Jon, Gary, List,
so, not the dynamical object is changed, but a new DO is esteblished, according to Peirce. This new DO though resembles the former one, but to say, that an object is affected or changed, is not the Peircean way of saying it.
But in a non-Peircean way, e.g in the boundary-object-theory alone, one might say so about the BO (by not calling it "DO"). A translation would always be necessary then. The term "object" is itself a BO.
Now I want to mitigate my term "dismantle and destruct a BO": First in non-Peircean terms: If there was an absolutely undivided society, there would not be BOs, but only common objects (COs). If then an antagonistic subsystem forms itself, it makes COs turn into BOs. These BOs have both a common quality, and a divided quality. The stronger the division of society becomes, the stronger gets the division-quality of the BO, and the weaker the common quality, and the clearer becomes the boundary, the border around the antagonistic subsystem. Therewith, the subsystem becomes stronger, even more a system.
In Peircean terms it is different, there is no graduality and no change in objects. Instead of a metamorphosis, they undergo a rebirth. But the effect is the same.
Best,
Helmut
25. September 2026 um 05:00
"Gary Richmond" <[email protected]>
wrote:Jon, Helmut, List,
Jon, your distinction between the dynamical object of a particular sign and the object of a subsequent sign helps clarify what I think Helmut is getting at. The interpretant does not turn back and determine the dynamical object of the sign that produced it, but it may become a further sign, and so it may also affect what people expect and do such that their actions can change the situation in which further semiosis takes place. Parker’s account of a world that includes each new sign seems helpful here.
Helmut, I take your question about what happens after an interpretant is formed to concern how interpretation can lead to changes in the world. Shared expectations affect what people do: their actions may change a social situation and that changed situation may give rise to further signs and interpretations. Is that the process you have in mind?
I also understand your hesitancy regarding 'habit'. In ordinary usage it may suggest, for example, a personal routine not reflected on. For Peirce, however, a habit is a disposition to respond in certain ways under certain circumstances. It can be shared, reflected upon, and potentially changed. Your phrase “shared expectations” tends toward that idea, I think.
Finally, I would hesitate to place social structure in 2ns rather than 3ns. Actual encounters, resistances, and changes involve 2ns. Shared expectations, insofar as they guide how people would respond on future occasions, involve 3ns. An interesting question is how those expectations are sustained and changed through actual encounters.
Best,
Gary R.
Jon, your distinction between the dynamical object of a particular sign and the object of a subsequent sign helps clarify what I think Helmut is getting at. The interpretant does not turn back and determine the dynamical object of the sign that produced it, but it may become a further sign, and so it may also affect what people expect and do such that their actions can change the situation in which further semiosis takes place. Parker’s account of a world that includes each new sign seems helpful here.
Helmut, I take your question about what happens after an interpretant is formed to concern how interpretation can lead to changes in the world. Shared expectations affect what people do: their actions may change a social situation and that changed situation may give rise to further signs and interpretations. Is that the process you have in mind?
I also understand your hesitancy regarding 'habit'. In ordinary usage it may suggest, for example, a personal routine not reflected on. For Peirce, however, a habit is a disposition to respond in certain ways under certain circumstances. It can be shared, reflected upon, and potentially changed. Your phrase “shared expectations” tends toward that idea, I think.
Finally, I would hesitate to place social structure in 2ns rather than 3ns. Actual encounters, resistances, and changes involve 2ns. Shared expectations, insofar as they guide how people would respond on future occasions, involve 3ns. An interesting question is how those expectations are sustained and changed through actual encounters.
Best,
Gary R.
On Thu, Sep 24, 2026 at 6:17 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote:
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _Helmut, List:As I have said before, it seems to me that an interpreter's expectation is a determination of that individual quasi-mind by previous signs; hence, it indeed pertains to the object of any sign that is currently determining that quasi-mind, not the interpretant of that particular sign. However, according to Peirce ...Therefore, every sign's dynamical object is likewise external to its interpretant, independent of it, and unaffected by it; so, it is not the case that "the interpretant then determines the dynamical object." However, the dynamical object of that interpretant (as another sign) now includes the very sign of which it is the interpretant, and the dynamical object of any subsequent interpretant (as yet another sign) includes that previous interpretant, and so on. Kelly A. Parker summarizes this nicely in his 1992 book, The Continuity of Peirce's Thought.
- Semiosis always and only proceeds in one direction, from the object through the sign toward the interpretant.
- Every sign determines its interpretant to stand in the same triadic relation to its object as that sign itself does.
- By definition, every sign's dynamical object is external to that sign, independent of it, and unaffected by it.
KAP: The dynamical object in each successive representation in the process is necessarily different from that of its predecessor. The dynamical object of the first representation is the real universe at that time, and the immediate object is an abstraction consisting of some aspects of this reality. The next representation, however, cannot have exactly the same dynamical object. The real universe is at that point populated by at least one additional entity--the first representamen itself. Every successive representation in the semeiotic process thus has as its dynamical object not just the universe which the first representamen represented, but that universe plus the first representamen itself. (p. 148)I add my usual disclaimer that whenever we discuss seemingly discrete objects, signs, and interpretants, we are referring to artifacts of analysis that we have prescinded from the real and continuous process of semiosis.Regards,Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAStructural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
On Thu, Sep 24, 2026 at 3:04 AM Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote:Gary, List,I think, you are right. I like yout first mentioned term "shared expectations" better, than "habits of interpretation", though both terms I find correct. But I suspect the term "habit" to have a pseudo-explanatory, and too generalizing, quality, or at least to me it seems so. I admit, that this feeling may be caused by the common-sense understanding of "habit" to be a not reflected piece of personal grounds of behavior.Some weeks before, I have come to my conclusion, that expectations (now I´d say, especially shared ones too) are a part of the dynamical object. So then, in a semiosis, not only the interpretant, and with it the following signs, is affected, influenced, determined, but via the interpretant the dynamical object as well.I now suspect (maybe though due to not enough knowledge of mine), that Perircean semiotics thoroughly analyses the determination path from the object to the sign and then to the interpretant, but not enough what happens afterwards. I guess, the interpretant then determines the dynamical object, or at least its change. The new dynamical object then determines the new sign,So, the interpretant not only is an interpretation, but as well a structure-changing agent. The structure of a semiotic system is situated in the dynamkical objects. So, structure is secondness, and not, as I had thought some time before, thirdness. This I think is in accord with Peirces concept of "Altersense", which, I think, includes memory, and Luhmann, for whom the structure of a social system is the expectations and the expectations of expectations.Best,Helmut
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] .
► <a href=""mailto:[email protected]" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" data-href="mailto:[email protected]">[email protected]">UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to
https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
