My understanding of a boundary object is something that means slightly different but partially overlapping things for different communities and thus can bring groups together but does not truly unite them.
The example I am familiar with is a taxidermic specimen at a museum. For biologists it might be a token exemplar of a species. For museum administrators it might be valuable because of the relative rarity of species and how it aligns with the museum’s mission. In this case it would be sign of reputation or some social/normative value. For taxidermists themselves, the very same specimen might be a sign of specific techniques of animal preservation. I think examples like this bring about a few questions for Peircean semiotics. While colloquially we say it is the same object, is the object of the sign really the same in each of these cases? What is the sign in each of these cases, and does it include what Peirce sometimes terms collateral experience/collateral observation? For example do the different rational communities bring different experiences to bear on the object (based on their training) and form different composite signs (specimen + collateral experience) which form the basis of different interpretants? It seems like each group is picking up on different iconic and indexical qualities that coexist in the same object. Colloquially I would say they form different interpretations of the same thing. The way I would normally talk about it would include how individual acts of deliberation are consciously choosing to focus on different aspects of the object. I am not exactly sure how to square this with a language of interpretants where interpretants are always the product of previous steps in process because it seems like there are interpretative acts being made that single out what qualities in the object are being attended to before the object is even considered as a sign. My hunch would be that, through different training, people habituate their individual minds to form different percepts when in contact with the same object and this becomes the foundation of different perceptual judgements, leading to different chains of semiosis. In this case it’s not that the interpretant formed is reaching back in time and selecting the qualities in the object but rather a long running chain of previous semiosis is already forming different intermediate signs which become the inputs to the different interpretants. On Fri, Sep 25, 2026 at 12:01 pm, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, Helmut, List, > > Jon, your distinction between the *dynamical object of a particular sign* > and the *object of a subsequent sign* helps clarify what I think Helmut > is getting at. The interpretant does not turn back and determine the > dynamical object of the sign that produced it, but it may become a further > sign, and so it may also affect what people expect and do such that their > actions can change the situation in which further semiosis takes place. > Parker’s account of a world that includes each new sign seems helpful here. > > Helmut, I take your question about what happens after an interpretant is > formed to concern how interpretation can lead to changes in the world. > Shared expectations affect what people do: their actions may change a > social situation and that changed situation may give rise to further signs > and interpretations. Is that the process you have in mind? > > I also understand your hesitancy regarding 'habit'. In ordinary usage it > may suggest, for example, a personal routine not reflected on. For Peirce, > however, a habit is a disposition to respond in certain ways under certain > circumstances. It can be shared, reflected upon, and potentially changed. > Your phrase “shared expectations” tends toward that idea, I think. > > Finally, I would hesitate to place social structure in 2ns rather than > 3ns. Actual encounters, resistances, and changes involve 2ns. Shared > expectations, insofar as they guide how people *would* respond on future > occasions, involve 3ns. An interesting question is how those expectations > are sustained and changed through actual encounters. > > Best, > > Gary R. > > On Thu, Sep 24, 2026 at 6:17 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Helmut, List: >> >> As I have said before, it seems to me that an interpreter's expectation is >> a determination of that individual quasi-mind by *previous *signs; >> hence, it indeed pertains to the *object *of any sign that is >> *currently *determining that quasi-mind, not the *interpretant *of that >> particular sign. However, according to Peirce ... >> >> - Semiosis always and only proceeds in one direction, from the object >> through the sign toward the interpretant. >> - Every sign determines its interpretant to stand in the same triadic >> relation to its object as that sign itself does. >> - By definition, every sign's *dynamical *object is external to that >> sign, independent of it, and unaffected by it. >> >> Therefore, every sign's *dynamical *object is likewise external to its >> interpretant, independent of it, and unaffected by it; so, it is *not *the >> case that "the interpretant then determines the dynamical object." >> However, the dynamical object *of that interpretant* (as another sign) >> now includes the very sign of which it is the interpretant, and the >> dynamical object of any subsequent interpretant (as yet another sign) >> includes that previous interpretant, and so on. Kelly A. Parker summarizes >> this nicely in his 1992 book, *The Continuity of Peirce's Thought*. >> >> KAP: The dynamical object in each successive representation in the >> process is necessarily different from that of its predecessor. The >> dynamical object of the first representation is the real universe at that >> time, and the immediate object is an abstraction consisting of some aspects >> of this reality. The next representation, however, *cannot *have exactly >> the same dynamical object. The real universe is at that point populated by >> at least one additional entity--the first representamen itself. Every >> successive representation in the semeiotic process thus has as its >> dynamical object not just the universe which the first representamen >> represented, but that universe *plus *the first representamen itself. >> (p. 148) >> >> >> I add my usual disclaimer that whenever we discuss seemingly discrete >> objects, signs, and interpretants, we are referring to artifacts of >> analysis that we have prescinded from the real and continuous process of >> semiosis. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Thu, Sep 24, 2026 at 3:04 AM Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> Gary, List, >>> >>> I think, you are right. I like yout first mentioned term "shared >>> expectations" better, than "habits of interpretation", though both terms I >>> find correct. But I suspect the term "habit" to have a pseudo-explanatory, >>> and too generalizing, quality, or at least to me it seems so. I admit, that >>> this feeling may be caused by the common-sense understanding of "habit" to >>> be a not reflected piece of personal grounds of behavior. >>> >>> Some weeks before, I have come to my conclusion, that expectations (now >>> I´d say, especially shared ones too) are a part of the dynamical object. So >>> then, in a semiosis, not only the interpretant, and with it the following >>> signs, is affected, influenced, determined, but via the interpretant the >>> dynamical object as well. >>> >>> I now suspect (maybe though due to not enough knowledge of mine), that >>> Perircean semiotics thoroughly analyses the determination path from the >>> object to the sign and then to the interpretant, but not enough what >>> happens afterwards. I guess, the interpretant then determines the dynamical >>> object, or at least its change. The new dynamical object then determines >>> the new sign, >>> >>> So, the interpretant not only is an interpretation, but as well a >>> structure-changing agent. The structure of a semiotic system is situated in >>> the dynamkical objects. So, structure is secondness, and not, as I had >>> thought some time before, thirdness. This I think is in accord with Peirces >>> concept of "Altersense", which, I think, includes memory, and Luhmann, for >>> whom the structure of a social system is the expectations and the >>> expectations of expectations. >>> >>> Best, >>> Helmut >>> >> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . >> ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM >> PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default >> email account, then go to >> https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . >> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; >> and co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
