Gary R., List: To be honest, I am now feeling hesitant about agreeing that "AI" systems *participate *in semiosis and inquiry because (like *collaborate*) it implies to me that they have *agency*. We too easily slip into talking about them *as if* they were persons, even when we explicitly deny that this is so.
Peirce explicitly refers to genuine triadic semiosis (continuous process) as "intelligent action." The sticking point for me is still whether digital "AI" systems are capable of that, even in principle, given that their internal operations consist entirely of brute dyadic reactions (discrete steps). Thanks, Jon On Mon, Jul 6, 2026 at 4:00 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, List, > > It doesn't seem to me that we disagree much on the semiotic status of > contemporary AI. As I understand your position, AI systems *can *participate > in semiosis but only "derivatively, dependently, and incompletely" as Jeff > put it. I fully agree that such systems do not possess autonomous > purposiveness. > > But I'm not sure that I agree with what seems to be your inference drawn > from that description. In my view 'derivative' need not necessarily imply > 'non-intelligent. As I earlier remarked, Peirce repeatedly describes > reality as exhibiting grades/degrees and a variety of forms of 3ns. If so, > then it does not seem obvious that every genuine manifestation of > intelligence must instantiate 3ns in its fullest and most autonomous form. > > I also think that we agree that AI-generated signs can become genuine > participants in inquiry, at very least once they've entered what I've been > calling 'the community of inquiry' for criticism, etc. We also seem to > agree that their final causation is embedded 'within larger human purposes > and institutions'. So my remaining question concerns whether that > embeddedness excludes them from being considered a form of intelligence, or > *whether > their embeddedness in, for example, scientific communities locates their > intelligence, albeit derivative, within a larger semiotic system.* > > In a word, I am no longer sure that Peirce's philosophy of continuity > compels us to locate intelligence primarily in isolated entities at all, be > they human or machine or whatever. In other words, I wonder *if > intelligence can be considered a property of semiosis itself wherever > it occurs*. Human intelligence would represent its fullest and richest > realization without necessarily exhausting its possible forms. > > Do you think this view is in any way compatible with Peirce's mature > conception of 3ns and continuity? For me a most interesting question > recently emerging from this discussion is: *Where in a Peircean universe > is intelligence itself located?* > > Best, > > Gary R. > > On Mon, Jul 6, 2026 at 11:26 AM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Gary R., List: >> >> I agree with you that in CP 2.27, "Peirce is drawing a distinction not >> between human reasoning and, say, machine reasoning. Rather, it is between >> living inquiry and its subsequent symbolic representation." My point is >> that current "AI" systems are only doing the latter, never the former--they >> represent reasoning but do not perform reasoning; they facilitate living >> inquiry but do not carry it out themselves. Indeed, they are far more >> sophisticated than a simple syllogism, and as your thought experiment >> demonstrates, their effects (interpretants) can even be comparable to those >> of human-produced lectures and papers. However, that is precisely because >> they are deterministically assembling similar texts in accordance with >> probabilistic analysis of a vast repository of such content. >> >> I do not locate intelligence primarily, let alone exclusively, in human >> reasoning; I locate it in the continuous process of genuine (irreducibly >> triadic) semiosis. The original question was not whether "AI" systems can >> participate in "the larger semiotic process through which interpretants are >> continually generated, developed, etc."--they certainly can and do--but >> whether "AI" systems themselves are accurately characterized as >> intelligent. I remain unconvinced; as I see it, "artificial intelligence" >> is still entirely parasitic on human intelligence. As Jeff noted, it >> participates in inquiry "derivatively, dependently, and incompletely. ... >> Its final causation, if we may use that language, is borrowed, scaffolded, >> and embedded within human purposes, institutional designs, training >> regimes, and ongoing inquiries." >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Mon, Jul 6, 2026, 1:09 AM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> Jon, Jeff, Ulysses, List, >>> >>> Jon, thank you for a response that has once again caused me to rethink >>> my own position. Your citation of CP 2.27 seems especially important, >>> although I find myself drawing a somewhat different conclusion from it than >>> you did. As I read that passage, Peirce is reminding us that when we >>> later reconstruct our reasoning as an explicit argument that we are not >>> reproducing the original process of thought. We begin with the conclusion, >>> formulate it propositionally, and then reconstruct premises that justify >>> it. The result is, as Peirce says, the "self-defence" of the inquiry rather >>> than the inquiry itself. Indeed, he clearly doubts whether the propositions >>> we come up with truly resemble the original thinking. >>> >>> If my reading of that passage is even approximately correct, then it >>> seems to me that Peirce is drawing a distinction not between human >>> reasoning and, say, machine reasoning. Rather, it is between living inquiry >>> and its subsequent symbolic representation. That argument is not the >>> original process of thinking but, rather, it is itself a newly generated >>> sign that enters the continuing inquiry where it may be interpreted, >>> criticized, revised, etc. and possibly become the source of further >>> interpretants. And this is what gives me pause regarding the present >>> discussion. Because if neither the printed syllogism nor the written >>> scientific paper captures the actual movement of thought, then the question >>> we've been considering cannot simply be whether AI produces arguments that >>> represent reasoning. After all, we humans do not ordinarily exchange >>> 'living thought' with one another either; instead, we exchange signs that >>> become occasions for further semiosis. >>> >>> Returning to my earlier thought experiment. My point was not that >>> communal inquiry exhausts intelligence (Peirce's example of the animalcule >>> shows otherwise). Rather, I was trying to consider *where the >>> interpretants that matter for, especially, scientific inquiry actually >>> emerge*. These clearly do not reside in the lecture, the paper (or, for >>> that matter, the AI system). Rather, they emerge in the continuing inquiry >>> which those signs bring about. >>> >>> This is why I continue to resist thinking that AI merely represents >>> reasoning in the same sense that, say, a printed syllogism does. Certainly >>> AI generates symbolic representations, but those are typically not the end >>> of the matter. Rather, as I earlier suggested, they become new signs that >>> may reveal previously unnoticed distinctions, reveal inconsistencies, even >>> suggest hypotheses, etc. Their significance, therefore, seems to lie in >>> *what >>> they become within the evolving inquiry*. >>> >>> Jon, it seems that you locate intelligence primarily -- if not >>> exclusively -- in the process of human reasoning itself, whereas I find >>> myself increasingly tending to locate it in the larger semiotic process >>> through which interpretants are continually generated, developed, etc. >>> While those positions may be related, they are most certainly note >>> identical. >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Gary R >>> >>
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