Edwina: This question of “ding an sich” appears to me to be far more important to reading CSP’s text than you acknowledge in your short post, understandably.
. In modern analytical philosophy, this question unfolds into the meanings of Ramsey sentences in the transformations of vocabularies from one scientific language to another. (See Halvorson, 2019, The Logic in the Philosophy of Science. CUP. See, section 8,1, p. 247). BTW, the introductory chapter in this book is a remarkable historical critique of the multiple semantic approaches to expressing historical scientific syntax / semantic antecedents. Multiple approaches to semiosis are represented, described and evaluated. A fun read! But, I have digressed. My purpose is to address the roles of representations of forms / formula from various philosophical perspective - Descarte, Kant, Volta, Rutherford, Russell, Whitehead, Eddington and Carnap. I would like to pose a few questions about your synthesis of CSP’s texts. The focus / locus of my questions relate to the concept of “seme” as a mental object. By this I mean a thought (of any sort) that originates externally from an observed object. Further, by this I seek to express a clear, clean and sharp distinction between the interiority of an individual or community mind from the object as “ding an sich”. Commodities are examples. Now, one asks questions about locus of semiosis. And its position in the grammars of relationships. 1. Is semiosis a process of the individual mind in drawing (descriptive) consequents? 2. If so, what is the nature of the process? How are internal relations generated? 3. Are there different formed of semiosis for different external objects? 4. If so, how are the forms separated and placed into propositions? Finally, the point that appears to be a bit metaphysical, 5. Is semiosis apriori uni-local or is it bi-local? How is the external object related to the internal object? Underlying these questions are your views on scientific notations in “complex adaptive systems”.More specifically, the abstractive nature of semiotics / semiosis / semantics of syntagmatic propositions as legisigns. Thank in advance for your perpetual willingness to engage… Cheers Jerry > On Aug 6, 2025, at 1:18 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > > List > > I think that both Jack and Jon should define what each one means by the term > of ‘ding an sich’. I suspect that for each, the meanings are quite different > - and therefore, we have a situation of tails chasing tails. > > As for the one-post-per-day- I’m against it, because I think it transforms an > interactive discussion into a site of polemical sermons. > > And as an addition to this - I also suggest that posters should be careful to > differentiate themselves from their ‘mentors’, so to speak. That is - I > really don’t applaud the use of such phrases as ‘Peirce and I’ or 'Kant and > I’… The ‘best buddies' analogy only works, I suggest, for existential reality > and since neither gentleman is around..then.... > > With regard to the Peircean outline of the 'ding an sich’….it’s not the same, > as I understand his outline, as the external object which is ‘anything that > is not affected by any cognition, whether about it of not, of the man to whom > it is external’ [5.525]. This simply means, to me, an object which is not > being interacted with at the moment by this human.ie, until such time as it > becomes a Dynamic Object rather than an ‘external object’..[EP2.478]. Though > I will note that this external object, let’s call it a tree, is most > certainly in the semiosic process of Dynamic Object interaction with other > entities such as a caterpillar, an ant, a bird, .. > > Peirce continues in this section ….but, if you ‘exaggerate this …”you have > the conception of what is not affected by any cognitions at all…and.. the > notion of what does not affect cognition"…. That is - an entity which does > not affect cognition and which is itself not affected by cognition. > > This means, as I understand it, an entity which is outside of the processes > of Thirdness, because Thridness is the mode of being of Cognition or Mind, I > would just add that for Peirce, cognition does not require a brain > [4.551]…but is operative in all existentially..ie..existence requires > continuity of organization or habits-of-form, and these habits can be > understood as the operation of Mind/cognition - whether within the formation > and operation of a chemical molecule, a bacterium or an insect. . > > And note further, that Thirdness is communal; ie, Forms or habits don't exist > ‘per se’ [Aristotle vs Plato] but only within existing entities and operative > as a general, as a commonality - operative within a collective and thus > requires interaction…which is to say, semiosis. Can the ding an sich exist > per se, outside of semiosis? > In other words - is there such an entity operative without Mind? Doesn’t a > chemical molecule exist only within its common general formulation? And if it > does, then, doesn’t this put us more into the analysis offered by Peirce? > > So- the definition of ‘ding an sich’,in my view, requires clarification. > > Edwina > > . > > > > > > > >> On Aug 6, 2025, at 12:35 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >> Jack, List: >> >> In addition to the List post to which I am replying, you sent me three >> off-List messages within 30 minutes last night, followed by a fourth one >> this morning. Why not just wait a few hours to get some sleep, collect your >> thoughts, and send a single on-List post--the one per thread per day that is >> currently allowed--with everything that you wanted to say? I have come to >> appreciate the wisdom of that restriction, so that is exactly what I am >> doing here, quoting your off-List messages where I address them. I have >> tried to limit the resulting length of this post by linking or citing some >> relevant passages instead of quoting them. >> >> Your first statement below is inscrutable to me, but for "the tree example," >> you initially said the following off-List. >> >> JRKC: Humans may use representational sign-systems but there is zero proof >> (and none possible) that trees and so forth do. The tree's reality may have >> no "representation" at all. And, insofar as it could, it would always be >> beyond us to ever know. >> >> Not surprisingly for someone who has apparently embraced not only Kantian >> epistemology and metaphysics, but also Saussurean linguistics, this reflects >> a fundamental misunderstanding on your part--experience is a strictly >> cognitive phenomenon, but semiosis is not. "It appears in the work of bees, >> of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world; and one can no more >> deny that it is really there, than that the colors, the shapes, etc., of >> objects are really there" (CP 4.551, 1906). At this point, I join Peirce in >> despairing of making this "broader conception" understood, at least in your >> case. As you said later, "we probably diverge and that's fine." >> >> I previously quoted Kant's own epistemological definition of a priori as >> "knowledge that is absolutely independent of all experience" (emphasis >> mine). Best I can tell, you are still misapplying that term to the >> ontological concept of a thing-in-itself as that which is (supposedly) >> "beyond all possible experience" and therefore unknowable. However, you have >> yet to address Peirce's simple refutation of this, which I summarized a >> couple of days ago >> (https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2025-08/msg00008.html) as presented >> in the very same paragraph where he refers to Kant as someone "whom I more >> than admire" (CP 5.525, c. 1905; see also CP 6.95, 1903). Needless to say, I >> continue to agree with him, and thus disagree with you and Kant; again, "we >> probably diverge and that's fine." >> >> JRKC: Not to be a pain, but the Gödel part is also wrong. When you >> demonstrate complete inequivalence it has a bearing on all possible systems. >> That includes all possible meaning making systems--including this one and >> any possible system Peirce uses. >> >> I still disagree--Gödel's incompleteness theorems strictly pertain to >> sufficiently powerful formal systems as mathematical proofs that draw >> necessary conclusions about hypothetical states of things. Applying them in >> epistemology and ontology requires showing that both our knowledge and >> reality itself conform to every single premiss, including a specific formal >> system that meets the stipulated criteria. In other words, complete >> inequivalence is a controversial hypothesis, not another established theorem. >> >> JRKC: Any definition of an object through a symbolic system is a function of >> the system, not the object. >> >> Objects do not have definitions, words do; and those definitions are indeed >> functions of the sign system being employed, not the objects that they >> purport to describe. In Peircean terms, the definition of a word is its >> immediate interpretant, and whatever conforms to that definition is its >> (potential) immediate object when it is incorporated into a proposition. Any >> description of something using words is inevitably incomplete because the >> words themselves and the concepts that they denote are general and therefore >> indeterminate. As a result, "[T]he subject of discourse ... can, in fact, >> not be described in general terms; it can only be indicated. The actual >> world cannot be distinguished from a world of imagination by any >> description. Hence the need of pronoun and indices, and the more complicated >> the subject the greater the need of them" (CP 3.363, 1885; see also CP >> 2.337, c. 1895, and CP 2.536, 1902). >> >> Peirce's Existential Graphs iconically illustrate this. In the Beta part, >> names (words) denote general concepts and heavy lines of identity denote >> indefinite individuals (objects) to which those concepts are attributed by >> attaching their names. The effect of such combinations in various >> propositions is making the concepts more determinate and the individuals >> more definite--ascribing the same concept to multiple individuals, >> increasing that concept's logical breadth; and ascribing different concepts >> to the same individual, increasing each concept's logical depth (see the >> last two CSP quotations in my post at >> https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2025-07/msg00068.html). The product >> of these for any particular concept is its information (CP 2.419, 1867), >> which increases in both ways. >> >> This finally gets us back to my semiosic ontological hypothesis, which I >> will discuss further in a separate post in that thread. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt >> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> >> On Tue, Aug 5, 2025 at 11:13 PM Jack Cody <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> I can prove that to/through (mediation) the human being, the thing cannot >>> be what it is in asbentia of that relation nor need it even be similar or >>> remotely equivalent. I assert it rhetorically here. >>> >>> Now the tree example below, qua "impossible to know how a tree experiences >>> anything as the tree does for a human" - this has an obvious bearing on >>> realities that cannot possibly be represented (unless we mean represented >>> as in "made-up conceptual stuff which is not true"). >>> >>> As to ontology — and sorry for the double post — Kant's claim is absolutely >>> ontological for the noumenal is an ontological distinction and use of >>> "apriori" as beyond experience is catogircally demarcated from his use of >>> it in other contexts. He means, by the first a priori, that the meaning of >>> the "thing" as it is is beyond all possible experience and that is what the >>> thing in itself, generally, refers/corresponds to. That is an ontological >>> distinction (you cannot merely call it epistemological wheter you accept >>> the ontological distinction or not). >>> >>> Best wishes, >>> >>> Jack >> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at >> https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at >> https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the >> links! >> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . >> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] >> with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in >> the body. More at https://list.iu.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . >> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and >> co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with > UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the > body. More at https://list.iu.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iu.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
