Hello, Consider the following test case.
GR: It follows that no instance of 1ns or 2ns ever exists without 3ns which, moreover, is the condition of their manifestation. Let's suppose in the very, very early cosmos, there were no existing individuals. No particles and no atoms, only a vague field of random potentiality. Much was possible, nothing in particular was yet actual. In this limiting case, I am supposing both time and space were rather vague and indeterminate. For this sort of limiting case, my assumption is a random field of potentiality could be described in the terms of probablity theory by the central limit theorem, the law of large numbers, etc., as a description of what might come to be realized. Does such a supposition involve thirdness? If so, what sort? --Jeff ________________________________ From: [email protected] <[email protected]> on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> Sent: Saturday, October 11, 2025 9:10 AM To: Peirce-L <[email protected]> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Categories and Cosmology (was Peirce and contemporary cosmology) Gary R., List: GR: It follows that no instance of 1ns or 2ns ever exists without 3ns which, moreover, is the condition of their manifestation. This way of putting it is accurate as long as we understand "instance" and "exists" in the phaneroscopic (not metaphysical) sense, and it prompts me to offer a clarification. As Peirce explicitly states, 1ns and 2ns are never found without 3ns, but it is equally true that 3ns is never found without 2ns and 1ns--within our existing universe, all three categories are always present in every phenomenon, and we can only distinguish them by prescinding 2ns from 3ns and 1ns from 3ns and 2ns. That is how I understand his remark in the 1898 blackboard lecture that "in order to secure to 3ns its really commanding function, I find it indispensable fully [to] recognize that it is a 3rd, and that 1ns, or chance, and 2ns, or Brute reaction, are other elements, without the independence of which 3ns would not have anything upon which to operate" (CP 6.202). Accordingly, when I suggest that the constitution of being is an inexhaustible continuum (3ns) of indefinite possibilities (1ns), some of which are actualized (2ns), I am not proposing a temporal sequence of emergence in the past but an underlying ontological hierarchy. As I have said before, the temporal sequence of every such actualization is indeed spontaneity (1ns) followed by reaction (2ns) and then habit-taking (3ns), and that is what I take Peirce to be describing in his early cosmological writings where 1ns comes first. However, the basic thesis of his synechism is that this always and only occurs within the context of a more fundamental continuum--"I draw a chalk line on the board. ... There is a certain element of continuity in this line. Where did this continuity come from? It is nothing but the original continuity of the blackboard which makes everything upon it continuous" (CP 6.203). Finally, again, Peirce's hyperbolic cosmology posits that the evolution of states for the entire universe as a whole is from complete chaos or utter indeterminacy (1ns) in the infinite past, through this ongoing process of actualization (3ns) at any assignable date, toward complete regularity or utter determinacy (2ns) in the infinite future. What I have long found interesting about these three cosmological vectors--you call them representation, order, and process, but I would now advocate renaming the first one continuity--is that in each case, 2ns comes after 1ns, such that the only variation is the position of 3ns; it is first in the underlying constitution of being, second in the overall evolution of states, and third in the recurring sequence of events. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Fri, Oct 10, 2025 at 11:13 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: List, I have only a little to add to this thread at this time as I concur with Jon's criticism of Rose's interpretation of Peirce's cosmology centered in an earlier view later modified -- evolved -- as many of Peirce's views were on many topics. However, in a word, one ignores Peirce's cosmological writings after 1892 to the detriment of his mature view. First, Rose treats tychism (chance) as Peirce’s metaphysical foundation. But Peirce clearly identifies synechism (continuity) as the central principle of his cosmology, nay, his entire evolutionary philosophy (albeit with tychism being essential and co-implicative). As is his wont, Jon has supported this with strong textual evidence. Second, Rose misinterprets Peirce’s reference to a “creator” in 'A Neglected Argument' as 1ns generating the other categories. In context the “creator” is without question God (Ens necessarium) and most definitely not one of the categories. In addition, as Jon noted, Peirce explicitly says that God most resembles 3ns and not 1ns. So, however a reader might look upon Peirce's 'theism' (I, for example, am closer to panentheism than to theism), in several papers and List post Jon has definitively shown that Peirce was a theist, again, with considerable textual support (as if the N.A. weren't sufficient support in itself!) One can ignore those texts; but doing so does no justice to Peirce's cosmology in all its fullness. Third, Rose’s idea that 2ns and 3ns 'emerge' from 1ns contradicts Peirce’s late doctrine that the categories are co-involved (co-implicated). It follows that no instance of 1ns or 2ns ever exists without 3ns which, moreover, is the condition of their manifestation. Certainly each of the three categories can be prescinded from the categorial trichotomy (it is not usual to do that especially in certain analyses in theoretical grammar, the first branch of Peirce's logic as semeiotic), but that is but intellectual abstraction for specific purposes. Jon’s critique of Rose’s interpretation is fully consistent with Peirce’s mature cosmology (especially from 1892 onward). Rose’s reading -- while imaginative and interesting from a process-emergentist standpoint -- grossly mislocates Peirce’s metaphysical center (which is continuity, not chance) and mistakes the logical relations among the categories for a kind of temporal genesis. If Rose had framed his piece as a speculative reconstruction inspired by Peirce’s early cosmology it might have stood as an original philosophical experiment. Jon is not claiming that Peirce's later cosmology denies his earlier one, only that it helps clarify it, which is to say that we properly understand the earlier passages in light of the later ones. But as an interpretation of Peirce's cosmology looked on as a whole, Jon’s three objections are well-founded both textually and conceptually. Best, Gary R
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