Jeff, List: Omit the word "random," and your supposition basically matches Peirce's own hypothesis about the initial state--"a vague potentiality ... of everything in general, but of nothing in particular" (CP 6.196, 1898). A *field* of potentiality is a general *continuum* of indefinite possibilities, not any *individual* possibility; 3ns that *involves* 1ns, not 1ns by itself. This is the key distinction that I highlighted at the beginning of my post yesterday.
Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sat, Oct 11, 2025, 2:37 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard <[email protected]> wrote: > Hello, > > Consider the following test case. > > GR: It follows that no instance of 1ns or 2ns ever exists without 3ns > which, moreover, is the condition of their manifestation. > > Let's suppose in the very, very early cosmos, there were no existing > individuals. No particles and no atoms, only a vague field of random > potentiality. Much was possible, nothing in particular was yet actual. In > this limiting case, I am supposing both time and space were rather vague > and indeterminate. > > For this sort of limiting case, my assumption is a random field of > potentiality could be described in the terms of probablity theory by the > central limit theorem, the law of large numbers, etc., as a description of > what might come to be realized. > > Does such a supposition involve thirdness? If so, what sort? > > --Jeff > >
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