alliances forged there (ie NOT simply the middle officers who backed Chavez, though they mattered for sure) were essential to Chavez continuing to govern in the face of attack, and the many electoral battles often took on the dynamic of mass mobilisation of these alliances to push the class enemy back ( the 2004 recall referendum definitely had this dynamic). The limits of all of this are clear to see. There were very serious attempts to expand and radicalise all of this, to more decisively break the power of the oligarchs. The how and why all that has stalled, if not been rolled back -- but crucially not decisive defeated either -- is for a different account. But there is no way that story goes "There was no revolution coz Chavez only ever relied for power on a middle layer of officers". That is totally ahistorical and ignores the huge, deep-going and very wide-ranging class struggles over the past two decades. Stuart On Wed, 6 Mar 2019 at 20:26, Greg McDonald via Marxism < marxism@lists.csbs.utah.edu> wrote: > ******************** POSTING RULES & NOTES ******************** > #1 YOU MUST clip all extraneous text when replying to a message. > #2 This mail-list, like most, is publicly & permanently archived. > #3 Subscribe and post under an alias if #2 is a concern. > ***************************************************************** > > > > > Frankly, anyone who spent any time going around to communal councils > > there would recognise this as so much crap. > > > What took you do long? I was beginning to wonder if marxmail had swung > fully into the ranks of the Moronista party. > > > > > <https://lists.csbs.utah.edu/options/marxism/gregmc59%40gmail.com> > _________________________________________________________ > Full posting guidelines at: http://www.marxmail.org/sub.htm > Set your options at: > https://lists.csbs.utah.edu/options/marxism/stuartmunckton%40gmail.com > _________________________________________________________ Full posting guidelines at: http://www.marxmail.org/sub.htm Set your options at: https://lists.csbs.utah.edu/options/marxism/archive%40mail-archive.com
