Jerry, Edwina, List, Jerry, Jon brought this up subsequently in a slightly different thread—and I intend to reply there also—but one must, I think, note that the most significant ethical wins in human history have been blind to aesthetics (in the literal sense) altogether: emancipation (race-based slavery) and, well, emancipation (gender-based slavery [of a kind]). To disregard form entirely vis-à-vis ethnicity/race and gender/sexuality (I mean women’s emancipation and also the various civil rights movements to end segregation—not just in the US) and to see/recognize simply the human being… this is not an aesthetic? The “content of one’s [human] character”—rather important. It is the same, in rhetoric, as “all are created/born equal.” What I am pointing to is that I do not see an aesthetical value to these movements insofar as one would equate the traits, physical, with the ideal, non-physical. Indeed, the entire point of those movements is to ignore such traits insofar as they would otherwise render one equal or inferior. What is there to admire? It is the right thing to do. It is obviously “true.” But it is not a painting whose form I can study and admire for years, cultivating it as if it were a commodity with its own special language—though, at a different “level,” such movements certainly do have their own special language. And more broadly: what is there to discuss, if not ethics? I mean this seriously. If you remove ethics from economic theory, you essentially have no economics—despite economists over the centuries not always agreeing on how to implement policies with respect to macro-goals (ideals which stand as macro to technical/literal macroeconomics). Is it secretive? I’m not sure. The “ethics” I mean is the one which everyone acts with all the time—though not everyone has ever read a book about it. A bit like the capacity to speak language without having to be a linguist (and some would say that is preferable—not sure if the metaphor fully carries here). Whilst JAS in a different post—which needs a different reply—noted that there are certain things we already know and do not need infinite inquiry for, I maintain that the only truths we could know already and not require infinite inquiry for are ethical truths. As I write this, we are within some modality of thirdness (with indexicality of various kinds, and thus secondness too), but what interests me is the firstness of ethics. That is, such—ethical behavior, or the immediate feeling that something is right or wrong—is clearly a priori with respect to its codification in texts like these. And given certain empirical measures of testing, including things like polls over time (the only test for ethics other than some novel methods), I am interested in identifying that verified “truth” which I am pointing/indexing toward here, and which is universal, as being very much a priori with respect to my pointing. Ethical truth merely enters the “register/langue” as some variety of secondness/thirdness (no doubt). But surely it must precede these—because when I feel a sensation of offense at an unethical act, the spoken or written account of it is not the same as what I have felt. That sensation is a mode of firstness, irreducible to the symbolic, and can only be acting upon a genuinely truthful “resource” common to all people. This very much interests me. Thus, I ask if aesthetic is right when we consider that truthful ethical feeling/sensation (tone/etc) is not really formal at all? And when the truthful/ethical/moral thing to do, has, quite literally, been to "disregard form" (as differentiation qua equality..). Thus, a sense of injustice against one's own self or others, or both, is rather often aroused in the world we live in, and given we need ethical progress, I do not doubt that much of that feeling is "truthful" (micro to macro). Therefore, it is the firstness of ethics, which intrigues me with respect to Peirce. This is half-baked, I admit, but I think you can see there is something there? (Maybe not). Best, Jack ________________________________ From: Jerry Rhee <[email protected]> Sent: Monday, September 15, 2025 7:56 PM To: [email protected] <[email protected]>; Jack Cody <[email protected]> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness and Its Function
Hi Jack, Edwina, list, other people, Where do you stand with respect to the bold assertion by Peirce in CP 5.36? He seems to indicate that your problem is an old problem. What is it you admire of Ethics? What is its secret (ART 57, or do I mean ART 37)? I mean, is esthetics only for imbeciles or the useless- merely a matter we desire to forget? But we cannot get any clue to the secret of Ethics -- a most entrancing field of thought but soon broadcast with pitfalls - until we have first made up our formula for what it is that we are prepared to admire. I do not care what doctrine of ethics be embraced, it will always be so. (CP 5.36). Best, Jerry Rhee “It was this turn in which I thought the poets had preceded him, for it had always been a puzzle to me how the principle of telling lies like the truth, upon which all of Greek poetry rests, could precede the telling of the truth, for it seemed obvious to me, as it had to Socrates, that one cannot lie knowingly unless one knows the truth.” On Mon, Sep 15, 2025 at 1:26 PM Jack Cody <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: Edwina, List, ME: "I have but one note to add: The Real, for me, can only be an "ethical understanding" for this, how we practice with respect to ourselves and among each other, is the only practical constant that remains regardless of one's view of the universe or particular physical/metaphysical understanding. That's where I locate "truth" —in ethical practice whereby ideal is not idealism but necessarily true in the most pragmatic sense of the term." ----------------------------------- I'd like to press the above in the context of "dynamic object(s)". If one assumes "convergence" within Peirce's system, it seems evident to me that one has to pay the price, small or large, of the dynamic(al) object insofar as I understand that (almost as static, if not quite, or literally, static). Which leads to me to reject for the moment the idea of positivist knowledge with respect to things which may or may not be known, ever, and rather pragmatically relocate the debate within the most fundamental dialectic we have: "ethics". Though many books have been written on ethics, I do not believe a thousand years makes much of a difference (or an infinite period at that) with respect to the idea that "Murder is false/entirely wrong" (that harm inflicted, generally, is almost always, if not always, false/wrong). With that in mind, one must surely conclude that the Dynamic Object of that "moral judgement" is already "known" and is scarcely possible that we could know "why" any more in an infinite period than we already do? That is, we can argue catechism until the cows come home but we all surely know, innately (I sense arguments?), that these things are just "wrong". I see no value in infinite inquiry here —that is, no one is coming along with a "...and to murder was wrong because..." revelation which overrides basic innate moral instinct (or judgement) as we already have it. And thus, no matter what, I really do think ethics, as the most truthful way in which to treat one's self and lifeforms around one, is always "constant" —all ideas regarding the make-up of the universe or the atom (much the same?) do nothing to the idea (not really an idea, for surely this must emerge from pure firstness which, though technically "possible" in Peirce, may, in prohibition terms be said to be a "resource" which when required, one can draw on, and thus always actual and possible without contradiction) —do nothing to the idea that, practically, we already have a constant, which in global terms, we treat as if it scarcely existed (ETHICS). I've long since assumed that literalist versions of Plato's Cave aside, the only actual question in such situations, (an actually genuine "solution"), is ethics. It can be nothing else. And so, from firstness-soundness-thirdness, DO/Inf Inq, all to/through ethics. There is a better response in what I've said there —even the germs of a paper, but I wanted to make a brief contribution and I think a truthful one (I would like to hear people's opinions on the idea that truthful ethics is always universal, that is, not nominalist, and already, in so many respects, decided/determined, if not actualized —which is where one might cite "inquiry"? Though I maintain that 99% of all ethical principles one needs are basically innate and stem from the idea, never selfish, that none ought be able to do "one" harm ("learned" as a child...). We merely extend that to other people —though as a global society, despite everyone knowing these things, and knowing them insofar as they ever will, we seem rather crap at enforcing it consistently (we are antediluvian in this respect). Best, Jack ________________________________ From: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> on behalf of Jack Cody <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> Sent: Sunday, September 14, 2025 6:21 PM To: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>; Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness and Its Function Edwina, List, I think that post is very well done. Precise epistemological location and also a clearly articulated view of what thirdness is with respect to nominalism and realism, respectively. I'll have a think over that but I consider it a potentially very interesting start from which to hear other people's views. I think the descriptions/definitions are important as otherwise we're talking around each other. I have but one note to add: The Real, for me, can only be an "ethical understanding" for this, how we practice with respect to ourselves and among each other, is the only practical constant that remains regardless of one's view of the universe or particular physical/metaphysical understanding. That's where I locate "truth" —in ethical practice whereby ideal is not idealism but necessarily true in the most pragmatic sense of the term. Best Jack ________________________________ From: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> on behalf of Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> Sent: Sunday, September 14, 2025 3:33 PM To: Gary Richmond <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> Cc: Peirce List <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>; edwina taborsky <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness and Its Function Thirdness and its Function 1] I think a discussion of whether or not someone is a ‘nominalist’ vs a ‘scholastic realist’ can be empty – particularly when neither term is defined. 2] I think the nature of and role of Thirdness is vital – and ask whether or not it can appear in either nominalism or scholastic realism or in both? First – a brief definition. Nominalism, in my view refers to a belief that generals or universals [Thirdness] are concepts created by man and only individual entities ‘exist’. Scholastic realism refers to the view that generals or universals, understood as the rule of law governing individual instantiations of these laws -are real in themselves and not creations of man. 3] I don’t think either view can be removed from its societal connections and implications. The scholastic realism view fits into a societal view where the laws of life, so to speak, are predetermined [ by god?] and fixed; they can’t be changed by man’s whim. The nominalist view arose twice, in the 13th c and in the 18th c – when the rise of individual freedom of thought emerged, and the individual was seen as capable of not merely acceptance but of generating new laws, new rules. These are monumentally different world views and have of course, social and political implications. 4] Thirdness according to Peirce is, as developed by Nature, “ a mode of being which consists in the Secondness that it determines” 1903. 1.536. And “Thirdness cannot be understood without Secondness.” 1904. 8.331. Thirdness mediates between input and output, between “the causal act and the effect’ 1894.1.328 and Thirdness emerges ‘in nature’ 1887 1.366. – creating an ‘intelligible law. Obviously these definitions of Thirdness are aspects of scholastic realism not nominalism – but it is important to note both ultimate agency – Nature vs god and correlations. 4] I note – and I think this is vital - Peirce emphasizes the role of Secondness in actualizing Thirdness, ie, Thirdness does not function alone but as correlated with Secondness and Firstness enabling it to existentially function as that rule of law, to function as a predictive force of morphological formation. Where, Thirdness in the ‘first degree of degeneracy’ 1903. 5.70, in ‘irrational plurality, where the rule of law enables multiple individuals all aspects of that rule of law”… The key connective triadic sign is the Symbolic Indexical, [Thirdness as Secondness] which has been recently discussed and is one of the key Signs in Peircean semiosis. 5] I note that this insistence on the indexical actuality of Thridness moves Peirce into an analysis where these rules can change! Because of that connection with Secondness! These changing rules are not as concepts articulated by man but, in themselves. This is not nominalism but moves into the self-organized realm of CAS [ complex adaptive systems] which are a later development in the scientific world – and is most certainly a concept rejected by those who subscribed to the invincibility of these rules - ie- that Secondness or actuality had no effect on them. . Most certainly Peirce rejected predetermined Thirdness, with his support of the ‘symbols grow’ ; the fact that Thirdness rules evolve, adapt and change – due both to chance [ Firstness] Tychasm] and Agapasm or a feeling of connectness to the data. But he also rejected the vagaries of nominalism which sees a world without the realities of non-human Thirdness, ie, without the reality of rules and laws which are objectively real and not ‘figments of the mind’. Nominalism can move into pure idealism, where the rules can be considered human ideas - and these can lead to totalitarianism. 6] If we continue with the societal context – we can then ask – why does one or the other theory become dominant? The theory of nominalism, which empowers man to make-and-change-the rules of life; vs the theory of realism which inserts a non-human agency as the source of the laws {Nature,god]. And – furthermore – an additional concept that these laws are immutable and cannot change or be changed vs that the laws can self-organize and change. I think these are two basic mindsets which will always be with us – and we cannot ignore the societal modes in which they operate. Edwina _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> . ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>?subject=SIG%20peirce-l">UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
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