At the moment, a malicious guest might negotiate VIRTIO_NET_F_MQ and
!VIRTIO_NET_F_MQ in a loop which would be seen as qp_num going from 1 to
n and n to 1 continuously, triggering datapath reconfigurations at each
transition.
Limit this by only reconfiguring on increased qp_num.
The previous patch reduced the observed cost of polling disabled queues,
so the only cost is memory.
Signed-off-by: David Marchand <david.march...@redhat.com>
---
lib/netdev-dpdk.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/netdev-dpdk.c b/lib/netdev-dpdk.c
index 9ba8e67..fc554db 100644
--- a/lib/netdev-dpdk.c
+++ b/lib/netdev-dpdk.c
@@ -3510,8 +3510,8 @@ new_device(int vid)
newnode = dev->socket_id;
}
- if (dev->requested_n_txq != qp_num
- || dev->requested_n_rxq != qp_num
+ if (dev->requested_n_txq < qp_num
+ || dev->requested_n_rxq < qp_num
|| dev->requested_socket_id != newnode) {
dev->requested_socket_id = newnode;
dev->requested_n_rxq = qp_num;
--
1.8.3.1
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