At the moment, a malicious guest might negotiate VIRTIO_NET_F_MQ and !VIRTIO_NET_F_MQ in a loop which would be seen as qp_num going from 1 to n and n to 1 continuously, triggering datapath reconfigurations at each transition.
Limit this by only reconfiguring on increased qp_num. The previous patch reduced the observed cost of polling disabled queues, so the only cost is memory. Signed-off-by: David Marchand <david.march...@redhat.com> --- lib/netdev-dpdk.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/lib/netdev-dpdk.c b/lib/netdev-dpdk.c index 9088ff4..8a9723e 100644 --- a/lib/netdev-dpdk.c +++ b/lib/netdev-dpdk.c @@ -3517,8 +3517,8 @@ new_device(int vid) newnode = dev->socket_id; } - if (dev->requested_n_txq != qp_num - || dev->requested_n_rxq != qp_num + if (dev->requested_n_txq < qp_num + || dev->requested_n_rxq < qp_num || dev->requested_socket_id != newnode) { dev->requested_socket_id = newnode; dev->requested_n_rxq = qp_num; -- 1.8.3.1 _______________________________________________ dev mailing list d...@openvswitch.org https://mail.openvswitch.org/mailman/listinfo/ovs-dev