Hi elephant,
(I neglected your points, too, and will address them).
I said:
<Saying that language is discrete (and that reality is "continuous") is a physical
metaphor.>
You objected:
<It cannot, in this case, be a "physical metaphor", since in order for there to be
the "discrete" stuff in physics that you claim to be the basis of the metaphor,
discrete language itself must be used to create it. Yours is thus a picture of a
snake eating itself.>
I would like to know what does that mean to you, then, that reality is "continuous".
Webster defines discrete as non-continuous, but I will be satisfied even if you
explain why reality is not discrete, without reference to continuous, if that is
easier. Beware (needless to say this to *you*, but well...) that equating
discreteness to language won't be a legal move, because: a) there would be no
meaning in saying that language is discrete; b) this equation is not acknowledged in
any dictionary, and this thread seems to be about the "real" meaning of words, not
one that we attach to them opportunistically.
Another point: I don't feel so confident in is that all discreteness in the world is
a consequence of language. I assume that we are now using the word "language" in a
very profound way, referring to basic structures of language as Chomsky's, rather
than any specific language. This makes me wonder if the "a priori"-ness you want to
attach to the discrete concept isn't the same of the property of belonging to the
"basic language" underlying all languages (proto-language?). I would like you to
address this point too (just honestly curious).
If you want me to point at a short-circuit in your first discussion, I can try this
one:
Elephant (previously)
<I take this to be a sign that the discrete/continous distiction is apriori and not
metaphorical in origin at all. This is in fact born out by the dictionary citation
which does not limit the distinction to spatio-temporal sequence, but applies it
*universally*.>
If "discrete" is apriori, you have this problem (IMHO):
- you partition language in <literal>, <metaphorical>, <none of them>, where the
third part of language is that which "takes objects off the ground"... "discrete"
(if apriori) doesn't fit into any of those. It is not literal (referred to any
object, since it is apriori wrt object) nor metaphorical (same reason). The third
option - "discrete" belongs to the part of the language that creates discreteness
seems to be a snake eating itself.
For the pleasure of arguing, I wish to add another point:
Elephant (previously):
<I don't enjoy your talk of "horizons". It appears to be Wittgenstein's "limit" -
a concept that as you know I don't entertain *at all*. Language as it is imposes
no "limits" on what can be said, nothing that the poet or the philosopher cannot
extend - that's what poets and philosophers *do* (what they are *for*).>
Strangely, poets and philosophers are a perfect representative of what I would use
as an example for my own position. (Also the fact that you somehow group the two
categories together is strange to me). Poets do not really (literally) "say": they
suggest. Poets are largely metaphorical and imprecise and quite often
self-contradictory (as refers to literal meaning). Even if a poem has a perfectly
clear and intelligible "manifest" meaning, we read it as a poem only when we have
the attitude of reading between the lines, hearing what it suggests, feeling the
feeling that words vaguely and indirectly describe. So my point was and still is:
The domain of language (taken literally) is discrete. The domain of language taken
metaphorically is "somehow" continuous because you have your intuition work, and as
we know, you have the (pre-, non-linguistic) intuition of continuous reality (this
should be developed further).
A "sad flower". "Flower" points to a class of referents. "Sad" points to another
class that is incompatible, literally. This incompatibility causes us to either drop
the poem or enter a state of mind where we do not take words literally. We are
within language, but willing to feel where language is "pointing" (a place outside
of its formal domain).
Your position for what regards talking about the unspeakable seems to be that you
actually speak about the boundaries of the speakable ("What does the manipulation of
symbols show us? It shows us what it leaves out"), which is also a honest thing to
do and probably the essence of metaphysics. But IMHO that is *not* the main thing
RMP and Lao-Tse did. I think they both managed to convey a "feeling" of something
that is beyond each and every line in their books.
As a last note, I am perfectly at ease with anyone telling me that I have a wrong
idea of Zen, simply because I think of course we all, always have a wrong idea of
Zen. Your kind of confidence that Zen paradoxes have a linear, rational solution
(i.e., the solution is that "clapping" does not mean "two hands" clapping), IMHO, is
exactly that which Zen paradoxes are trying to deconstruct.
Hoping some of the above has any value
Andrea
elephant ha scritto:
> Andrea,
>
> You write:
> > Since the subject lies on our horizon
> > (is
> > actually the tool by which we conceptualize, and we need to conceptualize to
> > understand/reply to questions), trying to answer short-circuits language.
>
> Yes, Andrea, the question of whether all language is or is not universally
> metaphorical is a very global question indeed - that doesn't prove that it
> is at or beyond some "horizon". Nor do I get the metaphorical connection
> between language and electricity. I gave a very full discussion on the
> substantive question of this tread, containing my own reasoning and
> conclusions, at the very outset. It created no contradictions or paradoxes
> or "short-circuits". Nor did it receive or any direct comprehending replies
> (except from Roger). Perhaps you didn't read it. If you want to say that
> it is imposible to address this question directly, please take my post
> (which addresses the question directly) and show me how I am really talking
> nonsense.
>
> What I said was:
>
> >
> > I'm particulaly interested because it seems to me that you can't call most
> > human language *literal* exactly, given that it's the words as begets the
> > objects, not the other way around. On the other hand, that doesn't
> > automatically make such words metaphorical - I mean "metaphorical" might not
> > be a direct opposite of "literal", there might be some langauge which is
> > neither a report of a thing in terms of itself, nor a depiction of a thing in
> > terms of another. Most language in fact. And if it's this third category of
> > language (neither metaphoric nor literal) which is really fundamental (what
> > gets the objects off the ground, so to speak, so that we can later come along
> > and be 'literal' [and 'metaphorical'] about them), maybe we want to [must] say
> > that metaphor *can't* be
> > all pervasive.
> > But then again we don't really know [haven't yet discussed] what metaphor
> > is....
>
> > If you say with one camp [mine, and the dictionary's] that it's depicting
> > one thing through another, then it looks like [is the case that] metaphor
> > cannot go right down to the root of language - because the
> > root is where you have no thing to describe anything in terms of.
>
> > But maybe
> > the initial act of naming, of numbering - maybe this too [in a sense, not
> > literal, since there isn't a "one thing" before the numbering, obviously] is
> > seeing one thing
> > in terms of another - imposing *formal* being on the *dynamic*..... Or is this
> > something else again from what we normally call "metaphor"
> > [Which is what I'd Say] - what say you?
>
> I made my points in a conversational style to encourage conversation. My
> main thesis is that language cannot be universally metaphorical "because the
> root is where you have no thing to describe anything [else] in terms of".
> Any caveats to that depend on our coming up with a creative and persuasive
> redefinition of metaphor - which I also hoped might happen (but has been
> singularly lacking).
>
> *Well now Andrea, would you like to engage my proposals on metaphor in the
> critical discussion I hoped to start, or are you content to speechify?*
>
> You need to be a lot more careful about reading Wittgenstein into Zen,
> Andrea - both on the question of what the nonsense is telling us, and on the
> question of where the nonsense starts.
>
> I don't enjoy your talk of "horizons". It appears to be Wittgenstein's
> "limit" - a concept that as you know I don't entertain *at all*. Language
> as it is imposes no "limits" on what can be said, nothing that the poet or
> the philosopher cannot extend - that's what poets and philosophers *do*
> (what they are *for*). The limits, such as they are, are imposed by
> *reality*, not language. Wittgenstein's talk of a limit imposed by language
> is largely a result of wanting all language to fit his model of extensive
> training ("slab!"), a mixing up of language with the limited (non-existent)
> imaginative capacities of the people (or robotic cyphers) who are used by
> language rather than the other way around.
>
> And yes Andrea, nonsense can inform - of course it *can* inform. The
> question is whether, on a case by case basis, it actually does.
>
> You talk a bit about informative nonsense in Zen.
>
> I don't think this fits with notions of "horizon" or "limit" at all.
>
> It was my impression that, for instance, the challenge "what is the sound of
> one hand clapping?" is intended to elicit enlightenment to the fact that our
> answer to the question depends entirely on how we *choose* to define the
> world, in particular the concept "clapping". One hand clapping? Nonsense -
> that is, if you define clapping as the sound of two hands coming together.
> But you could choose to define it differently, say, as any noise made by a
> hand on sudden contact with another body, any other body. You slap the
> whithers of your horse: this is the sound of one hand clapping. So in this
> case Zen isn't doing anything Wittgensteinian like symultaneously seeing and
> not seeing beyond the boundaries of language so as to draw them, or
> asserting and not asserting contradictions, but merely pointing out the true
> relation between rationalisations and the world.
>
> "The sound of one hand clapping" is informative nonsense because it can be
> enlightening about what nonsense statements are and why they are nonsense.
> What we are supposed to learn from the nonsense is a general Buddhist theme:
> that we have to take responsibility for our own actions - in this case the
> action of defining a word.
>
> My problem with Wittgenstein as you may have surmised from earlier posts, is
> that what his nonsense is supposed to inform us about turns out, on close
> inspection, to be nonsense as well. At that precise point I lose track of
> where the "information" is supposed to lie.
>
> Something to bear in mind in all cases where someone claims to be teaching
> through paradox. Be sure that the koan is a koan, a puzzle with a point,
> and not just a pile of gibberish wasting your time.
>
> If someone talks self-contradictory gibberish at you, and the up shot of
> this gibberish is that you are led (mysteriously) to believe the train is at
> six, while in fact it left the station at quater to four, you won't have
> been very much informed. You will have had nonsense talked at you though.
>
> Stay aware,
>
> Elephant
>
> > From: Andrea Sosio <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > Organization: Italtel S.p.A.
> > Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > Date: Mon, 02 Apr 2001 09:28:47 +0200
> > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > Subject: Re: MD rogers metaphors
> >
> >
> >
> > elephant guessed:
> >
> >> Andrea, I don't think you really want to say that Zen amounts to accepting
> >> incoherent stuff as valid answers to coherent questions. But I am just
> >> guessing.
> >
> > Well, no.
> > Who knows, maybe another physical metaphor may be understood, this time. Let's
> > try:
> > If a question addresses something that lies on your intellectual horizon, for
> > example, language. Of course I'm not referring to just "any and whatever"
> > question about language (e.g., what's a noun?), but some general question such
> > as "is all language metaphorical?"... Since the subject lies on our horizon
> > (is
> > actually the tool by which we conceptualize, and we need to conceptualize to
> > understand/reply to questions), trying to answer short-circuits language. The
> > answer would require a perspective from outside your horizon. So you build a
> > mock answer, which somehow, in your opinion, resembles what the "true" answer
> > should be. Nonsensical or self-contradictory statement seem to work better
> > than
> > other kinds of mock answers for Zen disciples, probably because they too
> > clearly
> > reveal the short-circuit that occurred.
> >
> > (Not that all contradictions work - they have to somehow resemble, in your own
> > opinion, what the true answer would be if we could phrase them. Surely some
> > contradictions have more value than others, don't you think so?)
> >
> > Andrea
> >
> > --
> > Andrea Sosio
> > RIM/PSPM/PPITMN
> > Tel. (8)9006
> > mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
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> >
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> >
>
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--
Andrea Sosio
RIM/PSPM/PPITMN
Tel. (8)9006
mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
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