List, I have only a little to add to this thread at this time as I concur with Jon's criticism of Rose's interpretation of Peirce's cosmology centered in an earlier view later modified -- evolved -- as many of Peirce's views were on many topics. However, in a word, one ignores Peirce's cosmological writings after 1892 to the detriment of his mature view.
First, Rose treats tychism (chance) as Peirce’s metaphysical foundation. But Peirce clearly identifies synechism (continuity) as the central principle of his cosmology, nay, his entire evolutionary philosophy (albeit with tychism being essential and co-implicative). As is his wont, Jon has supported this with strong textual evidence. Second, Rose misinterprets Peirce’s reference to a “creator” in 'A Neglected Argument' as 1ns generating the other categories. In context the “creator” is without question God (Ens necessarium) and most definitely not one of the categories. In addition, as Jon noted, Peirce explicitly says that God most resembles 3ns and not 1ns. So, however a reader might look upon Peirce's 'theism' (I, for example, am closer to panentheism than to theism), in several papers and List post Jon has definitively shown that Peirce was a theist, again, with considerable textual support (as if the N.A. weren't sufficient support in itself!) One can ignore those texts; but doing so does no justice to Peirce's cosmology in all its fullness. Third, Rose’s idea that 2ns and 3ns 'emerge' from 1ns contradicts Peirce’s late doctrine that the categories are co-involved (co-implicated). It follows that no instance of 1ns or 2ns ever exists without 3ns which, moreover, is the condition of their manifestation. Certainly each of the three categories can be prescinded from the categorial trichotomy (it is not usual to do that especially in certain analyses in theoretical grammar, the first branch of Peirce's logic as semeiotic), but that is but intellectual abstraction for specific purposes. Jon’s critique of Rose’s interpretation is fully consistent with Peirce’s mature cosmology (especially from 1892 onward). Rose’s reading -- while imaginative and interesting from a process-emergentist standpoint -- grossly mislocates Peirce’s metaphysical center (which is continuity, not chance) and mistakes the logical relations among the categories for a kind of temporal genesis. If Rose had framed his piece as a speculative reconstruction inspired by Peirce’s early cosmology it might have stood as an original philosophical experiment. Jon is not claiming that Peirce's later cosmology denies his earlier one, only that it helps clarify it, which is to say that we properly understand the earlier passages in light of the later ones. But as an interpretation of Peirce's cosmology looked on as a whole, Jon’s three objections are well-founded both textually and conceptually. Best, Gary R On Fri, Oct 10, 2025 at 6:28 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > Atila, List: > > I changed the subject line this time because I am shifting back to a focus > on Peirce's expressed views instead of applying his ideas to modern > scientific theories. Specifically, I would like to respond to these brief > remarks. > > AB: Now my point (for another time) is that lecture 2 left me unsatisfied > about 1ns. It seemed the most defective and inadequate of the categories, > dangling apart from 3ns ... > > > Peirce recognizes that of his three categories, 1ns is the most difficult > to grasp conceptually and explain accurately. "It cannot be articulately > thought ... Stop to think of it, and it has flown! ... every description of > it must be false to it" (CP 1.357, EP 1:248, 1887-8). Personally, I have > found it helpful to distinguish an *individual *possibility or quality in > itself (1ns) from a continuous *range *of possibilities or *spectrum *of > qualities (3ns); it is the latter, not the former, that Peirce ultimately > posits as the initial state of things. An example of someone failing to > recognize this distinction, and thus misunderstanding his categories and > cosmology, is Philip Rose's 2016 paper, "C.S. Peirce's Cosmogonic > Philosophy of Emergent Evolution: Deriving Something from Nothing" ( > https://www.unav.es/gep/RoseScio2016.pdf). Here is the last paragraph of > its introduction. > > PR: Peirce rejects the mechanistic metaphysics against which emergentism > develops and proposes a radically new ontological system whose base > condition is not mechanism per se but *tychasm* or chance. Focusing on > the work produced during Peirce’s so-called 'Monist' period, we will see > that Peirce’s attempt to explain the origins of the laws of nature is in > fact the groundwork for what amounts to *a theory of emergent evolution*. > Much of the discussion will revolve around the cosmogonic hypothesis > outlined in Peirce’s unpublished work, "A Guess at the Riddle," for it is > here that the kernel of his cosmogonic philosophy is most clearly > articulated and laid out. Once Peirce’s cosmogonic hypothesis has been made > clear I will end by outlining my own speculative metaphysical account of > how the Categories themselves might have come about, with 3ns and 2ns > standing in an emergent relation to 1ns. (p. 125) > > > I see at least three problematic issues here. First, Rose seems to think > that *tychasm*--"evolution by fortuitous variation" (CP 6.302, EP 1:362, > 1893), i.e., in accordance with *tychism *as "the doctrine that absolute > chance is a factor of the universe" (CP 6.201, 1898)--is the central tenet > of Peirce's metaphysics. However, already in 1892 (CP 6.163, EP 1:333), he > refers to his overall system as "the synechistic philosophy" and says that > "it carries along with it" not only "tychism, with its consequent > thorough-going evolutionism," but also "a logical realism of the most > pronounced type," the doctrine that some generals are real; and "objective > idealism," the doctrine that mind is primordial and becomes matter by > developing inveterate habits. In the blackboard lecture, he states even > more directly, "I object to having my metaphysical system as a whole called > Tychism. For although tychism does enter into it, it only enters as > subsidiary to that which is really, as I regard it, the characteristic of > my doctrine, namely, that I chiefly insist upon continuity, or 3ns ... > Accordingly, I like to call my theory Synechism" (CP 6.202). > > > Second, Rose relies exclusively on Peirce's early (1887-93) cosmological > writings, especially "A Guess at the Riddle," instead of *also *taking > into account his later texts. In fact, he makes an especially egregious > interpretive error when commenting on the one and only late quotation that > he includes, from "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God" (1908), > when he mentions "Peirce's later claim that at least two of the three > Universes 'have a creator independent of them' (CP 6.483, EP 2:449), with > 1ns as presented here standing as the ground or 'creator' of the other two" > (p. 140). Anyone acquainted with that famous article knows that the > "creator" being referenced is not *any *of the three categories, but God > as *Ens necessarium*; and it is unambiguous in Peirce's still-unpublished > manuscript drafts for it that the one universe of which he suspects that > God might not be *completely* independent is the third one, because "He > is so much like a mind [3ns], and so little like a singular Existent [2ns] > ... and so opposed in His Nature to an ideal possibility [1ns]" (R 843). > > Third, Rose's account claims that 3ns and 2ns somehow emerged from 1ns as "a > state of absolute possibility, a state where there was nothing actual or > potential, no limit or limiting power whatsoever, just a state of absolute, > indeterminate possibility" (p. 139). By contrast, Peirce's starting point > in the blackboard lecture is "vague potentiality ... a continuum of forms > ... potentiality of everything in general, but of nothing in particular" > (CP 6.196); "general indefinite potentiality" (CP 6.199); "the original > vague potentiality, or at any rate of some early stage of its determination > ... for after all continuity is generality" (CP 6.203); "the original > generality ... the original continuity which is inherent in potentiality. > Continuity, as generality, is inherent in potentiality, which is > essentially general" (CP 6.204). Again, he repeatedly maintains that 2ns > and 3ns cannot *come from* 1ns; on the contrary, 1ns and 2ns cannot be > *without > *3ns. "Not only does 3ns suppose and involve the ideas of 2ns and 1ns, > but never will it be possible to find any 2ns or 1ns in the phenomenon that > is not accompanied by 3ns" (CP 5.90, EP 2:177, 1903). > > To be clear, I am not suggesting that Rose is wrong because Peirce is > right; I am only pointing out that Rose *disagrees *with Peirce about > these matters, apparently without recognizing it. Varying interpretations > of his writings are to be expected, especially since many of them from the > last two decades of his life--including some that shed valuable light on > both earlier and better-known texts, on cosmology as well as many other > subjects--remain unpublished except as online manuscript images. Wherever > there are such differences, readers must decide for themselves which > scholars have made the most persuasive cases for their positions, but some > claims about Peirce's *own *views are objectively falsified by their > inconsistency with what his words plainly state. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Tue, Oct 7, 2025 at 10:42 AM Atila Bayat <[email protected]> wrote: > >> List, +Robert Marty >> >> I must concur that this is a serious analysis of cosmology. Yet what are >> we talking about when we talk cosmology for Peirce? It’s a normative >> science and metaphysical discourse, a physical metaphysics, a bridge >> between general metaphysics and psychical metaphysics, and in the 1898 >> lecture 8 (p. 267), “mathematical metaphysics.” >> >> His cosmology is construed as an “evolutionary” metaphysics; Peirce will >> invoke the categories to render that bridge explicit. Cf. Lectures 2-3 in >> Turrisi’s Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism, which I often consider my leading >> resource of explication. See her initial commentary, Peirce’s 3 drafts of >> Lecture 2 published there, and 1 full complete Lecture 3. Turrisi well >> observes that there were 5 extant manuscripts for Lecture 2, and 3 printed >> in her book. Let me drop this a moment. Lecture 3, which I call the Kempe >> lecture, for me is mostly about mathematical form. Peirce writes, in the >> course of examining Kempe’s system; >> >> “…I found the three Categories copiously illustrated in the system. But >> what was still more interesting, a certain fault in the system, by no means >> of the fatal kind but still a vexatious inelegance which I had often >> remarked but could see no way of remedying, now when looked upon from the >> point of view of the categories, appeared in a new and stronger light than >> ever before, showing me not only how to remedy the defect that I had seen, >> but opening my eyes to *new* *possibilities of perfectionment* that I >> had never dreamed of. I wish I could *present all this to you,* for it >> is very beautiful and interesting as well as very instructive, but it would >> require several lectures and lead me quite away from Pragmatism.” >> (Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking, 1997, SUNY, p.186). >> >> Now we are left on our heels by Peirce, “it would require several >> lectures and lead me quite a way from Pragmatism.” Thus no explication from >> Peirce that I know of since. It thwarted me, perhaps as if one were in that >> lecture room with Peirce, how would we react? >> >> Now my point (for another time) is that lecture 2 left me unsatisfied >> about 1ns. It seemed the most defective and inadequate of the categories, >> dangling apart from 3ns; perhaps a kind of quantum logic might render it >> more intelligible. Notice that Hartshorne and Weiss themselves, back to the >> 1940s-50s, noted that Peirce didn’t have the advantage of quantum mechanics >> (which Edwina hints as well). Particularly, Hartshorne found there were >> some matters of inconsistency in Peirce on continuity, and others have >> perhaps noted. Not sure we want to go there yet. I just want to raise >> consciousness at this stage, something rather imperfect here, yet >> fascinating. >> >> I will pick this up further in a reply to Robert Marty’s earlier and >> noteworthy post, which is overdue, in which I take up quantum logic and >> lattices. >> >> Atila >> > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
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