> > For deniability to have any real world effect, there'd need to be a LOT > of people forging chat logs pretty routinely. As it's only relevant when > there's some breakdown in privacy, and that should hopefully be rare in a > good cryptographic system, getting people to routinely forge or edit logs > seems .... hard. > > It doesn't need to be routine, just frequent enough that nobody assumes > authencity.
The point is: it isn't, and frankly I'm highly sceptical it will ever be. Further, an unauthenticated chat log _is_ potentially more convincing than you are (see the anakata case for example), and no one stores authenticated chat logs that I know of. Do you? Relatedly: have you altered chat logs at some point? Specifically, have you _added_ stuff to a chat log? Do you know of an instance where this has happened? Would a judge, police office, prosecutor or jury have any knowledge about such a thing having happened? Would they decide that this is likely to have happened in any specific instance? Deniability is a solution looking for a problem, and so far it's not doing a great job of finding it. Best /P > _______________________________________________ > Messaging mailing list > [email protected] > https://moderncrypto.org/mailman/listinfo/messaging -- Petter Ericson ([email protected]) _______________________________________________ Messaging mailing list [email protected] https://moderncrypto.org/mailman/listinfo/messaging
