Gary R., List: I agree with you that in CP 2.27, "Peirce is drawing a distinction not between human reasoning and, say, machine reasoning. Rather, it is between living inquiry and its subsequent symbolic representation." My point is that current "AI" systems are only doing the latter, never the former--they represent reasoning but do not perform reasoning; they facilitate living inquiry but do not carry it out themselves. Indeed, they are far more sophisticated than a simple syllogism, and as your thought experiment demonstrates, their effects (interpretants) can even be comparable to those of human-produced lectures and papers. However, that is precisely because they are deterministically assembling similar texts in accordance with probabilistic analysis of a vast repository of such content.
I do not locate intelligence primarily, let alone exclusively, in human reasoning; I locate it in the continuous process of genuine (irreducibly triadic) semiosis. The original question was not whether "AI" systems can participate in "the larger semiotic process through which interpretants are continually generated, developed, etc."--they certainly can and do--but whether "AI" systems themselves are accurately characterized as intelligent. I remain unconvinced; as I see it, "artificial intelligence" is still entirely parasitic on human intelligence. As Jeff noted, it participates in inquiry "derivatively, dependently, and incompletely. ... Its final causation, if we may use that language, is borrowed, scaffolded, and embedded within human purposes, institutional designs, training regimes, and ongoing inquiries." Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Jul 6, 2026, 1:09 AM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, Jeff, Ulysses, List, > > Jon, thank you for a response that has once again caused me to rethink my > own position. Your citation of CP 2.27 seems especially important, although > I find myself drawing a somewhat different conclusion from it than you did. As > I read that passage, Peirce is reminding us that when we later reconstruct > our reasoning as an explicit argument that we are not reproducing the > original process of thought. We begin with the conclusion, formulate it > propositionally, and then reconstruct premises that justify it. The result > is, as Peirce says, the "self-defence" of the inquiry rather than the > inquiry itself. Indeed, he clearly doubts whether the propositions we come > up with truly resemble the original thinking. > > If my reading of that passage is even approximately correct, then it seems > to me that Peirce is drawing a distinction not between human reasoning and, > say, machine reasoning. Rather, it is between living inquiry and its > subsequent symbolic representation. That argument is not the original > process of thinking but, rather, it is itself a newly generated sign that > enters the continuing inquiry where it may be interpreted, criticized, > revised, etc. and possibly become the source of further interpretants. And > this is what gives me pause regarding the present discussion. Because if > neither the printed syllogism nor the written scientific paper captures the > actual movement of thought, then the question we've been considering cannot > simply be whether AI produces arguments that represent reasoning. After > all, we humans do not ordinarily exchange 'living thought' with one another > either; instead, we exchange signs that become occasions for further > semiosis. > > Returning to my earlier thought experiment. My point was not that communal > inquiry exhausts intelligence (Peirce's example of the animalcule shows > otherwise). Rather, I was trying to consider *where the interpretants > that matter for, especially, scientific inquiry actually emerge*. These > clearly do not reside in the lecture, the paper (or, for that matter, the > AI system). Rather, they emerge in the continuing inquiry which those signs > bring about. > > This is why I continue to resist thinking that AI merely represents > reasoning in the same sense that, say, a printed syllogism does. Certainly > AI generates symbolic representations, but those are typically not the end > of the matter. Rather, as I earlier suggested, they become new signs that > may reveal previously unnoticed distinctions, reveal inconsistencies, even > suggest hypotheses, etc. Their significance, therefore, seems to lie in *what > they become within the evolving inquiry*. > > Jon, it seems that you locate intelligence primarily -- if not exclusively > -- in the process of human reasoning itself, whereas I find myself > increasingly tending to locate it in the larger semiotic process through > which interpretants are continually generated, developed, etc. While those > positions may be related, they are most certainly note identical. > > Best, > > Gary R >
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