Jon, Jeff, List, As I wrote yesterday, your exposition, Jon, seems highly consonant with the development of Peirce’s thinking about the ordering of the categories in his cosmology including the introduction of that late, nuanced emphasis on an ur-continuity (the blackboard). Your arguing for an underlying continuum (3ns) containing indefinite possibilities (1nses) some of which become actual (2nses) certainly is in agreement with Peirce’s synechism, continuity being the ultimate character of reality. It necessarily places 3ns in a more explicitly foundational role than Peirce did in his earlier cosmological narratives. The cosmological progression 1ns -> 2ns -> 3ns corresponds to Peirce’s early evolutionary model while his later integration of this with a deeper, timeless continuum would appear to reconcile tychism with synechism.
I found your observation that 3ns can appear first, second, or third depending on the level of analysis, expressing Peirce’s own non-linear use of the categories across logical, metaphysical, and cosmological contexts, of great interest. Again, your analysis conforms closely to Peirce’s category theory across these contexts as it accurately represents the co-implication of 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns in all phenomena, their ontological interdependence, and the synechistic priority of 3ns. So, treating 3ns as 1st in the constitution of being doesn't contradict Peirce's earlier view, but emphasizes the primacy of continuity as the condition for all manifestation. JAS: "What I have long found interesting about these three cosmological vectors--you call them representation, order, and process, but I would now advocate renaming the first one continuity--is that in each case, 2ns comes after 1ns, such that the only variation is the position of 3ns; it is first in the underlying constitution of being, second in the overall evolution of states, and third in the recurring sequence of events." I will have to reflect further as to whether to rename what I now call the 'vector of representation' the 'vector of continuity' as there still seem to be some good reasons to keep the original name. As you may recall, I earlier termed what I now term the 'vector of process', the 'vector of evolution' since 'process' was the broader term, 'evolution' being but one -- albeit a most significant -- type of process. Is it possible that the vector 3ns -> 1ns -> 2ns (currently the 'vector of representation') represents continuity but is not limited to that one representation as significant as it is? Still, this deserves further thought. JAS (responding to Jeff): Omit the word "random," and your supposition basically matches Peirce's own hypothesis about the initial state--"a vague potentiality ... of everything in general, but of nothing in particular" (CP 6.196, 1898). *A field of potentiality is a general continuum of indefinite possibilities*, not any individual possibility; 3ns that involves 1ns, not 1ns by itself. This is the key distinction that I highlighted at the beginning of my post yesterday (emphasis and underlining added). Making this essential distinction appears to me to answer Jeff's two questions: "Does such a supposition [that 'a random field of potentiality could be described in the terms of probability theory. . .] involve thirdness? If so, what sort?" Some related Peirce quotations (and one possible 'hallucination') for mental stimulation. “Metaphysics consists in the result of the absolute acceptance of logical principles not merely as regulatively valid, but as truths of being” (1.487). "It will be very difficult for many minds -- and for the very best and clearest minds, more difficult than for others -- to comprehend the logical correctness of a view which does not put the assumption of time before either metaphysics or logic instead of after those kinds of necessity, as here arranged (emphasis added). CP 1.490 Google's 'automatic AI whether you want it or not' came up with this: “Metaphysics is but the application of logic to the real world, and the logic of the real world cannot be different from the logic of possible worlds.” This would be too perfect, but I couldn't locate it anywhere on the internet so that it's likely a hallucination (my own!) Best, Gary R On Sat, Oct 11, 2025 at 4:31 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > Jeff, List: > > Omit the word "random," and your supposition basically matches Peirce's > own hypothesis about the initial state--"a vague potentiality ... of > everything in general, but of nothing in particular" (CP 6.196, 1898). A > *field* of potentiality is a general *continuum* of indefinite > possibilities, not any *individual* possibility; 3ns that *involves* 1ns, > not 1ns by itself. This is the key distinction that I highlighted at the > beginning of my post yesterday. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Sat, Oct 11, 2025, 2:37 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> Hello, >> >> Consider the following test case. >> >> GR: It follows that no instance of 1ns or 2ns ever exists without 3ns >> which, moreover, is the condition of their manifestation. >> >> Let's suppose in the very, very early cosmos, there were no existing >> individuals. No particles and no atoms, only a vague field of random >> potentiality. Much was possible, nothing in particular was yet actual. In >> this limiting case, I am supposing both time and space were rather vague >> and indeterminate. >> >> For this sort of limiting case, my assumption is a random field of >> potentiality could be described in the terms of probablity theory by the >> central limit theorem, the law of large numbers, etc., as a description of >> what might come to be realized. >> >> Does such a supposition involve thirdness? If so, what sort? >> >> --Jeff >> >> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
