On Sep 15, 2025, at 2:56 PM, Jerry Rhee <[email protected]> wrote:
Hi Jack, Edwina, list, other people,
Where do you stand with respect to the bold assertion by Peirce in CP
5.36?
He seems to indicate that your problem is an old problem.
What is it you admire of Ethics?What is its /secret /(ART 57, or do I
mean ART 37)?
I mean, is esthetics only for imbeciles or the useless- merely a
matter we desire to forget?
/But we cannot get any clue to the secret of Ethics/
/-- a most entrancing field of thought but soon broadcast with
pitfalls -/
/until we have first made up our formula for /*/what it is that we
are prepared to admire/*/./
/I do not care what doctrine of ethics be embraced, it will always be
so. (CP 5.36)./
Best,
Jerry Rhee
/“It was this turn in which I thought the poets had preceded him, /
/for it had always been a puzzle to me //how the principle of telling
/*/lies like the truth/*/, /
/upon which all of Greek poetry rests, could precede the telling of
the truth, /
/for it seemed obvious to me, as it had to Socrates, /
/that one cannot lie knowingly unless one knows the truth.” /
On Mon, Sep 15, 2025 at 1:26 PM Jack Cody <[email protected]> wrote:
Edwina, List,
ME: "I have but one note to add: The Real, for me, can only be an
"ethical understanding" for this, how we practice with respect to
ourselves and among each other, is the only practical constant
that remains regardless of one's view of the universe or
particular physical/metaphysical understanding. That's where I
locate "truth" —in ethical practice whereby ideal is not idealism
but necessarily true in the most pragmatic sense of the term."
-----------------------------------
I'd like to press the above in the context of "dynamic
object(s)". If one assumes "convergence" within Peirce's system,
it seems evident to me that one has to pay the price, small or
large, of the dynamic(al) object insofar as I understand that
(almost as static, if not quite, or literally, static).
Which leads to me to reject for the moment the idea of positivist
knowledge with respect to things which may or may not be known,
ever, and rather pragmatically relocate the debate within the
most fundamental dialectic we have: "ethics".
Though many books have been written on ethics, I do not believe a
thousand years makes much of a difference (or an infinite period
at that) with respect to the idea that "Murder is false/entirely
wrong" (that harm inflicted, generally, is almost always, if not
always, false/wrong). With that in mind, one must surely conclude
that the Dynamic Object of that "moral judgement" is already
"known" and is scarcely possible that we could know "why" any
more in an infinite period than we already do?
That is, we can argue catechism until the cows come home but we
all surely know, innately (I sense arguments?), that these things
are just "wrong". I see no value in infinite inquiry here —that
is, no one is coming along with a "...and to murder was wrong
because..." revelation which overrides basic innate moral
instinct (or judgement) as we already have it.
And thus, no matter what, I really do think ethics, as the most
truthful way in which to treat one's self and lifeforms around
one, is always "constant" —all ideas regarding the make-up of the
universe or the atom (much the same?) do nothing to the idea (not
really an idea, for surely this must emerge from pure firstness
which, though technically "possible" in Peirce, may, in
prohibition terms be said to be a "resource" which when required,
one can draw on, and thus always actual and possible without
contradiction) —do nothing to the idea that, practically, we
already have a constant, which in global terms, we treat as if it
scarcely existed (ETHICS).
I've long since assumed that literalist versions of Plato's Cave
aside, the only actual question in such situations, (an actually
genuine "solution"), is ethics. It can be nothing else. And so,
from firstness-soundness-thirdness, DO/Inf Inq, all to/through
ethics.
There is a better response in what I've said there —even the
germs of a paper, but I wanted to make a brief contribution and I
think a truthful one (I would like to hear people's opinions on
the idea that truthful ethics is always universal, that is, not
nominalist, and already, in so many respects, decided/determined,
if not actualized —which is where one might cite "inquiry"?
Though I maintain that 99% of all ethical principles one needs
are basically innate and stem from the idea, never selfish, that
none ought be able to do "one" harm ("learned" as a child...). We
merely extend that to other people —though as a global society,
despite everyone knowing these things, and knowing them insofar
as they ever will, we seem rather crap at enforcing it
consistently (we are antediluvian in this respect).
Best,
Jack
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*From:* [email protected]
<[email protected]> on behalf of Jack Cody
<[email protected]>
*Sent:* Sunday, September 14, 2025 6:21 PM
*To:* [email protected] <[email protected]>; Edwina
Taborsky <[email protected]>
*Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness and Its Function
Edwina, List,
I think that post is very well done. Precise epistemological
location and also a clearly articulated view of what thirdness is
with respect to nominalism and realism, respectively.
I'll have a think over that but I consider it a potentially very
interesting start from which to hear other people's views. I
think the descriptions/definitions are important as otherwise
we're talking around each other.
I have but one note to add: The Real, for me, can only be an
"ethical understanding" for this, how we practice with respect to
ourselves and among each other, is the only practical constant
that remains regardless of one's view of the universe or
particular physical/metaphysical understanding. That's where I
locate "truth" —in ethical practice whereby ideal is not idealism
but necessarily true in the most pragmatic sense of the term.
Best
Jack
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*From:* [email protected]
<[email protected]> on behalf of Edwina Taborsky
<[email protected]>
*Sent:* Sunday, September 14, 2025 3:33 PM
*To:* Gary Richmond <[email protected]>
*Cc:* Peirce List <[email protected]>; edwina taborsky
<[email protected]>
*Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness and Its Function
Thirdness and its Function
1] I think a discussion of whether or not someone is a
‘nominalist’ vs a ‘scholastic realist’ can be empty –
particularly when neither term is defined.
2] I think the nature of and role of Thirdness is vital – and ask
whether or not it can appear in either nominalism or scholastic
realism or in both? First – a brief definition.
Nominalism, in my view refers to a belief that generals or
universals [Thirdness] are concepts created by man and only
individual entities ‘exist’. Scholastic realism refers to the
view that generals or universals, understood as the rule of law
governing individual instantiations of these laws -are real in
themselves and not creations of man.
3] I don’t think either view can be removed from its
societal connections and implications. The scholastic realism
view fits into a societal view where the laws of life, so to
speak, are predetermined [ by god?] and fixed; they can’t be
changed by man’s whim. The nominalist view arose twice, in the
13^th c and in the 18^th c – when the rise of individual
freedom of thought emerged, and the individual was seen as
capable of not merely acceptance but of generating new laws, new
rules. These are monumentally different world views and have of
course, social and political implications.
4] Thirdness according to Peirce is, as developed by Nature, “ a
mode of being which consists in the Secondness that it
determines” 1903. 1.536. And “Thirdness cannot be understood
without Secondness.” 1904. 8.331. Thirdness mediates between
input and output, between “the causal act and the effect’
1894.1.328 and Thirdness emerges ‘in nature’ 1887 1.366. –
creating an ‘intelligible law.
Obviously these definitions of Thirdness are aspects of
scholastic realism not nominalism – but it is important to note
both ultimate agency – Nature vs god and correlations.
4] I note – and I think this is vital - Peirce emphasizes the
role of Secondness in actualizing Thirdness, ie, Thirdness does
not function alone but as correlated with Secondness and
Firstness enabling it to existentially function as that rule of
law, to function as a predictive force of morphological
formation. Where, Thirdness in the ‘first degree of degeneracy’
1903. 5.70, in ‘irrational plurality, where the rule of law
enables multiple individuals all aspects of that rule of law”…
The key connective triadic sign is the Symbolic Indexical,
[Thirdness as Secondness] which has been recently discussed and
is one of the key Signs in Peircean semiosis.
5] I note that this insistence on the indexical actuality of
Thridness moves Peirce into an analysis where these rules can
change! Because of that connection with Secondness! These
changing rules are not as concepts articulated by man but, in
themselves. This is not nominalism but moves into the
self-organized realm of CAS [ complex adaptive systems] which are
a later development in the scientific world – and is most
certainly a concept rejected by those who subscribed to the
invincibility of these rules - ie- that Secondness or actuality
had no effect on them. .
Most certainly Peirce rejected predetermined Thirdness, with
his support of the ‘symbols grow’ ; the fact that Thirdness rules
evolve, adapt and change – due both to chance [ Firstness]
Tychasm] and Agapasm or a feeling of connectness to the data.
But he also rejected the vagaries of nominalism which sees a
world without the realities of non-human Thirdness, ie, without
the reality of rules and laws which are objectively real and not
‘figments of the mind’. Nominalism can move into pure idealism,
where the rules can be considered human ideas - and these can
lead to totalitarianism.
6] If we continue with the societal context – we can then ask –
why does one or the other theory become dominant? The theory of
nominalism, which empowers man to make-and-change-the rules of
life; vs the theory of realism which inserts a non-human agency
as the source of the laws {Nature,god]. And – furthermore – an
additional concept that these laws are immutable and cannot
change or be changed vs that the laws can self-organize and
change. I think these are two basic mindsets which will always be
with us – and we cannot ignore the societal modes in which they
operate.
Edwina
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