Jon, List, Jon, thank you thoughtful, textually rich, and challenging response. I found your discussion of the *commens*, quasi-minds, and the communicational interpretant very helpful. It has persuaded me that my use of Pietarinen's expression "overlapping triadic relations" may very well obscure distinctions that Peirce himself makes. In particular, your reminder that communication is but one manifestation of semiosis, and that signs need not always involve actual utterers or interpreters, are important qualifications that I readily accept.
Nevertheless, I find myself wondering whether our remaining disagreement lies less in the nature of semiosis than in the nature of intelligence. You distinguish two questions: First, can AI systems participate in semiosis? Second, if they can, is such participation sufficient to warrant calling them intelligent? Your answer to the first question is 'Yes'; the second 'No'. I agree that participation in semiosis cannot by itself be sufficient for intelligence. *Every sign participates in semiosis*, although no one would therefore attribute intelligence to every sign. But I am less persuaded that *autonomous purposiveness* is a necessary condition for every form of intelligence recognized by Peirce. Again, he not infrequently attributes forms or degrees of intelligence to phenomena that are not autonomous persons. Animal instinct, biological adaptation, habit-taking throughout nature, scientific inquiry, and evolutionary growth, including the growth of reason throughout the cosmos *all appear to exhibit intelligent characteristics without thereby constituting independent rational agents*. So it seems to me that for Peirce intelligence admits of degrees and forms rather than marking the sharp ontological boundary you're suggesting. That is why I continue to attach considerable importance to *the production of interpretants*. Suppose an AI system exposes an unnoticed inconsistency, proposes a plausible hypothesis, reformulates an argument in a more illuminating way, or reveals a previously overlooked relation among signs (all of which I've seen AI do, although you appear to doubt it). Those interpretants aren't 'in the machine'; rather, *such interpretants **become signs within the continuing inquiry itself, *and as such are subject to criticism, revision, rejection, or acceptance by the community of inquiry. In my view, their significance is not determined by their origin but by their consequences in inquiry. So you will not be surprised, I think, that I hesitate to describe AI merely as *simulating collaboration*. Certainly it does not possess autonomous agency, moral responsibility, or independent ends: there is no argument between us there! Perhaps our disagreement is concerned less with the reality of the interpretants than the agency responsible for them. In my view, the programmer of an AI machine does not determine the interpretants generated within a given inquiry. So I would argue that while the machine is certainly not an autonomous inquirer, yet it does not seem to me to be simply a passive artifact. It appears to occupy an intermediate semiotic role that, I believe, deserves close philosophical examination. I think that our disagreement concerns less with whether AI participates in semiosis but, rather, what additional conditions must be satisfied before that participation deserves the name *intelligence*. My own present thinking is that intelligence, like semiosis itself, admits degrees rather than sharp boundaries. Autonomous purposiveness such as we humans possess undoubtedly is unquestionably one of its highest expressions. However, I am much less persuaded that it is a *necessary condition* for every form of intelligence capable of contributing to inquiry and the communal growth of knowledge. Whether or not you find this to be a defensible interpretation of Peirce on this matter, I am grateful that this discussion has moved from the usual debates over consciousness and computation to what strikes me as the far deeper Peircean question concerning the relation among semiosis, intelligence, and inquiry. Best, Gary R. On Thu, Jul 2, 2026 at 6:49 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary R., List: > > I agree that Pietarinen's suggestion of an "overlapping triadic relation" > whose correlates are the utterer, the sign, and the interpreter is quite > interesting. However, I am not yet convinced that it is an accurate > conceptualization, especially since communication is not the only > manifestation of semiosis. According to Peirce, the utterer and interpreter > are *dispensable*; the object is the essential ingredient of the utterer, > and the interpretant is the essential ingredient of the interpreter (EP > 2:403-10, 1907). There are signs that have no utterer--"symptoms of > disease, signs of weather, etc." (EP 2:496, 1909 Feb 26)--and signs that > have no *actual *interpreter, i.e., no *dynamical *interpretant. > > Even so, Peirce does describe a sign as "a medium of communication" and "a > determination of a quasi-mind" (EP 2:390-2, 1906), where what is being > communicated is "a Form" and "it is necessary that there should be two, > if not three, *quasi-minds*" involved (EP 2:544n22, 1906). Specifically, > "signs > require at least two Quasi-minds; a *Quasi-utterer* and a > *Quasi-interpreter*; and although these two are at one (*i.e.*, are one mind) > in the sign itself, they must nevertheless be distinct. In the Sign they > are, so to say, *welded*" (CP 4.551, 1906). Moreover, "The quasi-mind is > itself a sign, a determinable sign" (SS 195,1906 Mar 9); and "the > *Communicational > Interpretant* ... is a determination of that mind into which the minds of > utterer and interpreter have to be fused in order that any communication > should take place. This mind may be called the *commens*" (SS 196-7, EP > 2:478, 1906 Mar 9). > > Accordingly, I suggest that it is better to avoid referring to > utterer-sign-interpreter as an "overlapping triadic relation" and instead > identify utterer, commens, and interpreter as the three quasi-minds > involved in any event of semiosis--when a dynamical object, the essential > ingredient of the utterer, determines a sign-token, the essential > ingredient of the commens, to determine a dynamical interpretant, the > essential ingredient of the interpreter. In this account, can "AI" systems > participate in semiosis by serving as such quasi-minds? If so, is that > sufficient to ascribe genuine intelligence to them? As someone who views > the entire universe as one immense sign, such that discrete things and > their dyadic reactions--including digital processing operations--are > degenerate outcomes of continuous and triadic semiosis, my current answers > are yes to the first question and no to the second. > > Frankly, I dispute the assertion that "AI" systems are "able to respond, > criticize, reformulate, compare alternatives, and extend an inquiry"; I > still maintain that they merely *simulate *these behaviors. They do not > possess *agency*, the ability to *choose *whether and how to perform such > tasks; they only do exactly what they are told by humans, in exactly the > way that they have been programmed to do them by humans, just like other > computer programs. They produce an admittedly very sophisticated *illusion > *of collaboration by mimicking human language, including the use of first > person, but they are really just additional tools facilitating inquiry by > humans. Their output consists of degenerate dyadic reactions, not genuine > triadic interpretants. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Wed, Jul 1, 2026 at 11:02 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Jon, List, >> >> Pietarinen's paper has provoked a thought that I had not previously fully >> appreciated and which seems relevant in response to your critique of my >> thesis that AI represents a form of intelligence. What especially struck >> me is not just Pietarinen's regarding nonhuman sign users as >> potentially viable participants in inquiry, but his suggestion that *Peirce's >> account of communication may itself involve two overlapping triadic >> relations*. One, the *semiotic triad, Object - Sign - Interpretant*, >> which describes semiosis as such: the object determining the sign, >> determining an interpretant which may itself become a new sign in the >> continuing growth of inquiry. >> >> Pietarinen also identifies a second triad, what might be calls the >> *communicative >> triad, **Utterer - Sign - Interpreter*. The self-same sign that mediates >> between object and interpretant also mediates between participants in >> inquiry. Communication, in this view, is not something added onto semiosis, >> rather, *semiosis is intrinsically communicative*. Peirce's definition >> that a sign is "something which stands to somebody for something" perhaps >> deserves to be taken quite literally in human communication, perhaps >> especially that communication involved in inquiry. >> >> If this is correct then inquiry begins to look quite different. It is not >> just a series of individual, personal acts of reasoning; and neither is it >> simply transmission of information between inquirers. Rather, it is >> possible to see *inquiry as a developing network of overlapping sign >> relations in which interpretants generated in one communicative exchange >> can become signs in another*. Thus, the *community of inquiry *is >> nourished by the continuing semiosic processes through which meanings are >> created, criticized, revised, and further developed. >> >> In my view this also helps clarify the place of AI within inquiry. In an >> earlier post I remarked that, as I see it, *AI can participate in >> semiosis without possessing mind*. Rather, Pietarinen's analysis >> suggests that *AI systems can function as a participant within the >> communicative dimension of semiosis.* From my own experience, I believe >> that one can say that the kind of continuity that develops in an extended >> human-AI interaction isn't at all that involving an artificial personality, >> but *merely the continuation of the inquiry*. >> Jon, you raise what seems to me to be an important qualification. You ask >> whether present or future AI systems might actually possess ends of their >> own, or, do they merely function as sophisticated means -- tools -- by >> which we humans pursue our ends. At present I strongly agree with you that >> AI does not exhibit autonomous purposiveness in the sense Peirce associates >> with organisms, individual humans, and communities. However, my proposal >> does not require such autonomous purposiveness. >> >> In my view, participation in semiosis needn't imply independence of >> purpose. For example, scholarly books and academic papers certainly preserve >> and transmit signs without possessing ends of their own. AI differs from >> them, however, in *actually** being able to respond, criticize, >> reformulate, compare alternatives, and extend an inquiry *(btw, my sense >> is that one can't really see this capacity without at least experimenting >> with AI in an inquiry of her own). So for me the question is not whether >> AI is or can become an autonomous inquirer, but *if responsive AI sign >> systems can contribute genuine interpretants to inquiries* whose >> ultimate aims, however, remain those of human individuals and communities. >> >> Whether this ultimately proves to be a plausible way of understanding >> contemporary AI remains an open question. Still, it strikes me as a >> distinctly Peircean question. If communication is recognized as intrinsic >> to semiosis rather than external to it, then the possibility that >> responsive AI sign systems can participate in the communal growth of >> inquiry no longer seems conceptually outlandish. At the very least, I >> believe that it is a philosophical question well worth investigating. >> >> I would certainly be eager to read the thoughts of especially young >> interested people as this question regarding AI seems to me now to be a >> kind of philosophical "Wild West" (as one young educator whom I'll discuss >> in a future post, put it). >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R. >> > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . 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