Jonathan, Hi.
So now I'm a Cartesian am I?
No.
Small thing this: could you please stop trying to find reasons not to deal
with what I actually say? It would please me.
In particular I would like you to deal with the fact that you committed a
U-turn on the "as if" in "as if aware" half-way through your last post for
which you gave no justification or even explanation. Have you been
preparing one? Yes you have - we'll get onto that, because like all treats
it must be saved to the last.
JONATHAN:
> Welcome aboard Marco. Your question as to whether or not we need the Awareness
> concept is a good one. I see this concept as an escape from the metaphysics of
> causality. I don't know about elephant, but Roger indicates that he mostly
> accepts the concept, but doesn't like the word "awareness" which happens to be
> the word that Platt chose when this thread got started.
ELEPHANT:
I see. So now that we didn't get the answer we were hoping for on the
"aware" topic, lets pretend we were talking about something else entirely.
And what's that?
I differ from Roger's views on this not one iota, BTW. But I don't
understand exactly what concept you are signing Roger up to in "mostly
accepts the concept", so I can't speak for anybody's views on that one.
Also, since you are apparently liable to change any given concept 180
degrees without warning, it seems to me unwise to say that I agree with you
on anything - it would be like signing a blank cheque.
BTW I entirely agree with what Roger says here:
> ROGER:
> Just to clarify, to my knowledge nobody has argued the replacement of VALUE
> for CAUSATION. This is a central tenet of the MOQ, and is one that I agree
> with. My argument has been that it is absurd to say that subatomic patterns
> are AWARE. I do not see 'awareness' as a requirement to escape the 'strict
> causation principle'. Again, to my way of thinking, if you are saying that
> neutrinos are aware, according to my dictionary you are saying they are
> "cognizant, conscious, sensible, alive, awake, and having knowledge of
> something, and that they can draw inferences from their experiences."
JONATHAN:
> Roger, you motivated me to look a 2 dictionaries I have in the house - the
> American Heritage and the Collins (British). What was very interesting is that
> both dictionaries included the word "mindful" in their definitions of
> awareness. I'd like to see Elephant's response to this definition - it implies
> that MIND can be CONTAINED in aware objects.
ELEPHANT:
No it doesn't. Short tutorial on the english language: a "bottleful" can be
contained by a stomach, a set of wine glasses, or nothing at all. A
"bottleful" is a measure, in this case of volume: thus the insertion of
"bottleful" into a sentence does not necesserily imply the containment of a
volume of liquid by a bottle. The grammar of "bottleful" is similar to
"litre". Similarly "mindful" is also a measure, in this case of awareness,
rather than volume. It is certainly not the claim that awareness comes
contained in physical objects.
I see absolutely no grounds to even suspect that, unless you are (for no
stated reason) assuming the equivalence of the terms "mind" and "brain".
Even if you are, the measurement grammar of the ending "-ful" invalidates
the conclusions you draw, since even "brainful" would not be proof that a
brainful of awareness is physically contained in a skull: awareness is being
measured in this case, not volume. But in any case "mind" does not mean
"brain" - so you are missing both belt and braces.
JONATHAN:
> Can any material object be said to contain mind?
ELEPHANT:
No.
An elucidation? Look, we know exactly what buckets contain: water.
Bottles? Wine. Molecules? Atoms. Atoms? Quarks etc. Notice a general
rule? Good.
What are you thinking Jonathan - that if we made the holes in the seive real
small we could catch consciousness?
JONATHAN:
> Is the human *body* aware (mindful), or is the body the human *without* the
> mind?
ELEPHANT:
"No", and again "No".
JONATHAN:
> My point is that we have to be careful (aware, mindful;-) of the context that
> produced the definitions that apper in modern dictionaries, and keep a look
> out for the influence of a certain celebrated French philosopher.
ELEPHANT:
Am I to undestand that you have hit upon a new method of doing philosophy?
Why yes, I think you have. Instead of deploying our reason, you would have
us consult the works of ***Rene Descartes*** (or Sartre, it don't really
matter). Anything he says we can confidently take as false - and that's how
we will come to the right conclusion on the question of awareness. Yippee!
But lo, what's this, a new and unreported manuscript bearing Rene Descartes'
name.... and what's within? Why, a 300 page anticipation of the MOQ in
every detail (surpressed to avoid controversy with the church). Now what
will we do? It looks like the Method-Of-Contradicting-Rene-Descartes isn't
so hot after all - perhaps we will actually have to do some thinking to work
out which of the things that Descartes said is right and which of them is
wrong. Oh, woe is us! For this is sore labour!
>
> ROGER:
> If we must say so, then did Pirsig have to say so too? Does Pirsig say so?
> (that they are aware, not that they "prefer" with italics around the term.)
> And if Pirsig didn't ever say so, then why is it we "must say" so? And if we
> must redefine awareness, exactly how is it we want to redefine it? Where
> will we keep this list of new definitions?
JONATHAN:
> Roger, should the MoQ ever become a dominant philosophy, the effects will
> surely be felt in dictionary definitions.
ELEPHANT:
Ha! (forgive me). And how will our converts understand us? Perhaps you
have the necessary communication skills to overcome the minor obstacle that
you have placed in your own path by electing not to speak english.
JONATHAN:
> While recognizing Pirsig's
> tremendous contribution, I also note his statement (in an old message to the
> Lila Squad) that most of the MoQ remains uncharted. IMO, the causality area is
> one where Pirsig has left us a lot of work.
ELPHANT:
That's just where I don't understand you, Jonathan. What is the "problem"
with RMP's stance on causality to which conscious atoms are supposed to be
the "solution"? I just don't get it. Like Roger says (and you at one point
agree), you can replace "causation" with value just fine while retaining the
"as if" quotation marks around "prefer". It works, and it isn't broke. So
why go hacking at the quotation marks and the "as if"? You just haven't
explained the need to do that at all. (you will do, you will...)
JONATHAN:
> Platt, to be fair, I think that some valid points are coming out. I like your
> question about viruses vs. rock (vs. humans), and have an interesting
> observation that relates to the dynamism=awareness that Marco brought up. It
> is certainly easier to define and describe the behaviour of an electron than a
> virus. As things get more complex, definitions become much more difficult,
> less rigorous and more error prone . . . . . . i.e. EASIER TO DEFY. Thus,
> statements about the "higher levels" of the MoQ being more dynamic may be no
> more than a trivial truism. I don't think it teaches us anything about the
> nature of awareness.
ELEPHANT:
It's not particulary easy or rigourous to define Europe. Does that make
Europe conscious? No. Complexity-consciousness theory makes no sense
what-so-ever. Nor have you demonstrated any need for it in the MOQ, or even
*compatibilty* with MOQ.
> ROGER:
>> So, my challenge to Jonathan, Marco and Platt is to:
>> 1) quit arbitrarily redefining awareness to mean "the ability to be
>> non-mechanistic and dynamic.". If you have to do so, at least tell people
>> how and why you redefine a perfectly good word when others could have
>> sufficed (ie "atoms are dynamic" or "atoms are non-mechanistic")
JONATHAN:
> Roger, you are twisting things. You already know my view that being
> "non-mechanistic" is not an "ability", but is the nature of nature. It is our
> definitions and laws that are mechanistic. You also miss the point that "atoms
> are aware" is a statement that cuts both ways - it says as much about
> awareness as it does about atoms. IMO, man has done a much better job at
> describing and defining atoms than he has at understanding awareness.
ELEPHANT:
Whoops. Your last sentence contradicts the one just before it.
Illuminating slip.
JONATHAN:
> Much of
> the mankind thinks that awareness and atoms belong to two different worlds,
> one called MIND and the other called MATTER!!!!
ELEPHANT:
Strikes me that you have read somewhere that the mind/matter dualism is
wrong, without ever understanding what that dualism was or what precisely
was wrong with it. FYI, this is all about substance. So long as you don't
talk about mind and matter as substances you are perfectly at liberty to
point out that mind and matter are not the same. The dangerous point of
view, the one which created problems for Descartes and which has been
rightly ridiculed by the philosophical community of late, is that which says
that mind and matter are two different kind of substances - where
"substance" has a meaning derived from Aristotle. Since Aristotelian
substance doesn't enter into my discussion of either mind or matter (Nor
Roger's I'll bet) your bringing the subject up is a rather bad sign
regarding your mindfulness.
"Mind" has a clear enough meaning in my use of it and it is not related to
substance. Substantial "Matter" I have not mentioned at all, since I follow
Pirsig in treating objects as constructions superimposed on the reality of
Value.
ROGER:
>> 2) let me know exactly which parts of the Webster definition of this word you
>> all throw around you believe actually applies to sub-atomic patterns
JONATHAN:
> All the words are problematic! They are all loaded. Whichever word we pick
> will first have to be defused so that nobody feels threatened. If it isn't
> Roger over awareness, it'll be someone else (maybe me) over some other word.
ELEPHANT:
Roger gave you the option of actually explaining what you mean. I'll add my
voice to that faint plea. You prefer, on such occasions, to argue that
no-one can really explain what they mean. Well shut up then.
ROGER:
>> 3) let me know if you have some logical proof that non-mechanistic implies
>> awareness (as conventionally defined)
JONATHAN:
> Play fair Roger. You know I can't give you anything that you'll accept.
> Let's just redefine awareness as the property as being like Woody Allen and
> say that atoms are just like him
> (well sperm cells are!!!).
ELEPHANT:
What's the difference between Woody Allen and New York? New York has an up
state.
(What's the similarity? They are both "aware". Hm... deep and thought
provoking stuff...... )
JONATHAN:
> Now on to Elephant - who I have certainly got wound up:
>
>> JONATHAN
>> If you were being true to your claims, you would say that nature
>> behaves *as if* it contains aware atoms.
>>
>
> ELEPHANT
>>> Yours is a trully constructive
>>> suggestion, and I accept it forthwith. . .
>
> JONATHAN
>> Now that you accept my "trully constructive" repositioning of *as if*, I
> will
>> apply Occam's Razor one again, and remove the *as if* altogether:
>> "nature contains aware atoms"
>
> ELEPHANT:
> WHAT?!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! That's no Ockhams razor, that's a mad slasher
> movie. Can you give me *ANY* justification for that bizare switchback? I'm
> open mouthed with astonishment.
JONATHAN:
> Elephant, when you insert *as if* into a statement, the purpose is usually to
> imply the opposite.
ELEPHANT:
Perhaps you mean that when I say "as if" I mean "not even apparently"? Well
no, actually, I really do mean "as if", that being the reason I used the
damm words. Care to take that on board?
JONATHAN:
> If I write "Elephant behaves *as if* he were almost human", the implication is
> that you are in truth not human.
ELEPHANT:
And in truth atoms do not prefer anything at all. Glad we agree.
JONATHAN:
> I have accepted that *as if* is implicit in ANY statement (i.e. an admission
> of fallibility). However, to insert [the "as if"?] into the statement "nature
contains aware
> atoms" has value only if you wish to present an alternative. This is what you
> imply, and what you fail to do. You may now close your mouth.
ELEPHANT:
And open it again like a goldfish.
Yes, as you conceed you have "accepted" that the *as if* is implicit in any
statement, and so far as i can see you haven't *argued* for it *at all*.
About the "present an alternative" gob-stoper, I confess I do not have any
clear idea what you are claiming. Is it that in order for me to say that
atoms behave "as if" they were aware I also have to say that atoms do *not*
behave "as if" they were aware, thus presenting "an alternative" in the
light of which my first claim can "has value"?
Well if that's it, your saying it is jolly odd. I thought you had already
presented just that alternative in the light of which my contrary claim has
value. What are you saying - that no-one can meaningfully say anything
unless they always and immediately say the opposite as well?
Well if that's your theory it would explain alot of things.
Become aware,
Elephant
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