> > Jerry list > > I’m afraid - most of your questions I can’t answer as I don’t readily > understand them. As well, I don’t read those philosophers that you refer to > ... > > 1’]/ You write that a seme is: a thought that originates externally from an > external object.. I’m not sure that this is the definition of a ’seme’, > which to my understanding, is a ‘class-name [4.538], as ‘anything which > serves for any purpose as a substitutive for an object of which it is, in > some sense, a representative or Sign” . Would an example be the odour of a > skunk? > > 2] You refer to the ’sharp distinction’ between the interiority of the > individual or community mind from the object’. Again, I’m not sure of your > meaning - do you mean the difference between the knowledge base or > ‘generalized habits-of-formation [ Thirdness] from the Dynamic Object? There > must be a differentiation between entities for interaction to take place, > but, there must also be some commonality of the knowledge base [ Thirdness] > for that interaction to even have any functionality! > > I don’t understand your reference to ‘commodities’. > > 3] -1 Semiosis is always a process of the individual and within a common > mind. > -2 Are you asking for an outline of the process of the semiosic act?It’s been > described on this list many times! See Peirce’s outline of ’the weather > 8.314’ where the sign-vehicle [Peirce] engages with the External Object [ the > weather] which sighting becomes the Dynamic Object, passing data to the > knowledge base [representamen] which mediates and processes it to produce the > Interpretants [the understanding of the weather].. > 3- I can’t imagine that there are different forms of semiosis for different > objects! Not sure of your meaning. > -4 and 5- I’m afraid I don’t understand your questions. > > And - don’t understand your point about ’scientific notations in complex > adaptive systems’ .. > > Sorry. [ I also don’t know if this is more than my one post a day per thread > or what…I’ve been busy getting in a new washing machine and that’s been my > exciting involvement of the day..] > > Edwina > >> On Aug 7, 2025, at 4:59 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >> Edwina: >> >> This question of “ding an sich” appears to me to be far more important to >> reading CSP’s text than you acknowledge in your short post, understandably. >> >> . In modern analytical philosophy, this question unfolds into the meanings >> of Ramsey sentences in the transformations of vocabularies from one >> scientific language to another. (See Halvorson, 2019, The Logic in the >> Philosophy of Science. CUP. See, section 8,1, p. 247). BTW, the >> introductory chapter in this book is a remarkable historical critique of the >> multiple semantic approaches to expressing historical scientific syntax / >> semantic antecedents. Multiple approaches to semiosis are represented, >> described and evaluated. A fun read! >> >> But, I have digressed. >> My purpose is to address the roles of representations of forms / formula >> from various philosophical perspective - Descarte, Kant, Volta, Rutherford, >> Russell, Whitehead, Eddington and Carnap. >> >> I would like to pose a few questions about your synthesis of CSP’s texts. >> The focus / locus of my questions relate to the concept of “seme” as a >> mental object. By this I mean a thought (of any sort) that originates >> externally from an observed object. Further, by this I seek to express a >> clear, clean and sharp distinction between the interiority of an individual >> or community mind from the object as “ding an sich”. Commodities are >> examples. >> >> Now, one asks questions about locus of semiosis. And its position in the >> grammars of relationships. >> >> 1. Is semiosis a process of the individual mind in drawing (descriptive) >> consequents? >> 2. If so, what is the nature of the process? How are internal relations >> generated? >> 3. Are there different formed of semiosis for different external objects? >> 4. If so, how are the forms separated and placed into propositions? >> >> Finally, the point that appears to be a bit metaphysical, >> >> 5. Is semiosis apriori uni-local or is it bi-local? How is the external >> object related to the internal object? >> >> Underlying these questions are your views on scientific notations in >> “complex adaptive systems”.More specifically, the abstractive nature of >> semiotics / semiosis / semantics of syntagmatic propositions as legisigns. >> >> Thank in advance for your perpetual willingness to engage… >> >> Cheers >> >> Jerry >> >> >>> On Aug 6, 2025, at 1:18 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>> List >>> >>> I think that both Jack and Jon should define what each one means by the >>> term of ‘ding an sich’. I suspect that for each, the meanings are quite >>> different - and therefore, we have a situation of tails chasing tails. >>> >>> As for the one-post-per-day- I’m against it, because I think it transforms >>> an interactive discussion into a site of polemical sermons. >>> >>> And as an addition to this - I also suggest that posters should be careful >>> to differentiate themselves from their ‘mentors’, so to speak. That is - I >>> really don’t applaud the use of such phrases as ‘Peirce and I’ or 'Kant and >>> I’… The ‘best buddies' analogy only works, I suggest, for existential >>> reality and since neither gentleman is around..then.... >>> >>> With regard to the Peircean outline of the 'ding an sich’….it’s not the >>> same, as I understand his outline, as the external object which is >>> ‘anything that is not affected by any cognition, whether about it of not, >>> of the man to whom it is external’ [5.525]. This simply means, to me, an >>> object which is not being interacted with at the moment by this human.ie, >>> until such time as it becomes a Dynamic Object rather than an ‘external >>> object’..[EP2.478]. Though I will note that this external object, let’s >>> call it a tree, is most certainly in the semiosic process of Dynamic >>> Object interaction with other entities such as a caterpillar, an ant, a >>> bird, .. >>> >>> Peirce continues in this section ….but, if you ‘exaggerate this …”you have >>> the conception of what is not affected by any cognitions at all…and.. the >>> notion of what does not affect cognition"…. That is - an entity which does >>> not affect cognition and which is itself not affected by cognition. >>> >>> This means, as I understand it, an entity which is outside of the processes >>> of Thirdness, because Thridness is the mode of being of Cognition or Mind, >>> I would just add that for Peirce, cognition does not require a brain >>> [4.551]…but is operative in all existentially..ie..existence requires >>> continuity of organization or habits-of-form, and these habits can be >>> understood as the operation of Mind/cognition - whether within the >>> formation and operation of a chemical molecule, a bacterium or an insect. . >>> >>> And note further, that Thirdness is communal; ie, Forms or habits don't >>> exist ‘per se’ [Aristotle vs Plato] but only within existing entities and >>> operative as a general, as a commonality - operative within a collective >>> and thus requires interaction…which is to say, semiosis. Can the ding an >>> sich exist per se, outside of semiosis? >>> In other words - is there such an entity operative without Mind? Doesn’t a >>> chemical molecule exist only within its common general formulation? And if >>> it does, then, doesn’t this put us more into the analysis offered by Peirce? >>> >>> So- the definition of ‘ding an sich’,in my view, requires clarification. >>> >>> Edwina >>> >>> . >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> On Aug 6, 2025, at 12:35 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Jack, List: >>>> >>>> In addition to the List post to which I am replying, you sent me three >>>> off-List messages within 30 minutes last night, followed by a fourth one >>>> this morning. Why not just wait a few hours to get some sleep, collect >>>> your thoughts, and send a single on-List post--the one per thread per day >>>> that is currently allowed--with everything that you wanted to say? I have >>>> come to appreciate the wisdom of that restriction, so that is exactly what >>>> I am doing here, quoting your off-List messages where I address them. I >>>> have tried to limit the resulting length of this post by linking or citing >>>> some relevant passages instead of quoting them. >>>> >>>> Your first statement below is inscrutable to me, but for "the tree >>>> example," you initially said the following off-List. >>>> >>>> JRKC: Humans may use representational sign-systems but there is zero proof >>>> (and none possible) that trees and so forth do. The tree's reality may >>>> have no "representation" at all. And, insofar as it could, it would always >>>> be beyond us to ever know. >>>> >>>> Not surprisingly for someone who has apparently embraced not only Kantian >>>> epistemology and metaphysics, but also Saussurean linguistics, this >>>> reflects a fundamental misunderstanding on your part--experience is a >>>> strictly cognitive phenomenon, but semiosis is not. "It appears in the >>>> work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world; and >>>> one can no more deny that it is really there, than that the colors, the >>>> shapes, etc., of objects are really there" (CP 4.551, 1906). At this >>>> point, I join Peirce in despairing of making this "broader conception" >>>> understood, at least in your case. As you said later, "we probably diverge >>>> and that's fine." >>>> >>>> I previously quoted Kant's own epistemological definition of a priori as >>>> "knowledge that is absolutely independent of all experience" (emphasis >>>> mine). Best I can tell, you are still misapplying that term to the >>>> ontological concept of a thing-in-itself as that which is (supposedly) >>>> "beyond all possible experience" and therefore unknowable. However, you >>>> have yet to address Peirce's simple refutation of this, which I summarized >>>> a couple of days ago >>>> (https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2025-08/msg00008.html) as >>>> presented in the very same paragraph where he refers to Kant as someone >>>> "whom I more than admire" (CP 5.525, c. 1905; see also CP 6.95, 1903). >>>> Needless to say, I continue to agree with him, and thus disagree with you >>>> and Kant; again, "we probably diverge and that's fine." >>>> >>>> JRKC: Not to be a pain, but the Gödel part is also wrong. When you >>>> demonstrate complete inequivalence it has a bearing on all possible >>>> systems. That includes all possible meaning making systems--including this >>>> one and any possible system Peirce uses. >>>> >>>> I still disagree--Gödel's incompleteness theorems strictly pertain to >>>> sufficiently powerful formal systems as mathematical proofs that draw >>>> necessary conclusions about hypothetical states of things. Applying them >>>> in epistemology and ontology requires showing that both our knowledge and >>>> reality itself conform to every single premiss, including a specific >>>> formal system that meets the stipulated criteria. In other words, complete >>>> inequivalence is a controversial hypothesis, not another established >>>> theorem. >>>> >>>> JRKC: Any definition of an object through a symbolic system is a function >>>> of the system, not the object. >>>> >>>> Objects do not have definitions, words do; and those definitions are >>>> indeed functions of the sign system being employed, not the objects that >>>> they purport to describe. In Peircean terms, the definition of a word is >>>> its immediate interpretant, and whatever conforms to that definition is >>>> its (potential) immediate object when it is incorporated into a >>>> proposition. Any description of something using words is inevitably >>>> incomplete because the words themselves and the concepts that they denote >>>> are general and therefore indeterminate. As a result, "[T]he subject of >>>> discourse ... can, in fact, not be described in general terms; it can only >>>> be indicated. The actual world cannot be distinguished from a world of >>>> imagination by any description. Hence the need of pronoun and indices, and >>>> the more complicated the subject the greater the need of them" (CP 3.363, >>>> 1885; see also CP 2.337, c. 1895, and CP 2.536, 1902). >>>> >>>> Peirce's Existential Graphs iconically illustrate this. In the Beta part, >>>> names (words) denote general concepts and heavy lines of identity denote >>>> indefinite individuals (objects) to which those concepts are attributed by >>>> attaching their names. The effect of such combinations in various >>>> propositions is making the concepts more determinate and the individuals >>>> more definite--ascribing the same concept to multiple individuals, >>>> increasing that concept's logical breadth; and ascribing different >>>> concepts to the same individual, increasing each concept's logical depth >>>> (see the last two CSP quotations in my post at >>>> https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2025-07/msg00068.html). The product >>>> of these for any particular concept is its information (CP 2.419, 1867), >>>> which increases in both ways. >>>> >>>> This finally gets us back to my semiosic ontological hypothesis, which I >>>> will discuss further in a separate post in that thread. >>>> >>>> Regards, >>>> >>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>>> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian >>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt >>>> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>>> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> >>>> On Tue, Aug 5, 2025 at 11:13 PM Jack Cody <[email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>>> I can prove that to/through (mediation) the human being, the thing cannot >>>>> be what it is in asbentia of that relation nor need it even be similar or >>>>> remotely equivalent. I assert it rhetorically here. >>>>> >>>>> Now the tree example below, qua "impossible to know how a tree >>>>> experiences anything as the tree does for a human" - this has an obvious >>>>> bearing on realities that cannot possibly be represented (unless we mean >>>>> represented as in "made-up conceptual stuff which is not true"). >>>>> >>>>> As to ontology — and sorry for the double post — Kant's claim is >>>>> absolutely ontological for the noumenal is an ontological distinction and >>>>> use of "apriori" as beyond experience is catogircally demarcated from his >>>>> use of it in other contexts. He means, by the first a priori, that the >>>>> meaning of the "thing" as it is is beyond all possible experience and >>>>> that is what the thing in itself, generally, refers/corresponds to. That >>>>> is an ontological distinction (you cannot merely call it epistemological >>>>> wheter you accept the ontological distinction or not). >>>>> >>>>> Best wishes, >>>>> >>>>> Jack >>>> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >>>> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at >>>> https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at >>>> https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the >>>> links! >>>> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] >>>> . >>>> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] >>>> with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing >>>> in the body. More at https://list.iu.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . >>>> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and >>>> co-managed by him and Ben Udell. >>> >>> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >>> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at >>> https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at >>> https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the >>> links! >>> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] >>> . >>> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] >>> with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in >>> the body. More at https://list.iu.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . >>> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and >>> co-managed by him and Ben Udell. >> >
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iu.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
