On 15/12/2016 22:09, Adrian Farrel wrote:
As for the proof of transit work, I think it is a bit of a mess at the moment. It seems to be growing new approaches and options, each with drawbacks and issues. And I'm not clear on the objectives. This might be handled as with the previous document by describing and scoping the experiment, but as currently written, it would appear that the intention is to research a number of potential approaches to proof of transit rather than to experiment with a particular protocol solution, and that might make the document better suited to the NMRG. So I would like to apply a bit more caution to that document.
I think that there are two proof of transit solutions needed. One for network operators for simple operational verification and one for commercial or regulatory situations. In the first case one can assume a benign environment and use a lightweight approach. In the other one must assume a hostile environment and apply a more stringent proof. Maybe one can be a variant of the other, but this should not be at the cost of performance and implementation expense.
- Stewart
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