Jerry list I’m afraid - most of your questions I can’t answer as I don’t readily understand them. As well, I don’t read those philosophers that you refer to ...
1’]/ You write that a seme is: a thought that originates externally from an external object.. I’m not sure that this is the definition of a ’seme’, which to my understanding, is a ‘class-name [4.538], as ‘anything which serves for any purpose as a substitutive for an object of which it is, in some sense, a representative or Sign” . Would an example be the odour of a skunk? 2] You refer to the ’sharp distinction’ between the interiority of the individual or community mind from the object’. Again, I’m not sure of your meaning - do you mean the difference between the knowledge base or ‘generalized habits-of-formation [ Thirdness] from the Dynamic Object? There must be a differentiation between entities for interaction to take place, but, there must also be some commonality of the knowledge base [ Thirdness] for that interaction to even have any functionality! I don’t understand your reference to ‘commodities’. 3] -1 Semiosis is always a process of the individual and within a common mind. -2 Are you asking for an outline of the process of the semiosic act?It’s been described on this list many times! See Peirce’s outline of ’the weather 8.314’ where the sign-vehicle [Peirce] engages with the External Object [ the weather] which sighting becomes the Dynamic Object, passing data to the knowledge base [representamen] which mediates and processes it to produce the Interpretants [the understanding of the weather].. 3- I can’t imagine that there are different forms of semiosis for different objects! Not sure of your meaning. -4 and 5- I’m afraid I don’t understand your questions. And - don’t understand your point about ’scientific notations in complex adaptive systems’ .. Sorry. [ I also don’t know if this is more than my one post a day per thread or what…I’ve been busy getting in a new washing machine and that’s been my exciting involvement of the day..] Edwina > On Aug 7, 2025, at 4:59 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Edwina: > > This question of “ding an sich” appears to me to be far more important to > reading CSP’s text than you acknowledge in your short post, understandably. > > . In modern analytical philosophy, this question unfolds into the meanings of > Ramsey sentences in the transformations of vocabularies from one scientific > language to another. (See Halvorson, 2019, The Logic in the Philosophy of > Science. CUP. See, section 8,1, p. 247). BTW, the introductory chapter in > this book is a remarkable historical critique of the multiple semantic > approaches to expressing historical scientific syntax / semantic antecedents. > Multiple approaches to semiosis are represented, described and evaluated. A > fun read! > > But, I have digressed. > My purpose is to address the roles of representations of forms / formula from > various philosophical perspective - Descarte, Kant, Volta, Rutherford, > Russell, Whitehead, Eddington and Carnap. > > I would like to pose a few questions about your synthesis of CSP’s texts. > The focus / locus of my questions relate to the concept of “seme” as a mental > object. By this I mean a thought (of any sort) that originates externally > from an observed object. Further, by this I seek to express a clear, clean > and sharp distinction between the interiority of an individual or community > mind from the object as “ding an sich”. Commodities are examples. > > Now, one asks questions about locus of semiosis. And its position in the > grammars of relationships. > > 1. Is semiosis a process of the individual mind in drawing (descriptive) > consequents? > 2. If so, what is the nature of the process? How are internal relations > generated? > 3. Are there different formed of semiosis for different external objects? > 4. If so, how are the forms separated and placed into propositions? > > Finally, the point that appears to be a bit metaphysical, > > 5. Is semiosis apriori uni-local or is it bi-local? How is the external > object related to the internal object? > > Underlying these questions are your views on scientific notations in “complex > adaptive systems”.More specifically, the abstractive nature of semiotics / > semiosis / semantics of syntagmatic propositions as legisigns. > > Thank in advance for your perpetual willingness to engage… > > Cheers > > Jerry > > >> On Aug 6, 2025, at 1:18 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >> List >> >> I think that both Jack and Jon should define what each one means by the term >> of ‘ding an sich’. I suspect that for each, the meanings are quite >> different - and therefore, we have a situation of tails chasing tails. >> >> As for the one-post-per-day- I’m against it, because I think it transforms >> an interactive discussion into a site of polemical sermons. >> >> And as an addition to this - I also suggest that posters should be careful >> to differentiate themselves from their ‘mentors’, so to speak. That is - I >> really don’t applaud the use of such phrases as ‘Peirce and I’ or 'Kant and >> I’… The ‘best buddies' analogy only works, I suggest, for existential >> reality and since neither gentleman is around..then.... >> >> With regard to the Peircean outline of the 'ding an sich’….it’s not the >> same, as I understand his outline, as the external object which is ‘anything >> that is not affected by any cognition, whether about it of not, of the man >> to whom it is external’ [5.525]. This simply means, to me, an object which >> is not being interacted with at the moment by this human.ie, until such time >> as it becomes a Dynamic Object rather than an ‘external object’..[EP2.478]. >> Though I will note that this external object, let’s call it a tree, is most >> certainly in the semiosic process of Dynamic Object interaction with other >> entities such as a caterpillar, an ant, a bird, .. >> >> Peirce continues in this section ….but, if you ‘exaggerate this …”you have >> the conception of what is not affected by any cognitions at all…and.. the >> notion of what does not affect cognition"…. That is - an entity which does >> not affect cognition and which is itself not affected by cognition. >> >> This means, as I understand it, an entity which is outside of the processes >> of Thirdness, because Thridness is the mode of being of Cognition or Mind, >> I would just add that for Peirce, cognition does not require a brain >> [4.551]…but is operative in all existentially..ie..existence requires >> continuity of organization or habits-of-form, and these habits can be >> understood as the operation of Mind/cognition - whether within the >> formation and operation of a chemical molecule, a bacterium or an insect. . >> >> And note further, that Thirdness is communal; ie, Forms or habits don't >> exist ‘per se’ [Aristotle vs Plato] but only within existing entities and >> operative as a general, as a commonality - operative within a collective and >> thus requires interaction…which is to say, semiosis. Can the ding an sich >> exist per se, outside of semiosis? >> In other words - is there such an entity operative without Mind? Doesn’t a >> chemical molecule exist only within its common general formulation? And if >> it does, then, doesn’t this put us more into the analysis offered by Peirce? >> >> So- the definition of ‘ding an sich’,in my view, requires clarification. >> >> Edwina >> >> . >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> On Aug 6, 2025, at 12:35 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Jack, List: >>> >>> In addition to the List post to which I am replying, you sent me three >>> off-List messages within 30 minutes last night, followed by a fourth one >>> this morning. Why not just wait a few hours to get some sleep, collect your >>> thoughts, and send a single on-List post--the one per thread per day that >>> is currently allowed--with everything that you wanted to say? I have come >>> to appreciate the wisdom of that restriction, so that is exactly what I am >>> doing here, quoting your off-List messages where I address them. I have >>> tried to limit the resulting length of this post by linking or citing some >>> relevant passages instead of quoting them. >>> >>> Your first statement below is inscrutable to me, but for "the tree >>> example," you initially said the following off-List. >>> >>> JRKC: Humans may use representational sign-systems but there is zero proof >>> (and none possible) that trees and so forth do. The tree's reality may have >>> no "representation" at all. And, insofar as it could, it would always be >>> beyond us to ever know. >>> >>> Not surprisingly for someone who has apparently embraced not only Kantian >>> epistemology and metaphysics, but also Saussurean linguistics, this >>> reflects a fundamental misunderstanding on your part--experience is a >>> strictly cognitive phenomenon, but semiosis is not. "It appears in the work >>> of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world; and one can >>> no more deny that it is really there, than that the colors, the shapes, >>> etc., of objects are really there" (CP 4.551, 1906). At this point, I join >>> Peirce in despairing of making this "broader conception" understood, at >>> least in your case. As you said later, "we probably diverge and that's >>> fine." >>> >>> I previously quoted Kant's own epistemological definition of a priori as >>> "knowledge that is absolutely independent of all experience" (emphasis >>> mine). Best I can tell, you are still misapplying that term to the >>> ontological concept of a thing-in-itself as that which is (supposedly) >>> "beyond all possible experience" and therefore unknowable. However, you >>> have yet to address Peirce's simple refutation of this, which I summarized >>> a couple of days ago >>> (https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2025-08/msg00008.html) as presented >>> in the very same paragraph where he refers to Kant as someone "whom I more >>> than admire" (CP 5.525, c. 1905; see also CP 6.95, 1903). Needless to say, >>> I continue to agree with him, and thus disagree with you and Kant; again, >>> "we probably diverge and that's fine." >>> >>> JRKC: Not to be a pain, but the Gödel part is also wrong. When you >>> demonstrate complete inequivalence it has a bearing on all possible >>> systems. That includes all possible meaning making systems--including this >>> one and any possible system Peirce uses. >>> >>> I still disagree--Gödel's incompleteness theorems strictly pertain to >>> sufficiently powerful formal systems as mathematical proofs that draw >>> necessary conclusions about hypothetical states of things. Applying them in >>> epistemology and ontology requires showing that both our knowledge and >>> reality itself conform to every single premiss, including a specific formal >>> system that meets the stipulated criteria. In other words, complete >>> inequivalence is a controversial hypothesis, not another established >>> theorem. >>> >>> JRKC: Any definition of an object through a symbolic system is a function >>> of the system, not the object. >>> >>> Objects do not have definitions, words do; and those definitions are indeed >>> functions of the sign system being employed, not the objects that they >>> purport to describe. In Peircean terms, the definition of a word is its >>> immediate interpretant, and whatever conforms to that definition is its >>> (potential) immediate object when it is incorporated into a proposition. >>> Any description of something using words is inevitably incomplete because >>> the words themselves and the concepts that they denote are general and >>> therefore indeterminate. As a result, "[T]he subject of discourse ... can, >>> in fact, not be described in general terms; it can only be indicated. The >>> actual world cannot be distinguished from a world of imagination by any >>> description. Hence the need of pronoun and indices, and the more >>> complicated the subject the greater the need of them" (CP 3.363, 1885; see >>> also CP 2.337, c. 1895, and CP 2.536, 1902). >>> >>> Peirce's Existential Graphs iconically illustrate this. In the Beta part, >>> names (words) denote general concepts and heavy lines of identity denote >>> indefinite individuals (objects) to which those concepts are attributed by >>> attaching their names. The effect of such combinations in various >>> propositions is making the concepts more determinate and the individuals >>> more definite--ascribing the same concept to multiple individuals, >>> increasing that concept's logical breadth; and ascribing different concepts >>> to the same individual, increasing each concept's logical depth (see the >>> last two CSP quotations in my post at >>> https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2025-07/msg00068.html). The product >>> of these for any particular concept is its information (CP 2.419, 1867), >>> which increases in both ways. >>> >>> This finally gets us back to my semiosic ontological hypothesis, which I >>> will discuss further in a separate post in that thread. >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian >>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt >>> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> >>> On Tue, Aug 5, 2025 at 11:13 PM Jack Cody <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>> I can prove that to/through (mediation) the human being, the thing cannot >>>> be what it is in asbentia of that relation nor need it even be similar or >>>> remotely equivalent. I assert it rhetorically here. >>>> >>>> Now the tree example below, qua "impossible to know how a tree experiences >>>> anything as the tree does for a human" - this has an obvious bearing on >>>> realities that cannot possibly be represented (unless we mean represented >>>> as in "made-up conceptual stuff which is not true"). >>>> >>>> As to ontology — and sorry for the double post — Kant's claim is >>>> absolutely ontological for the noumenal is an ontological distinction and >>>> use of "apriori" as beyond experience is catogircally demarcated from his >>>> use of it in other contexts. He means, by the first a priori, that the >>>> meaning of the "thing" as it is is beyond all possible experience and that >>>> is what the thing in itself, generally, refers/corresponds to. That is an >>>> ontological distinction (you cannot merely call it epistemological wheter >>>> you accept the ontological distinction or not). >>>> >>>> Best wishes, >>>> >>>> Jack >>> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >>> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at >>> https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at >>> https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the >>> links! >>> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] >>> . >>> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] >>> with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in >>> the body. 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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iu.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
