Helmut, Jon, List, Helmut, I may be misunderstanding you so let me ask first about the distinction you draw between an object changing and a new dynamical object being established. Do you mean that a later sign has a different dynamical object because the situation now includes the earlier sign and whatever followed from it? That is how I understand Jon’s and Kelly Parker’s point. I would not take it to mean that an institution -- or some other social reality --cannot gradually change.
I’m also interested in your account of a common object becoming a boundary object as an antagonistic group forms. Could you give us an example of the object and the groups involved? I had understood a boundary object as allowing groups with different practices to work with something they recognize in common. Must those groups first have formed an undivided society, or do their differences *become* antagonistic? Perhaps an example would help us distinguish three things that may be running together here: 1. changes in the social object, 2. changes in what different groups take it to mean, and 3. the changing dynamical objects of successive signs. I'd imagine that your thought about how division alters shared expectations concerns all three, but I’m not yet sure how you see them related. Best, Gary R On Fri, Sep 25, 2026 at 5:55 AM Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, Gary, List, > > so, not the dynamical object is changed, but a new DO is esteblished, > according to Peirce. This new DO though resembles the former one, but to > say, that an object is affected or changed, is not the Peircean way of > saying it. > > But in a non-Peircean way, e.g in the boundary-object-theory alone, one > might say so about the BO (by not calling it "DO"). A translation would > always be necessary then. The term "object" is itself a BO. > > Now I want to mitigate my term "dismantle and destruct a BO": First in > non-Peircean terms: If there was an absolutely undivided society, there > would not be BOs, but only common objects (COs). If then an antagonistic > subsystem forms itself, it makes COs turn into BOs. These BOs have both a > common quality, and a divided quality. The stronger the division of society > becomes, the stronger gets the division-quality of the BO, and the weaker > the common quality, and the clearer becomes the boundary, the border around > the antagonistic subsystem. Therewith, the subsystem becomes stronger, even > more a system. > > In Peircean terms it is different, there is no graduality and no change in > objects. Instead of a metamorphosis, they undergo a rebirth. But the effect > is the same. > > Best, > Helmut > 25. September 2026 um 05:00 > "Gary Richmond" <[email protected]> > *wrote:* > Jon, Helmut, List, > > Jon, your distinction between the *dynamical object of a particular sign* > and the *object of a subsequent sign* helps clarify what I think Helmut > is getting at. The interpretant does not turn back and determine the > dynamical object of the sign that produced it, but it may become a further > sign, and so it may also affect what people expect and do such that their > actions can change the situation in which further semiosis takes place. > Parker’s account of a world that includes each new sign seems helpful here. > > Helmut, I take your question about what happens after an interpretant is > formed to concern how interpretation can lead to changes in the world. > Shared expectations affect what people do: their actions may change a > social situation and that changed situation may give rise to further signs > and interpretations. Is that the process you have in mind? > > I also understand your hesitancy regarding 'habit'. In ordinary usage it > may suggest, for example, a personal routine not reflected on. For Peirce, > however, a habit is a disposition to respond in certain ways under certain > circumstances. It can be shared, reflected upon, and potentially changed. > Your phrase “shared expectations” tends toward that idea, I think. > > Finally, I would hesitate to place social structure in 2ns rather than > 3ns. Actual encounters, resistances, and changes involve 2ns. Shared > expectations, insofar as they guide how people *would* respond on future > occasions, involve 3ns. An interesting question is how those expectations > are sustained and changed through actual encounters. > > Best, > > Gary R. > > On Thu, Sep 24, 2026 at 6:17 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Helmut, List: > > As I have said before, it seems to me that an interpreter's expectation is > a determination of that individual quasi-mind by *previous *signs; hence, > it indeed pertains to the *object *of any sign that is *currently *determining > that quasi-mind, not the *interpretant *of that particular sign. However, > according to Peirce ... > > - Semiosis always and only proceeds in one direction, from the object > through the sign toward the interpretant. > - Every sign determines its interpretant to stand in the same triadic > relation to its object as that sign itself does. > - By definition, every sign's *dynamical *object is external to that > sign, independent of it, and unaffected by it. > > Therefore, every sign's *dynamical *object is likewise external to its > interpretant, independent of it, and unaffected by it; so, it is *not *the > case that "the interpretant then determines the dynamical object." > However, the dynamical object *of that interpretant* (as another sign) > now includes the very sign of which it is the interpretant, and the > dynamical object of any subsequent interpretant (as yet another sign) > includes that previous interpretant, and so on. Kelly A. Parker summarizes > this nicely in his 1992 book, *The Continuity of Peirce's Thought*. > > KAP: The dynamical object in each successive representation in the process > is necessarily different from that of its predecessor. The dynamical object > of the first representation is the real universe at that time, and the > immediate object is an abstraction consisting of some aspects of this > reality. The next representation, however, *cannot *have exactly the same > dynamical object. The real universe is at that point populated by at least > one additional entity--the first representamen itself. Every successive > representation in the semeiotic process thus has as its dynamical object > not just the universe which the first representamen represented, but that > universe *plus *the first representamen itself. (p. 148) > > > I add my usual disclaimer that whenever we discuss seemingly discrete > objects, signs, and interpretants, we are referring to artifacts of > analysis that we have prescinded from the real and continuous process of > semiosis. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Thu, Sep 24, 2026 at 3:04 AM Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Gary, List, > > I think, you are right. I like yout first mentioned term "shared > expectations" better, than "habits of interpretation", though both terms I > find correct. But I suspect the term "habit" to have a pseudo-explanatory, > and too generalizing, quality, or at least to me it seems so. I admit, that > this feeling may be caused by the common-sense understanding of "habit" to > be a not reflected piece of personal grounds of behavior. > > Some weeks before, I have come to my conclusion, that expectations (now > I´d say, especially shared ones too) are a part of the dynamical object. So > then, in a semiosis, not only the interpretant, and with it the following > signs, is affected, influenced, determined, but via the interpretant the > dynamical object as well. > > I now suspect (maybe though due to not enough knowledge of mine), that > Perircean semiotics thoroughly analyses the determination path from the > object to the sign and then to the interpretant, but not enough what > happens afterwards. I guess, the interpretant then determines the dynamical > object, or at least its change. The new dynamical object then determines > the new sign, > > So, the interpretant not only is an interpretation, but as well a > structure-changing agent. The structure of a semiotic system is situated in > the dynamkical objects. So, structure is secondness, and not, as I had > thought some time before, thirdness. This I think is in accord with Peirces > concept of "Altersense", which, I think, includes memory, and Luhmann, for > whom the structure of a social system is the expectations and the > expectations of expectations. > > Best, > Helmut > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]">UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or > "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go > to [email protected] . ► UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L > <[email protected]> . But, if your subscribed email account is > not your default email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE > PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben > Udell. > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]">UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]">UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
