The danger is a bad resource,  If that can redirect the client to a arbitrary 
AS to phish the resource owner's credentials that is a bad thing.

The presumption is that the client knows where the trusted AS for that resource 
is, and if it needs to discover it that is a much bigger issue.

In the IMAP case the client probably needs to do discovery on the identifier 
itself to figure out where to send the user.

John B.
On 2012-05-15, at 1:18 PM, Sergey Shishkin wrote:

> Bill,
> 
> it might be me misreading the Implicit Grant Flow, but I understood it like 
> this:
> 
> 1. client tries to get a resource from server;
> 2. server redirects client to auth-service;
> 3. client authenticates against auth-service (HTTP Basic or whatever);
> 4. auth-service redirects client back to the resource;
> 5. client tries to get the resource providing the token.
> 
> In step 3 the client is of course responsible for protecting its password 
> from phishing, so auth-service should authenticate itself with a certificate.
> 
> Am I right? If, yes my idea was to use this flow while choosing a 
> standardized token - Bearer. But Bearer insists on 401 instead of redirects 
> and that confused me.
> 
> Sergey
> 
> On Tue, May 15, 2012 at 6:24 PM, William Mills <wmi...@yahoo-inc.com> wrote:
> You can hard configure it into your client, that's safe.  The problem comes 
> when the client can be sent to an arbitrary, possibly phishing, site to do 
> authentication.  If the client supports the password grant then it probably 
> just hands in the username and password without user interaction.
> 
> -bill
> 
> From: Sergey Shishkin <sergei.shish...@gmail.com>
> To: William Mills <wmi...@yahoo-inc.com> 
> Cc: "oauth@ietf.org" <oauth@ietf.org> 
> Sent: Tuesday, May 15, 2012 9:09 AM
> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Bearer: Response to an unauthenticated request
> 
> In my scenario I control both the resource provider and the token issuer and 
> I'm fine with the resource provider knowing the issuer. So, discovery is not 
> needed. Or do I miss something?
> 
> On Tue, May 15, 2012 at 6:04 PM, William Mills <wmi...@yahoo-inc.com> wrote:
> Yes, what you're running across here is the "discovery" problem.  How do you 
> discover the authentication endpoints for a service.  Unfortunately it turns 
> out returning that as part of the 401 has big security concerns.  It's still 
> being figured out.
> 
> From: Sergey Shishkin <sergei.shish...@gmail.com>
> To: oauth@ietf.org 
> Sent: Tuesday, May 15, 2012 5:12 AM
> Subject: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Bearer: Response to an unauthenticated request
> 
> While designing a hypermedia-driven API I'm evaluating possibilities to use 
> OAuth Bearer tokens for claims-based authorization. Currently I struggle with 
> how to communicate to the API client the way to obtain the token. In a 
> hypermedia-driven manner I don't want the API client to get this information 
> out of band, but rather let the client "just follow the links".
> 
> The Bearer draft 
> [http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-v2-bearer-19#section-3] advises 
> to send a 401 response with a WWW-Authenticate challenge specifying optional 
> realm and scope. The problem here: neither realm nor scope identify the token 
> issuer. 
> 
> The OAuth 2.0 draft 
> [http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-v2-26#section-4.1.1] suggests to 
> redirect the resource owner to the token issuer, IIRC. I like this way from 
> the hypermedia perspective, but still have mixed feelings about missed 401 
> and WWW-Authenticate challenge.
> 
> Did I missed some part of draft covering my scenario? Are there any known 
> grassroots implementations doing just that on the internet? Any opinion on 
> the subject is very much appreciated.
> 
> Thanks in advance,
> Sergey
> 
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> 
> 
> 
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