Or create new separate or superseding norms. The revision of norms over time, and avoiding local contradictions between them, is a key part of the sources of epistemic accelerationism - Sellars, Brandom, etc. .
- I like this a lot - I think somewhere between the fallible pragmaticism of Peirce and the revisionary manifest image of Sellars we have a sober image of how rationalism can relate to situate error and incongruency. Your point earlier about the problematic nature of normativity I think can be approached via a notion of combining normativity with agency. That is, if the Brandomian normativist is also a norm-creator normativity becomes a rational construct that a subject works to invent, modify and redact. Between these I think the validity of the norm is found in its constant revision - likewise the defense of new rationalism and its ties to accelerating the means of both resistance and production might lie less in the sort of Adornian critique of instrumental rationality (and the move then to poetics and the like) but to a pluralization of rationality in the most scientist way possible. I think between Feyerabend and Stengers there might be a nice complement to the Peirce/Sellars/Brandom pragmatist continuum - in it we progress from rationalism to its revisions to their explosion. Both (Feyerabend and Stengers) having been branded (as always, by enemies) as irrationalists, they might be the most persistent exponent of a plural rationalism. Feyerabend at every moment demands debate and overturning of the precepts of any rational construct of experimental endeavour (having himself - somewhat comparably to Putnam - evolved through different positions that he would then come to "refute"/disagree with (empiricism, rationalism, eliminativism, anarchic disagreement, democratization, abundance), while Stengers evolves directly from the laboratory construct to ecology, politics - in a sense skipping traditional rationalism to the applied effects of activities. For me this is a strong area of accelerationist tendencies - questions like: what would a rationalist ecopolitics look like - how is revisionism, plurality and alterity connected - how can technological discourse evolve to a rationalist otherness that disagrees in essence with the progress of bureaucratic vagueness. Rob can you say more about the Casper algorithm? On Sun, May 1, 2016 at 12:36 AM, Rob Myers <r...@robmyers.org> wrote: > On 29/04/16 06:51 PM, erik zepka wrote: > > > > And when the questions, as both Ruth > > and Alan have effectively talked about, get to a realm of inhuman > > problematics, ecological, species-threatening, who should advise then? > > Deodands: > > https://forum.ethereum.org/discussion/392/deodands-dacs-for-natural-systems > > ;-) > > > We could at least say that for every categorical norm (a type of person, > > a type of organism, a type of biosphere) there's an exception and that > > considering that exception can help expand the norm. > > Or create new separate or superseding norms. The revision of norms over > time, and avoiding local contradictions between them, is a key part of > the sources of epistemic accelerationism - Sellars, Brandom, etc. . > > The current work on the "Casper" algorithm for Ethereum may end up as a > realisation in code of this kind of local-within-the-global consensus. > > > If we imagined an > > accelerationist advisory committee (maybe this is one), whatever our > > question, it might choose to attempt to make accountable whatever > > accelerationism then meant or did - the advisory committee then itself > > might be considered normative, but it doesn't subtract from the fact > > that it might have been a sober move within a given context. > > The Manifesto is against *fetishising* democratic proceduralism. > > As Ordinaryism points out, sometimes to increase our knowledge we do > have to listen to other people. > > But as Big Data point outs, what people *do* is a better indicator than > what they *say*. We are increasingly able to reason about both using > computing machinery. Epistemic accelerationism may ultimately lead to > the automation of philosophy, although this is not a sufficient or > necessary destiny for it. > > It would be difficult to regard this as impossible at the same time as > (for example) criticising algorithms for being racist. > > _______________________________________________ > NetBehaviour mailing list > NetBehaviour@netbehaviour.org > http://www.netbehaviour.org/mailman/listinfo/netbehaviour > -- erikzepka.com x-o-x-o-x.com
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